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Our mandate was to consider the economic feasibility and possible impact of a
free trade agreement between the European Union and Georgia. The study has been
conducted by a group of researchers from Poland, Ukraine, UK, US and Georgia.
All have worked on this project in an independent capacity. The European
Commission has also commissioned a similar study for Armenia. Even though the
methodology of the two reports is the same, the two studies are independent and
the economic feasibility and impact of a free trade agreement with each country is
assessed on its own merits.
Defining the FTA scenarios
Throughout the report we look at different degrees of integration between
Georgia and the EU. We start with two variants of a simple free trade agreement
(FTA) assuming the elimination of tariffs and quantitative restrictions in the
bilateral trade between Georgia and the EU. The first Simple FTA scenario assumes
full liberalization of trade in industrial products and halving of tariffs and
elimination of all quantitative restrictions on agricultural and food products on
Georgian exports to the EU and vice versa. The second Simple FTA BIS scenario
assumes full elimination of tariffs and quantitative restrictions on all products in
the bilateral trade between Georgia and the EU. Further, we look at three Deep
FTAs. The Deep FTAs assume various degrees of changes in the domestic policy and
business environment affecting trade and investment in Georgia. An FTA+
combines a Simple FTA with a consolidation of the domestic reforms that took
place over the recent years in a binding agreement. The FTA+ could consolidate
measures such as unilateral recognition of EU and international product standards
and facilitation of customs procedures. Furthering the level of integration via a
Deep FTA would involve a more complete elimination of barriers to trade and
investment throughout various sectors of the economy. This would also result in a
more extensive commitment to the reform of domestic policies in the direction of
EU standards in Georgia. Finally, the comprehensive set of reforms resulting from
the Deep FTA along with more wide-ranging flanking measures e.g. on competition
and corruption could lead to a re-branding of Georgia as a favourable investment
location. This is our scenario Deep FTA+ where we assume that Georgia would
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Executive Summary
achieve a notable reduction in the perceived risk premium on investment, reflecting
a sustained re-branding of Georgia as a favorable and safe place to invest. 
Economic context
Georgia is currently enjoying very rapid GDP growth, notwithstanding the very
serious economic sanctions imposed on it by Russia since 2006. This rapid growth
is expected to continue with only a slight deceleration over the next two to three
years. FDI has been growing, but the long term prospects for further FDI inflows
are not certain. Georgia has pursued a very liberal policy, especially when it comes
to trade and has been largely successful in eliminating petty corruption. However,
some serious problems remain with the implementation of law.
Regional FTAs
Georgia has free trade agreements with the CIS countries and has recently
signed an FTA with Turkey. The Georgia-Russia FTA is dysfunctional. Since the end
of 2006 Russia has closed its land frontier and civil aviation connections with
Georgia, and banned the import of wines and agricultural produce1. Georgia has
already acted radically by introducing zero tariffs unilaterally for almost all
industrial products and action to de-corrupt the customs services. In view of its
location and economic strategy Georgia also has a major interest in possible
regional multilateral free trade initiatives in the wider Black Sea region, whereas a
regional FTA limited to only the South Caucasus would be of little interest.  
Impact of the EU-Georgia FTA – Sussex Framework
Georgia has fully liberalized trade on its side for non-agricultural products (with
very minor exceptions) and significantly also for agricultural goods as a result of
the 2006 tariff reductions. Georgian products benefit from the GSP status in the
markets of the EU, the USA, Canada, Switzerland, Japan, and Turkey. Under the
EU’s GSP, Georgia has qualified for the special arrangement for sustainable
development and good governance (GSP+) offering it a particularly advantageous
access to the EU market. Given that trade between the EU and Georgia is almost
tariff free, there is little scope for significant shallow integration induced welfare
effects. Distortions in trade are possibly created by non-tariff barriers
(infrastructure, regulatory and institutional) and thus cooperation between Georgia
and the EU on their reduction should be welfare increasing. Any significant welfare
gains therefore are expected to come from political and economic stability of the
region and in particular from deeper integration with the EU. 
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1 Very recent information suggests that Russia now intends to relax these sanctions. 
Institutional and regulatory harmonization
Georgia has made a certain progress in regulatory harmonization with the EU
over a short time period. In many areas, Georgian legislation is already rather close
to that of the EU. The most important issues that arise now are in the
implementation of the adopted legislation. Georgia still lags behind in
implementing its obligations under the ENP Action Plan, especially in areas of
competition policy, IPRs, product standards, and food safety. 
In a Deep FTA, flanking measures will probably go along the path outlined in
the PCA and ENP Action Plan. As recent experience shows, laws on the books and
obligation under the PCA and ENP Action Plan did not stop Georgia from
effectively scrapping the enforcement of SPS measures and product standards for
domestic producers until the time when the markets demonstrate the need for such
institutions and export capacity develop. Therefore, implementation of the flanking
measures would be conditional on the position of the Georgian Government as
regards desirable degree of approximation to EU aquis as well as ability to
implement in practice adopted laws and regulations.
Survey of non-tariff barriers (NTBs)
The survey results indicate that the Georgian firms do not feel much burden
resulting from NTBs in European markets. This perception is partially explained by
the nature of Georgian exports to the EU which include mostly mineral and raw
materials that satisfy EU regulations with little difficulty. There are just two
agricultural products exported to the EU – wine and hazelnuts, which have special
(and rather easy to comply with) arrangements for SPS conformity certification. In
addition manufactured products are often produced under special arrangements
similar to the outward processing scheme. Under such arrangements, the Georgian
firms provide production services rather than the finished product. The European
partners take care of the most of the logistical issues and requirement certifications.
Hence, Georgian counterparts are not even familiar with full costs involved in
exporting to the EU. The average Georgian company does not export to the EU,
mainly because it cannot offer an attractive product meeting quality and safety
standards of the European market, but those that do export show signs of entering
into production chains.  
Services sectors
Tourism: This is an area of great natural advantage for Georgia. The main issue
facing the Georgian tourist industry is the development of the related services
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needed to exploit the full tourist potential of the country. Foreign direct investment
and government financed investment in tourism has been growing rapidly in
Georgia over the last few years. Despite these investments Georgia still does not
have facilities capable of hosting large conferences, congresses or exhibitions.
However a national programme for marketing tourism was adopted in 2008.
Information and Communication Technology
This is a uniquely important sector, because it provides a whole range of
essentially technological services, which can be used to upgrade production and
management systems in virtually every sector of the economy. There are significant
problems of excessive market power in both fixed and mobile telephony markets in
Georgia. Local institutions are not powerless in the face of these problems, but
comprehensive liberalization of the telecoms market will require significant
strengthening of competition policy and this could form part of a Deep FTA+.
Construction and Engineering services
Georgia does not export construction services. But she does export aircraft
maintenance services. She does so, however, only to Turkmenistan, in payment of
an old debt relating to gas supplies. When that debt is paid off, the provision of
these services to Turkmenistan will probably cease. The circumstances here are,
therefore, very specific, and the impact of any possible FTA is probably negligible.
Financial Services and Banking
The banking sector is largely liberalized and is now about 50% foreign-owned.
Under the WTO agreements the Georgian insurance sector remains subject to some
restrictions, mainly in relation to presence of natural persons, but these do not
appear to be onerous. EU-owned subsidiaries are already obliged to fulfil EU
financial market regulations (including home country regulatory control), so there
is an automatic degree of acquis compliance coming with increased FDI in this
sector. This would be systematised under a Deep FTA+.
Energy-related services
Under Georgia’s WTO accession agreement energy-related services are largely
liberalized, and the electricity industry is mainly privately owned, apart from high-
voltage transmission lines. There are possibilities for Georgia to become an energy-
exporting country, in addition to its newly enhanced role as a transiting country.
But this would require much better regional cooperation at the political level. In
principle, a Deep FTA+ between Georgia and the EU would buttress regional
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energy cooperation, especially if it were flanked by similar agreements with
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia. 
Implications of an FTA for FDI flows
Up to 2006 FDI inflows to Georgia had been totalling below USD 0.5 billion a
year. At the moment, foreign direct investors into Georgia seem to be primarily
resource and market driven. The most plausible new sectors for increased FDI are
in the service sectors, both for business services if Georgia becomes a regional
transport and commercial hub and for tourism. Already the major unilateral
liberalisation of the service sectors as well as for trade in goods is helping here.
Potential inward FDI to Georgia following a Deep FTA+ with the EU could be
substantially higher than the current flows. Simulations suggest that the FDI stock
in Georgia might achieve a five-fold increase by 2020. However, this assumes that
Georgia makes further progress in its transition reforms.
Sectors of importance
Agro-food sector
A Simple FTA/Simple FTA BIS with the EU would not have a large effect on the
agro-food sector, because the EU import tariffs are not the main hampering factor.
This is notably true for Georgian wine exports to the EU market, where the building
of favourable brand recognition of Georgian wines calls for modern production
technologies and marketing skills, by comparison with its traditional markets
mainly in the CIS. In most other agri-food branches it would be vital for Georgia to
implement EU regulations and quality standards, which would be an objective for
a Deep FTA.
Energy
It cannot be expected that a Simple FTA would stimulate in the short run any
further improvement in the functioning of this sector. A Deep FTA+ could have, at
least in the medium term, a potential for bringing a more significant change to the
sector, assuming it would entail changes in the legal and regulatory framework and
particularly in its implementation. In general, the Georgian energy sector depends
primarily on strategic pipeline decisions, and not on an FTA. An exception may be
the hydropower sector.
CGE Model and Simulations
A range of scenarios has been simulated, starting with the effects of
liberalisation measures adopted by respectively Georgia (unilateral significant tariff
liberalisation of trade in goods along with the recognition of foreign product
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standards) and the EU (granting Georgia GSP+ under its new GSP scheme) in
2006 (baseline scenario), which could boost the GDP growth in Georgia by 1%. The
Simple FTA and Simple FTA BIS scenarios would not add much to this, since
essentially only the remaining agro-food tariffs would be reduced or dismantled.
However this simulation ignores possible confidence and synergy effects that could
come from the binding in of the multiple liberalization and reform measures that
Georgia has made in the recent past. These confidence effects can be modeled as
reductions in the perceived risk premium attached to investment in Georgia, which
could lead to additional welfare gains of 2.4% of GDP in the scenario FTA+.
Additional gains of 1.7% of GDP could be reaped from a Deep FTA that would lock
in further domestic policy changes such as conformity with EU regulatory
standards, improvement in customs procedures and further facilitation of FDI in
service sectors. If as a result of a Deep FTA and further flanking measures such as
on competition and corruption Georgia achieved a notable reduction in the
perceived risk premium on investment, reflecting a sustained re-branding of
Georgia as a favorable and safe place to invest, the total gains on the top of the ones
achieved out of the 2006 liberalisation might reach around 6.5% of GDP – scenario
Deep FTA+.
Policy recommendations
Overall we conclude that a free trade agreement between Georgia and the EU is
feasible, since Georgia has already taken liberalising measures going considerably
beyond a classic Simple FTA and on the other hand Georgia benefits from the EU
GSP+. We analyze the range of scenarios for deep integration that show the
benefits of the various degrees of integration. The final degree of deep integration
would be a result of negotiations between Georgia and the EU and is not up to us
to anticipate. The greatest benefits would accrue with a Deep FTA+ involving a
significant approximation of law along the priorities of the ENP Action Plan for
Georgia along with additional flanking measures on e.g. competition and
corruption and their effective implementation, which would mean a re-branding of
Georgia as a safe and attractive investment location. At the same time, given the
current progress with the implementation of the ENP Action Plan, serious
questions remain as to both the willingness and institutional capacity of Georgia to
undertake further commitments in the regulatory area. We note that the human
resources of the Government bodies are uneven in terms of education,
qualifications, and international experience. However, this situation could be eased
with technical assistance. 
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The aim of this study is to evaluate the economic feasibility and implications of
a free trade agreement between the EU and Georgia as well as of greater regional
integration between Georgia, Armenia and the Black Sea countries. The study uses
a mix of qualitative and quantitative analysis along with surveys, sectoral studies
and local expert knowledge. This approach will allow the policy maker not to rely
on any single methodology while providing an interrelated analysis of various
aspects of free trade agreements (FTAs). 
The study begins with an account of the status quo reporting on key features of
the Georgian economy and most recent trade and economic developments,
including a brief overview of EU-Georgia trade and economic relations (chapter 2).
Both chapter 3 and chapter 4 include the analysis of trade relations with the EU
and the remaining Georgia trade partners in greater detail. In chapter 3 we study
the options for future FTAs between Georgia and its neighbours. This is followed by
the diagnostic analysis based on various trade and economic indicators (Sussex
Framework) used to provide an insight into the trade and welfare implications of
greater integration with the EU and within the region (chapter 4). 
Throughout the report we look at different degrees of integration between
Georgia and the EU. We start with two variants of a simple free trade agreement
(FTA) assuming the elimination of tariffs and quantitative restrictions in the
bilateral trade between Georgia and the EU. The first Simple FTA scenario assumes
full liberalization of trade in industrial products and halving of tariffs and
elimination of all quantitative restrictions on agricultural and food products on
Georgian exports to the EU and vice versa. The second Simple FTA BIS scenario
assumes full elimination of tariffs and quantitative restrictions on all products in
the bilateral trade between Georgia and the EU. Further, we look at three Deep
21
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1. Introduction
FTAs. The Deep FTAs assume various degrees of changes in the domestic policy and
business environment affecting trade and investment in Georgia. An FTA+
combines a Simple FTA with a consolidation of the domestic reforms that took
place over the recent years in a binding agreement. The FTA+ could consolidate
measures such as unilateral recognition of EU and international product standards
and facilitation of customs procedures. Furthering the level of integration via a
Deep FTA would involve a more complete elimination of barriers to trade and
investment throughout various sectors of the economy. This would also result in a
more extensive commitment to the reform of domestic policies in the direction of
EU standards in Georgia. Finally, the comprehensive set of reforms resulting from
the Deep FTA along with more wide-ranging flanking measures e.g. on competition
and corruption could lead to a re-branding of Georgia as a favourable investment
location. This is our scenario Deep FTA+ where we assume that Georgia would
achieve a notable reduction in the perceived risk premium on investment, reflecting
a sustained re-branding of Georgia as a favorable and safe place to invest. 
As is becoming increasingly recognized there are potentially substantial gains to
be realized in regional trading arrangements to the extent that these include
elements of deep integration, as opposed to allowing only for shallow integration.
The extent to which successful deep integration can be achieved will depend on the
nature of existing non-tariff barriers which may be in place, and on the scope for
institutional and regulatory harmonization between the partner countries. Chapter
5 provides a detailed discussion of the institutional and regulatory harmonization
issues between the EU and Georgia. Changes in laws however do not immediately
translate into lowering of NTBs. The next chapter provides some more empirical
evidence of the status of the NTBs based on the survey conducted for the purpose
of this study in the late 2007. 
One of the key factors in further economic expansion of Georgia is the
development of competitive economy with strong service sectors. This cannot be
achieved without foreign direct investment. It is also expected that harmonization
of legislation, improved access to the EU market and reforms leading to improved
business environment following a conclusion of an FTA will act as strong incentives
for further flows of FDI. Here again, as in the case of NTBs, we apply both
qualitative and quantitative analysis. In chapter 7 we discuss the regulatory
barriers and practice with respect to establishment and cross-border issues
affecting trade and investment in a number of key service sectors. Then we turn our
focus to FDI and the likely benefits resulting from further integration with the EU
and the neighbouring countries. We employ a gravity model to evaluate the likely
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impact of an FTA. 
Finally, the CGE analysis brings together the elements discussed in previous
sections. We study the economic impact of elimination of tariffs, non-tariff barriers
in trade between the EU and Georgia and an improved access to the Georgian
market for foreign providers of services. We also study the impact of a potential
lowering of the risk to invest in Georgia believing that signing a Deep FTA+ with
the EU could serve as a positive signal to investors that Georgia’s economic reforms
are irreversible and that further improvements in business environment are to
follow.
Last chapter is devoted to diagnostic analysis of the implications of FTA for
further expansion of trade and investment in sectors key to the Georgian economy.
We focus on agro-food sector and energy. Finally, the last section provides some
policy recommendations regarding an EU-Georgia FTA. 
The translation of the final report into Georgian is foreseen and will be
completed within a month after the acceptance of the final text by the Commission.
Along with this report, the Commission ordered a similar report for Armenia.
Although the structure of the two reports is very similar and methodology applied
in various chapters in the case of both countries is the same, this is where the
similarities end. Both reports are independent and the impact of an FTA for each
country is being judged at its own merits.
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Georgia is a small country with a level of GDP per head that is low by European
standards, and comparable to that of Bulgaria. It is currently enjoying very rapid
GDP growth, after the collapse in GDP experienced in the early years of transition,
and this rapid growth is expected to continue with only a slight deceleration over
the next two-three years. Inflation is on the high side, and the IMF warned of the
dangers of overheating at the end of 2007. But inflation is forecast to fall slightly
over the next few years. This in turn reflects the likely evolution of the fiscal
situation. The budget deficit is expected to fall steadily from 2.8% of GDP in 2006
to under 2% of GDP in 2009.  
The pattern of economic growth in Georgia
As Table 2.2 shows, the Georgian economy has grown rapidly since the early
2000s, with the growth rate of GDP peaking in 2007. It is now expected to ease back
to a still impressive rate of around 7% through the period 2008-2010.
In sectoral terms the initial Georgian recovery was bolstered by very high rates
of growth of construction in the period 2002-4, possibly related to the building of
pipelines. In more recent years, however, industry is the sector that has most visibly
driven growth. Agricultural output is extremely volatile, and shows no clear
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2. The most recent trade and
economic developments in Georgia
Table 2.1. Key macro indicators
 2005 2006 2007 (est.) 
GDP (US$bn) 6.4 7.7 8.8 
Real GDP growth (%) 9.6 9.4 12-13 
Inflation (ave.; %) 8.2 9.2 8.0 
Population (m) 4.5 4.5 4.4 
GDP per head (US$) 1,422 1,711 2,000 
Consolidated fiscal deficit (% of GDP) -2.4 -2.8 -2.3 
upward trend. In terms of the main elements of GDP, consumption has been an
unusually large proportion of GDP throughout the early years of the century, and
the proportion has tended to increase, by 2007, indeed, tending to 100% (see Table
2.3). Investment has been steady at around 27-28% of GDP. The circle has been
squared through large-scale inflow of foreign funds, inflow which has tended to
increase, and which averaged nearly 25% 2006-2007. Over that period foreign
inflow represented nearly 90% of investment in Georgia. This is hardly a
sustainable pattern, and it suggests that any policy to reduce the current
overheating in the economy will have to include measures to cut consumption as a
proportion of GDP.
Prospects for domestic macroeconomic balance
As Table 2.4 demonstrates, there is a high degree of consensus about medium-term
macroeconomic trends in Georgia. There is a degree of variation between the Georgian
government, the IMF and the EIU on likely trends in the budget deficit, with the last
standing out as the least optimistic. Interestingly, however, these differences do not
translate into corresponding differences in forecasts for inflation, which are strikingly
consistent between the different sources. While the short-term issue of overheating is a
real one, there is little danger of the Georgian authorities losing control over the
macroeconomic balance in the medium-to-long term. 
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Source: GEPLAC, Georgian Economic Trends, October 2007; IMF, Georgia: Sixth Review under the Three-
Year Arrangement under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, August 2007
+Estimate
*Forecast
#First six months
Table 2.2 Annual growth rates of GDP and main production sectors, actual and forecast
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008* 2009* 2010* 
GDP 1.8 4.8 5.5 11.1 5.9 9.6 9.4 12-13+ 7.5 7.0 6.5 
Industrial 
 output 
3.2 -2.5 8.4 7.7  4.1 11.5 15.9 12.6# - - - 
Agricultural 
 output 
-12.0 8.2 -1.4 10.3 -7.9 12.0 -9.6 -0.3# - - - 
Construction 4.0 10.3 43.1 46.6 35.9 14.1 9.8 9.6# - - - 
Source: GEPLAC, Georgian Economic Trends, October 2007
* First six months
Table 2.3. Main macroeconomic elements as a %age of GDP
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007* 
Consumption 88.2 86.8 81.4 86.8 83.7 93.8 95.6 
Investment 28.3 25.5 27.7 28.3 28.6 26.7 27.6 
Net exports -14.4 -13.2 -14.6 -16.6 -17.8 -24.2 -24.0 
Employment
Unemployment has remained stubbornly high through the early years of the
century in Georgia, with a tendency to increase that has become more accentuated
in recent years. Detailed sectoral employment figures are not available, but
employment in agriculture accounts for around two-thirds of total employment.
This clearly reflects underemployment on a massive scale. So the overall scope for
increasing aggregate productivity through redeployment of labour is enormous in
Georgia. Any shifts of employment between sectors might impose transitional
adjustment costs due to lack of skills or inadequate social protection of some
individuals. However, in the long run expansion of the economy associated with
any FTA could clearly facilitate the processes of redeployment of labour and
increasing aggregate productivity.
Georgia’s external balance
Two of the dominant features of the Georgian economy are the balance of trade
deficit, equivalent to around 30% of GDP in the first quarter of 2007, and the
current account deficit, which came to around 19% of GDP for the same period.
Remittances are an important form of hard-currency inflow, but they have never
been sufficient to cover the trade deficit. The services and income balances are both
positive, but the numbers are small, and their impact on the overall current account
balance is marginal. The biggest single counterweight to the current account deficit
in recent years has been FDI. But short-term financial inflows do appear to be
becoming more important. At present, Georgia’s trade deficit is essentially driven
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Source: Government of Georgia, Basic Data and Directions for 2007-2010; IMF, Georgia: Sixth Review
under the Three-Year Arrangement under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, August 2007; EIU
Country Reports
Table 2.4. Alternative forecasts of key macroeconomic variables
 2008 2009 2010 
 Official IMF EIU Official IMF EIU Official IMF EIU 
Inflation (ave.;%) 5.0 6.9 6.5 5.0 5.0 6.0 5.0 5.0 - 
Consolidated fiscal  
deficit (% of GDP) 
-0.8 -0.5 -2.0 -0.5 -1.0 -1.8 -0.4 -1.4 - 
Source: GEPLAC, Georgian Economic Trends, October 2007
*First six months
Table 2.5. Unemployment rate (%), ILO definition
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007* 
10.3 11.1 12.6 11.5 12.6 13.8 13.6 15.1 
by remittances and FDI, and this is reflected in trends in exchange rates (Table 2
7). Thus the lari has shown a marked tendency to appreciate against the dollar over
the last year or so, while remaining fairly stable against the euro. With Georgia’s
relatively high rate of inflation, that has meant a strong tendency to appreciation of
the lari in real terms. But the tendency to lari appreciation did show definite signs
of easing in mid-2007.
FDI inflows into Georgia remain buoyant for the time being. But they have
historically been very dependent on pipeline projects, which are by their nature
lumpy, and therefore volatile. The figures for the first quarter of 2007 suggest that
FDI inflow is now diversifying, after the completion of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline.
There may in any case now be a new spurt in pipeline FDI, with the agreement on
the Supsa-Odessa pipeline. But if FDI does fall away, we may see a further upward
trend in short-term financial inflows, with the trade deficit increasingly driving the
capital account. That could in turn trigger an international payments crisis, and a
collapse in the value of the lari. More likely, it will simply produce a trend to
marginal depreciation (at least in nominal terms) in the lari.
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Table 2.6. The balance of payments (US$ m)
 Jan-March 2006 Jan-March 2007 
Exports 377 390 
Imports -726 -988 
Trade balance -349 -598 
Services balance 36 40 
Income balance 22 39 
Current transfers (remittances) 
balance 
96 134 
Current account balance -194 -386 
FDI (net) 146 287 
Capital and financial account 
balance 
212 418 
Source: EIU
Table 2 7  Lari:US$ exchange rates (end-period)
 Jan  
2005 
Jan  
2006 
Jan  
2007 
Feb  
2007 
Mar  
2007 
April 
2007 
May 
2007 
June 
 2007 
July  
2007 
Aug  
2007 
Exchange rate  1,820 1.813 1.720 1.713 1.700 1.690 1.678 1.670 1.668 1.663 
Year-on-year  
 % change 
16.7 0.8 5.1 5.9 7.2 7.5 7.3 6.5 6.1 5.4 
The pattern of foreign trade
Georgia’s main export lines are ferrous and non-ferrous metals, chemicals and,
in recent years cement. Car exports have gone up in recent years, but these are in
fact re-exports. On the import side, oil, gas and motor cars are predictably
prominent, with electronic and computer equipment, pharmaceuticals and wheat
also important. But the most striking feature on both export and import sides is the
predominance of unspecified ‘other’ commodity flows. Many of these are probably
foodstuffs or simple manufactures. In some cases they may represent a potential for
the development of intra-industry trade, such as would be facilitated by a free trade
agreement. These issues are analysed in greater detail in chapter 4.
Georgia’s trade and economic relations with the EU
Georgia has been a WTO member since 2000. The EU-Georgia bilateral trade
and economic relations are provided for by the EU-Georgia Partnership and
Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in force since July 1999. The PCA confirms most-
favoured nation (MFN) treatment with respect to tariffs and quantitative
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Source: GEPLAC, Georgian Economic Trends, October 2007
*First six months
Table 2.8. Foreign trade by main type of commodity (US$ m)
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007* 
Total exports 322.7 317.6 345.9 461.4 646.5 866.2 992.6 548.6 
Ferrous metals 13.6 17.6 15.5 26.1 42.5 80.2 89.8 52.0 
Scrap iron 39.0 33.1 36.5 60.1 95.9 84.2 72.4 51.0 
Copper 9.8 9.6 13.2 23.4 31.8 36.4 79.5 45.0 
Motor cars 0.3 0.5 0.6 1.1 3.8 17.9 50.6 33.1 
Cement 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.2 4.7 17.7 28.8 26.7 
Chemicals 16.2 4.9 12.0 18.4 28.8 35.8 46.6 28.8 
Gold 0.0 12.5 28.6 20.3 18.8 34.7 49.4 23.9 
Other 243.3 238.9 239.5 311.8 420.6 559.3 575.5 288.1 
Total imports 709.4 753.2 795.5 1141.2 1847.9 2490.9 3681.2 2229.4 
Oil and 
oil products 
71.8 87.7 88.8 104.8 186.2 336.3 443.1 228.2 
Motor cars 15.5 13.1 21.9 46.5 116.3 178.5 295.3 167.6 
Gas 50.3 48.8 52.4 66.0 80.1 90.8 213.1 177.3 
Pharmaceuticals 45.8 53.6 62.0 62.9 78.0 92.5 114.5 68.9 
Electronic  
equipment 
17.0 9.0 17.3 14.7 16.2 27.1 58.7 43.7 
Wheat 29.2 14.4 20.1 28.0 75.0 45.1 99.1 53.3 
Computers 
and computer 
 equipment 
1.3 2.2 5.0 12.3 15.7 22.4 46.4 34.2 
Other 478.5 524.4 528.0 806.0 1280.4 1698.2 2411.0 1456.2 
restrictions are prohibited in the bilateral trade. The PCA envisages progressive
regulatory approximation of Georgia’s legislation and practises to the most
important EU trade related regulatory acquis, which should lead to a better access
of Georgian products to the EU markets. The above regulatory aspect is further
emphasized and developed in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) Action
Plan for Georgia adopted in November 2006 (together with similar Action Plans for
the two other South Caucasus countries Armenia and Azerbaijan). In accordance
with a specific ENP Action Plan’s provision, the EU and Georgia are currently
negotiating a bilateral agreement on the protection of geographical indications for
wines, spirits and other agricultural products and foodstuff. Under the current EU
Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) scheme in force from January 2006 until
December 2008, Georgia has qualified for the enhanced preferences for sustainable
development and good governance (so-called GSP+) offering it a very
advantageous access to the EU market (only 14 other countries have qualified for
these enhanced preferences), and wishes to continue benefiting from the GSP+ also
under the new GSP Regulation in force as from 2009. Georgia makes an overall
good use of GSP (utilisation rate of 77% in 2006), but there is still room for
improvement, notably in the textiles sector where Georgia seems not to use the GSP
preferences at all (zero utilisation rate).
As Table 2.9. below shows, the EU share in total Georgian exports has generally
been in the range of one-fourth to one-fifth, with a weak upward trend. Copper
accounts for around 40% of Georgian exports to the EU and mineral waters for
about 15%.  
The EU generally accounts for about 30% of total Georgian imports, though the
figure was higher in the period 2003-4. Oil and oil products and motor cars
between them account for some 25% of total Georgian imports. But, as for
Georgian imports as a whole, a very large proportion of Georgian imports from the
EU are in the miscellaneous category. In most recent years the EU has accounted
for around one-third of total FDI inflow. In a few individual years, however, the
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Source: GEPLAC, Georgian Economic Trends, October 2007
*First six months
Table 2.9. EU-Georgia economic relations: key indicators (%)
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007* 
EU share in total  
exports 
23.7 19.4 18.3 17.7 19.8 25.0 25.9 23.1 
EU share in total  
Imports 
26.5 32.0 29.2 37.8 35.6 29.7 30.1 30.3 
EU share in total  
FDI inflow 
30.0 63.4 34.9 28.2 39.2 54.2 34.2 47.6 
figure has gone up to 50% and above. The next two chapters analyse Georgian trade
relations and trade patterns with the EU and its neighbours in greater detail.
Key features of the political economy of Georgia
Under President Saakashvili Georgia has undoubtedly pursued a genuinely
liberal policy in the economic sphere, in particular in relation to foreign trade,
where import duties have been reduced to zero for all non-agricultural products
with a very few exceptions. Partly as a result of this, genuine progress has been
made to reduce corruption. Oligopoly is a problem, which the weak competition
authority is hardly up to addressing. With all this economic and political liberalism,
however, there is an element of political arbitrariness in the Georgian political
economy. Stories of high-profile evictions abounded in 2007. In July, a number of
families were evicted from a building in the centre of Tbilisi, allegedly on the
grounds that it had been erected illegally in the Shevardnadze period. Soon after
that, the Georgian Union of Writers was evicted from a building which, it claimed,
it had owned for over a hundred years. Several newspapers which were tenants of
the Union in the same building were evicted at the same time. And Sony was evicted
from its main retail outlet in Tbilisi, although the Japanese company claimed that
it had a lease on the premises for the period up to 2010.  
The legal details of the individual eviction cases hardly matter for the purposes
of the present study. What matters is the principle of level playing fields. It is hardly
necessary to underline the damage that can be done to investment flows by treating
leading multinationals like Sony in this way, and to the business environment as it
affects foreign and local companies alike.  If FTAs mean level playing fields, and if
level playing fields mean due and transparent legal process, then Georgia still has
some work to do in terms of Priorities 1 and 2 of the EU/Georgia Action Plan (rule
of law and business environment).
The proposed Poti free economic zone
The Ministry of Economic Development has offered a 49-year lease on the port
of Poti to anyone who is prepared to develop it as a free economic zone. Rakeen
Development and Dubai World, both from the UAE, are reported to be interested.
The proposal goes against the EU Code of Conduct for Business Taxation, which
posits that ‘tax measures which provide for a significantly lower effective level of
taxation, including zero taxation, than those levels which generally apply in the
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Member State in question are to be regarded as potentially harmful and therefore
covered by this code.1 The IMF has publicly criticised the move on the grounds that
any special tax breaks for companies operating in the zone will disrupt the level
playing field. Indeed, given the strength of the liberal tenor of Georgian economic
policy in general, one may wonder what the rationale in creating a FEZ is. It would
certainly create problems for an FTA, even a Simple one.
The problem of agriculture
As many as 60-70% of the population of Georgia depend on agriculture for their
livelihood. But agriculture generated only 11.3% of Georgian GDP in 2006. These
bald figures reflect an economic and social reality which was very evident to the
members of the study group as they drove over from Yerevan to Tbilisi. And that
reality in turn helps to explain the problem of increasing regional disparities within
Georgia. Over the first quarter of 2007 gross output of goods and services per capita
in Tbilisi was 2.7 times the national average, compared to 2.4 times in 2003. Guria,
Georgia’s poorest region has gross output of goods and services per capita of just
16% of the national average. A free trade agreement with the EU would have little
to offer Georgian agriculture, except in speciality areas like wine. Its liberating
impact on industry and services might actually make the regional problem worse.  
Conclusions
In terms of both unemployment and underemployment in agriculture, Georgia
has a huge potential for generating further growth in GDP through the
redeployment of labour into productive activities. Figures for growth in industrial
output for recent years suggest that there is substantial scope for industry to drive
GDP growth in future years on the basis of such redeployment. But full exploitation
of this potential will require significant flanking measures relating primarily to the
rule of law and the principle of the level playing field, as laid out in the ENP
EU/Georgia Action plan. In terms of trade policy, that would mean a Deep FTA+.
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1 Council of the European Union, SN 4901/99, Brussels, 23 November 1999
The EU, as a matter of general policy, encourages its free trade partners to think
also in terms of their own regional economic integration, favouring in principle
‘south-south’ arrangements. This is advocated on both economic and political
grounds. The Commission has in fact been encouraging the three South Caucasus
states to work together with a view to better regional cooperation. This does at least
see the three foreign ministers meeting together with the EU periodically at times,
but given the present blockage between Armenia and Azerbaijan it falls to Georgia
to be the most practical pivot of South Caucasus regional trade flows.
In addition Georgia is by far the most liberal state in the region in its trade
policies, having made substantial unilateral tariff cuts (90% of tariff lines are
already bound at 0% MFN rates with the WTO), and it is willing in principle to go
further (like Estonia did in the earlier 1990s). 
Georgia now aims at becoming a regional commercial hub. The most impressive
investments in this category are the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, with the
parallel Baku-Tbilisi-Ezurum gas pipeline now also being completed. Further, a
new railway connection from Kars in Turkey into the Akhalkalaki region of Georgia
is currently being constructed, and this will connect with Tbilisi and on to Baku in
Azerbaijan. Georgia also seeks to make itself a regional hub for general commercial
purposes, with a new Tbilisi airport and substantial new hotel construction of
international calibre. Beyond these major infrastructures, Georgia now brands
itself with some justification as an extremely business-friendly location, with
minimal regulatory bureaucracy and a customs service which the business
community considers is no longer notorious for corruption. 
Georgia-Armenia FTA. This dates back to 1995 as part of the initial set of CIS
bilateral FTAs. However the trade flows between Armenia and Georgia, in spite of
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3. Georgia and regional integration
scenarios
their functioning FTA, are extremely limited. The shares of their bilateral trade
average for imports and exports represent only 4% of Georgia’s total trade, and 3%
of Armenia’s total trade on 2006. These shares have moreover even been decreasing
over the last ten years (see Table 31 below). 
Georgia-Azerbaijan FTA. This dates back to 1996. In the subsequent decade
Georgia’s trade with Azerbaijan has greatly increased, with Azerbaijan rising to 4th
place after the EU, Russia and Turkey as source of its imports, and 3rd place after
the EU and Turkey for its exports. 
Georgia–Turkey FTA. A bilateral FTA between Georgia and Turkey was
negotiated in the course of 2007 and concluded on 21 November. This could be a
step of considerable importance for Georgia, since trade with Turkey alone
amounts to about 50% of Georgia’s trade volumes with the EU. It could be
expected, given the proximity of Georgia and its very low wage levels, that a free
trade agreement with Turkey could trigger a substantial growth of out-sourcing to
Georgia and associated investment by Turkish industry. At the same time, it has to
be noted that the agreement reduces but does not eliminate tariffs for agricultural
products, with the Turkish side sticking to significant exceptions from
liberalisation, including for products of legitimate concern to Georgia (e.g. for
wine, nuts, some fruits and juices, anchovies and cheese). Furthermore, it is a very
shallow FTA which does not cover services and investment and in general does not
go beyond WTO requirements as regards regulatory issues.  
The EU-Turkish customs union should in principle mean that a Georgia-Turkish
FTA should wait until an EU-Georgia FTA is introduced. However the EU has
waived this formal requirement, on condition that the Georgia-Turkey FTA would
be compatible with WTO rules for free trade areas, namely to cover substantially all
trade.
Georgia -Russia. The Georgia-Russia FTA is dysfunctional. Since October 2006
Russia has closed its land frontier and civil aviation connections with Georgia, and
bans the import of wines and agricultural produce2. However the Georgian
economy has more than survived these intended punitive measures, and is growing
dynamically. The wine sector for its part     is now considered to have received a
healthy shock, in order to get improved quality and so be able to export to other
world markets. 
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2 The recent statements by Russia indicate that these sanctions might be lifted soon.
However, Russia has not closed its frontiers with the two secessionist entities,
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In particular the Roki tunnel through the Caucasus
mountains, joining North and South Ossetia, sees a considerable flow of trade on
which information is hardly transparent, and reportedly includes both military
materials supplies by Russia as well as goods such as petrol and tobacco which in
the past has been smuggled free of duties from South Ossetia into the rest of
Georgia. A notorious wholesale market for such goods on the frontier between
South Ossetia and the rest of Georgia was closed in recent years, but the frontier is
said to remain porous for smuggled goods. Georgia has raised the issue of Russia’s
frontiers with the secessionist entities in the context of Russia’ WTO accession.
Georgia would like to see these frontiers subject to international monitoring along
the lines of the EUBAM mission on the frontiers of Transnistria.
Other CIS free trade. In principle the CIS has a comprehensive matrix of bilateral
free trade agreements, as shown in Table 3.3, which with the exception of Russia
are understood to be functioning. But the scales of these trade flows are very small.
Georgia has been verging on quitting the CIS, but has not actually done so.
GUAM free trade. FTAs exist between all GUAM partner states – Georgia,
Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova. In addition the GUAM Summit of 20 July 2002
agreed to the establishment of a GUAM free trade area, although it is not evident
whether this adds anything to these countries’ bilateral FTAs, beyond being a
political statement. There has been an institutional strengthening of GUAM, with a
permanent secretariat now established in Kiev.   
Black Sea free trade area. This idea has long been on the agenda of the BSEC, but
never really advanced, first of all because both Greece and Turkey were part of the
EU’s customs union, thus requiring free trade between the EU and all the Black Sea
states. However the Commission has recently launched its ‘Black Sea Synergy’
concept and free trade for this region becomes now a more serious candidate for
consideration. Indeed with Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey half of the Black Sea coast
is already in the EU customs union. Of course a Black Sea FTA would still require first
of all agreements on EU-Russia, EU-Ukraine, EU-Moldova and EU-Azerbaijan free
trade, as well as with Armenia and Georgia. The Russian and Ukrainian cases have
both been subject to detailed feasibility studies made for the European Commission
(Ukraine in 2006, Russia in 2007), and so these have become at least more than purely
academic hypotheses. Negotiations of a deep and comprehensive FTA between the EU
and Ukraine have been launched on 18 February 2008 following the conclusions of
Ukraine’s WTO accession process on 5 February 2008. But for Russia there is no
presumption that an FTA with the EU will be negotiated following Russian WTO
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accession. Until and unless Russia was seriously interested in free trade this scenario
cannot materialise.
EU-ENP East free trade area. In the case that Russia was the only country of the Black
Sea region which did not want to pursue free trade with the EU, there would remain the
option of the EU+Turkey customs union making a multilateral free trade area with
Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Ukraine, i.e. with all the ENP-East countries
that have Action Plans. This could also be extended with the ‘deep free trade’ agenda,
since the EU intends to generalise this concept with all its ENP partner states.
South Caucasus free trade. A trilateral Armenia-Azerbaijan-Georgia, or ‘South
Caucasus’ free trade area may come to mind as a hypothetical scenario, with
Europeans naturally thinking of the Benelux model as an example of three small
economies which integrated faster than its wider region. While this would of course
require resolution of the Armenia-Azeri conflict, a formal trilateral agreement
would not add much for Georgia, given its existing bilateral FTAs with both
Armenia and Azerbaijan, which have not generated substantial trade volumes.  
Other free trade initiatives. Georgia in addition pursues its radical liberalising
agenda with negotiations underway for a FTA with the Gulf Cooperation Council,
and discussions initiated with India.
Conclusion. Georgia’s wider regional trade policies are an essential feature of its
current economic strategy, which has as a matter of the highest urgency and priority
to find new sources for economic expansion to compensate the serious adverse effects
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Table 3.1. Trade flows between Georgia and major partners, 2006 
 Georgia imports Georgia exports 
 million $ % million $ % 
EU-27 1060.9 28.9% 255.3 25.7% 
Russia 558.8 15.2% 75.7 7.6% 
Turkey 522.6 14.2% 124.9 12.6% 
Azerbaijan 318.5 8.7% 92.2 9.3% 
Ukraine 320.1 8.7% 57 5.7% 
United States 129.7 3.5% 58.9 5.9% 
Turkmenistan 101.1 2.8% 71.8 7.2% 
Un. Arab Emirates 109.1 3.0% 22.9 2.3% 
Armenia 40.2 1.1% 73.6 7.4% 
Iran 40.3 1.1% 2.7 0.3% 
Canada 14.3 0.4% 48.9 4.9% 
Moldova 3.5 0.1% 0.2 0.0% 
Rest of world 455.4 12.4% 107.4 10.8% 
Total 3 674.5 100.0% 991.5 100.0% 
of Russia’s punitive sanctions. The EU and Turkey, which are already now Georgia’s
first and second trade partners, are key partners for these purposes. In addition
Georgia’s ambition to become a regional commercial hub and transit centre logically
requires that it establish a comprehensive set of free trade agreements with its
partners. Georgia has already acted radically in support of these ambitions, with zero
tariffs introduced unilaterally for almost all industrial products erga omnes with the
whole of the world, and action to de-corrupt the customs services. It has retained
moderate tariffs just for agricultural products, mainly as instrument of leverage in
bargaining with Turkey, whose agricultural tariffs (excluded from its customs union
with the EU) remain extremely high. In view of its location and economic strategy
Georgia also has a major interest in possible regional multilateral free trade initiatives
in the wider Black Sea region, whereas a regional FTA limited to only the South
Caucasus would be of little interest.  
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Table 3.2. Trade flows between Georgia and major partners, 1996
 Georgia imports Georgia exports 
 million $ % million $ % 
EU-27 263.1 38.3% 32.2 16.2% 
Russia 127.1 18.5% 56.7 28.5% 
Turkey 76.6 11.2% 25.9 13.0% 
Azerbaijan 78.7 11.5% 24.3 12.2% 
Ukraine 38.8 5.7% 5.4 2.7% 
United States 29.8 4.3% 1.3 0.7% 
Turkmenistan 4.1 0.6% 13.4 6.7% 
Un. Arab Emirates 0.6 0.1% 0.0 0.0% 
Armenia 17.2 2.5% 21.0 10.6% 
Iran 2.7 0.4% 2.2 1.1% 
Canada 0.08 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 
Moldova 0.1 0.0% 0.1 0.1% 
Rest of world 47.92 7.0% 16.3 8.2% 
Total 686.8 100.0% 198.8 100.0% 
Source: Kort and Dragneva * Theoretical FTA, impeded in practice by Russia’s banning Georgian wines and
agricultural produce since the end of 2006, the closing of land frontier crossing points with Georgia, and
the suspension of direct civil aviation connections.  
Table 3.3. Georgia’s Free Trade Agreements with CIS countries
Partner country Date of agreement 
Armenia 1995 
Azerbaijan 1996 
Kyrgyzstan 1995 
Kazakhstan 1995 
Moldova 1997 
Russia 1994* 
Tajikistan No 
Turkmenistan 1996 
Ukraine 1995 
Uzbekistan 1995 
In this chapter the potential effects of an EU-Georgia FTA have been examined
in terms of welfare gains and losses from simple (shallow) integration. In addition,
some insights have been made in regard to potential gains from deep integration.
The analysis has been made on the basis of the Sussex Framework methodology
and resulted in the following conclusions: 
• Georgia has almost done free trade on its side already for non-agricultural
products (with very minor exceptions) and significantly also for agricultural
goods as a result of the 2006 tariff reduction. About 90% of tariff lines are set
to zero; 
• the reduction of import tariffs by Georgia in 2006 is expected to increase
Georgia’s trade with its main partners, as well as to induce some welfare
increasing trade re-orientation from CIS supply sources towards non-CIS
partners;
• distortions in trade are possibly created by non-tariff barriers (infrastructure,
regulatory and institutional) and thus cooperation between Georgia and the
EU on their reduction should be welfare increasing. Georgia and the EU
already cooperate on the reduction of non-tariff barriers in the framework of
the PCA and ENP Action Plan’s implementation;
• since the EU’s major imports to Georgia (vehicles, machinery and electrical
equipment, mineral fuels, pharmaceuticals, instruments and chemicals) are
exempted from tariffs in Georgia, hence there is little direct shallow
integration welfare effects are likely to occur from the EU-Georgia FTA in
regard to these products;
• substantial share (over 70%) of Georgia’s imports from non-EU countries, the
low similarity between the production and trade structures of Georgia and the
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4. Assessing the potential welfare
effects of an EU-Georgia FTA using
the Sussex Framework 
EU along with the low correlation between the countries RCAs – all suggest
that trade diversion is on balance more likely than trade creation from a future
EU-Georgia FTA. At the same time, pre-FTA free trade regime for industrial
trade in Georgia suggests a low-scale trade diversion effect.  
• the EU is an important market for Georgia’s exports and its importance has
been growing over time, though owing to the low levels of pre-FTA EU tariffs,
and non-tariff protection measures (such as quantitative restrictions), the
direct shallow integration-induced impact of the FTA on Georgia’s exports to
the EU is likely to be comparatively small. In the longer perspective, Georgia’s
future comparative advantages still remain to be created by investment in new
economic structures (for example outsourcing) to take advantage of low
Georgian labour costs. 
• there is little evidence of current significant deep integration between the EU
and Georgia as expressed by the intra-industry trade between them. The
development of new industrial structures under the future EU-Georgia FTA
may lead to strengthening of intra-industry trade linkages between countries;
• Turkey is also a relatively important partner for Georgia – the second largest
trade partner in 2006. In November 2007, the countries have concluded the
FTA, which fully liberalizes trade in non-agricultural goods, but provides for
significant exceptions to liberalization of the agricultural trade. The dangers
of trade diversion from Turkey to the EU are likely to be low under the future
EU-Georgia FTA due to the pre-FTA free trade regime in non-agricultural
trade. Any deep integration benefits that promote trade with the EU will also
facilitate trade with Turkey which has undergone regulatory harmonisation
with the EU. 
• to conclude, the risks of welfare-decreasing trade diversion from the future
EU-Georgia FTA as a result of shallow integration are low for both Georgia
and the EU due to the current low level of tariffs in both parties. From
Georgia’s perspective, potentially significant welfare gains could come from a
continuing process of deepening integration, which has already been set in
motion due to its substantial liberalisation of all four freedoms (goods,
services, capital and labour). A greater level of Georgia’s regulatory and
institutional approximation with the EU resulting from a Deep FTA+ could
boost further the welfare gains for Georgia. Therefore, the continuation of the
profound economic reforms in accordance with the European standards and
best practice is of primary importance for Georgia.
38
Maryla Maliszewska (ed.)
CASE Network Reports No. 79/2008
4.1. Introduction
In order to evaluate the trade and welfare implications of a potential EU-Georgia
FTA we apply a set of diagnostic indicators developed by the University of Sussex
(referred to as the “Sussex Framework”). The Sussex Framework helps to identify
possible gains and losses from a bilateral preferential trade agreement between
countries, as outlined conceptually in Gasiorek et. al. (2006) – see also Box 1. 
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Box 1 Welfare gains from shallow and deep integration: the main concepts
Shallow integration is defined as the removal of border barriers to trade, such as
tariffs and quotas; which normally comprises the first policies to be implemented under
any preferential trade agreement (PTA). Shallow integration is typically accompanied by
both trade creation and trade diversion which have opposing welfare effects. Trade
creation is welfare increasing since countries shift from consumption of less efficiently
produced (higher cost) domestic goods in favour to more efficiently produced (lower
cost) goods of the partner country. This results in cost savings and more efficient
resource allocation within the participating countries. Trade creation could occur either
on the production side when trade displays domestic production of goods, which are
similar with those produced by partner country; and on the consumption side when
demand and consumption of imports increases due to lower partner country prices.       
Trade diversion is welfare decreasing since it is characterised by the sourcing of
imports switching away from more efficient non-partner countries to less efficient
partner countries. Partner countries enjoy preferences within the trade agreement and
thus are able to undercut their more efficient and lower cost non-partner competitors.
The net welfare impact of a preferential trade agreement depends on the relative size of
these two trade effects. At the same time, welfare increasing trade reorientation from
less efficient to more efficient sources of imports may take place should partner
countries participate in other trade preferential agreements with third countries. 
Deep integration implies reductions in, or elimination of regulatory and behind-the-
border impediments to trade, which may relate to customs procedures, product
standards and certifications procedures, competition policy, government procurement,
market access for foreign providers of services, FDI regulations, etc. As such, partner
countries develop closer and more stable trade relations allowing for more
specialization in niche goods, participation in a fine division of labour, creation of stable
value chains. Deep integration has welfare increasing impacts for partner countries due
to greater exploitation of economies of scale in production, technology transfer and
diffusion both through trade and FDI, positive externalities from institutional and policy
approximation leading to wide productivity increases. The welfare gains from deep
integration, though being not immediate, and if appropriately implemented, are
generally likely to exceed substantially the possible losses from shallow integration.
The majority of the Sussex Framework indicators concentrate on the welfare
consequences from shallow integration. Indicators for deep integration are much
harder to identify, though looking at patterns of intra-industry trade is useful in this
regard. The evaluation of the relative importance of trade creation and trade
diversion effects from shallow integration is carried out in accordance with
theoretically grounded rules of thumb:
1.The higher are the initial tariffs, the greater is the likelihood of both trade
creation and trade diversion.
2.The greater the number of PTA partners the more likely it is that there will be
overlaps with cost differences, and therefore the greater the likelihood of
trade creation.   
3.The wider the difference in comparative advantage between countries and the
higher the initial share of trade between them, the more likely the trade
agreement will be welfare improving. 
4.The more similar is the product mix in the partner countries, the more likely
it is that there will be trade creation because there is more scope for
specialization. 
5.The higher the percentage of trade with potential partners, the greater the
possibility that the PTA will be welfare increasing. 
4.2. Georgia’s foreign trade dynamics 
Over the last decade, Georgia has advanced substantially in terms of its integration
into the world economy. According to the officially reported trade statistics, Georgia’s
merchandise trade turnover expanded by more than 5 times during the period, from
USD 886 million in 1996 (28.6% of GDP) up to USD 4.7 billion (about 60% of GDP)
in 2006. Imports of goods accounted for the major part of total merchandise trade in
Georgia (77.5% in 1996 and about 79% in 2006). Merchandise imports constituted
about 47.5% of GDP in 2006, while exports – 12.8% of GDP (22.2% and 6.4%
respectively in 1996). As a result, Georgia suffered a huge merchandise trade deficit,
which deteriorated considerably from USD 488 million or about 16% of GDP in 1996
to USD 2.6 billion or about 33% of GDP in 2006. 
The growth of both exports and imports started fast accelerating in 2003, with
import growth rates exceeding those of exports (see Figure 4.1). High growth rates
of imports in 2004 (61.9% yoy and 40.3% yoy respectively) may be attributed to the
appreciation of national currency during 2004 of about 10.7% (IBM report, 2004).
Anticorruption measures of the government and improvements in national trade
data reporting in 2004 also added to both imports and exports figures. In 2006,
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export growth decelerated again to 14.6% yoy (from 33.9% in 2005)3 partly due to
Russia’s trade embargo on main Georgia’s exports4. On the contrary, imports
surged by 47.6% yoy (from 34.8% yoy in 2005) driven by the tariff reform and
higher energy prices (mineral fuels (HS 27) account for about 20% of total imports).
Consequently, the merchandise trade, deficit widened by more than 65% yoy in
2006 as compared to the previous year5. It is worth noting that there are
considerable differences in Georgia’s official trade statistics vs. its balance of
payment data, especially regarding exports of goods. For example, according to the
official trade statistics exports of goods reached USD 993 million in 2006 while
balance of payment data reported USD 1.7 billion exports of goods in 20066). This
suggests that there are substantial unregistered trade flows, which do not appear to
be reflected in the trade statistics.
Trade in services, and in particular transport services, plays a significant role in
the foreign trade of Georgia as a transit country7. Exports of service increased by
25% yoy in 2006 and accounted for about 35% of total exports of goods and services
from Georgia (imports of services constituted 16.5% of total imports). Georgia’s
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3 See Key indicators of Developing Asia and Pacific Countries, 2007.
4 In early 2006 the Russian Federation prohibited imports of Georgian wines and mineral water
“Borjomi” to the territory of Russia accusing Georgian goods of incompliance with SPS
requirements (regarding pesticide residues). Also, the check-point “Verkhny Lars” was closed by
Russia. Besides, in October 2006, Russia cut air, land and sea traffic between the two countries. 
5 About 60% of trade balance deterioration was explained by the expansion of imports of mineral
fuels followed by transport equipments, metals and machinery (ADB, 2007).
6 See Key indicators of Developing Asia and Pacific Countries, 2007. 
7 Currently the services sector accounts for about 62% of Georgia’s GDP.
Source: Key indicators of Developing Asia and Pacific Countries, 2007; IBM study (based on trade data).
Figure 4.1. Georgia’s merchandise trade dynamics
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exports of services reached 11.4% of GDP in 2006, imports – 9.4%. The two major
items of exports of services include transportation and travel services.
4.3. Georgia’s trade policies and market access
Tariffs
According to the first rule of thumb, the higher are the initial trade barriers, the
greater is the likelihood of both trade creation and trade diversion after those
barriers are removed under the preferential regime. 
Georgia has made a considerable progress in liberalising its trade and foreign
exchange regimes, implemented the harmonization of its trade regime with the
WTO rules and became a member of the WTO in June 20008. Except for tariff-free
regimes within FTAs, Georgia applies MFN tariffs to imports from its trade
partners. Current import tariffs in Georgia have been in effect since September 1st,
2006 (according to the Law of Georgia #3509 “On Customs Tariffs”9). As a result,
Georgia’s tariff system has been substantially changed first of all through the
reduction of the number of tariffs to three (0, 5 and 12) with a maximum tariff of
12%. All but a very few non-agricultural products are 0 rated. Overall, about 85%
of all tariff lines10 are currently set to zero, while in regard to agricultural products
about 42% of tariff lines within 1-24 HS commodity groups are free from tariff
protection11. It is worth noting that, according to the WTO, before the tariff
reduction in 2006 the simple average MFN tariff equalled 7.0%, including for
agricultural products – 11.5%, for non-agricultural products – 6.4%12.
September 2006 changes to Georgia’s tariff regime have lowered tariff barriers
to trade with Georgia substantially, especially for non-agricultural products. The
simple average MFN tariff (excluding specific duties) is now estimated at abo-
ut 1.0%, including 5.6% – for agricultural products, and 0.3% – for non-agricultu-
ral products13. If weighed by 2006 imports from: 
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8 Georgia’s WTO tariff commitments envisaged binding its simple average MFN tariff at 7.4% level
for the entire HS nomenclature, including 13.4% – for agricultural products and 6.5% – for non-
agricultural products (see the WTO
(http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/georgia_e.htm).
9 http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/GEO_September%202006_Tax%20&%20%20
Legal%20news(2).pdf
10 The total number of tariff lines is 10 890, including 2444 tariff lines of 1-24 HS groups for
agricultural products (http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/georgia_e.htm).
11 I bit.
12 I bit. 
13 Based on the latest data on MFN applied tariffs in the WTO country profile for Georgia (see
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/georgia_e.htm)
• all partners: weighted average MFN applied tariff equals 1.1% for all goods,
5.5% for agricultural products, and 0.2% for non-agricultural products. 
• the EU27: weighted average MFN applied tariff equals 0.6% for all goods,
6.7% – for agricultural products, and 0.1% – for non-agricultural products.
The magnitude of applied average tariffs reflects the fact that the EU imports
are mainly comprised of non-agricultural products subject to duty-free
treatment in Georgia. 
In accordance with the new Customs Code, maximum MFN rates of 12% are
applied mainly to agricultural products, which are sensitive for Georgian economy
and hence traditionally has been protected, namely: live birds, meat and meat
products, dairy products, natural honey and eggs, fresh and prepared vegetables and
fruits, tea, maize and maize seed, cereal flours and preparations of cereals, sugar
and sugar products, non-alcoholic beverages and beer, tobacco products. Imports of
wines, ethyl spirits and alcoholic beverages (as well a few other products) are taxed
by specific tariffs. Concerning non-agricultural products, MFN rates (12%) are
applied to only two HS groups: HS 25 (salts, sulphur, plastering materials, lime and
cement) and HS 68 (articles of stones, plaster, cement, asbestos). 
Georgia has done free trade on its side already for non-agricultural products
(with a few exceptions) as a result of the 2006 tariff reduction; tariffs for
agricultural products have been also cut. According to the first rule of thumb, low
tariff protection in Georgia indicates the low level of existing tariff-driven trade
distortions. The liberalization of tariff barriers in 2006 has also resulted in a
reduction of preference margins previously received by CIS trade partners (see
Table 4.1) thus facilitating Georgia’s shift from the CIS to non-CIS sources of
imports (trade reorientation effect).
Since pre-FTA tariff protection in Georgia is low, if not-existent for non-
agricultural goods, the future reduction of tariff barriers under the EU-Georgia FTA
is expected to have limited scope for either trade creation or trade diversion into
Georgia’s economy, especially in regard to non-agricultural trade. Therefore, other
factors will be more important in determining welfare effects of the EU-Georgia FTA. 
At the same time agricultural products remain the most protected. Thus, there
is some scope for both trade creation and trade diversion with regard to these
products under a future FTA. The overall net welfare effect needs to be considered
in the light of other rules of thumb. Further government policy on tariff
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liberalization, announced to be on the agenda of the Government of Georgia in
2007 and 2008 (ADB, 2007), will also influence the outcomes of possible EU-
Georgia FTA.
Concerning market access for exporters, Georgia enjoys MFN treatment from
the other WTO members, as well as free trade regimes with CIS countries. In
addition, Georgian products benefit from GSP status in the markets of the EU, the
USA, Canada, Switzerland, Japan, and Turkey15. Thanks to these market access
preferences Georgia has been able to diversify and increase its total preferential
exports to these countries (see Table 4-5 on Georgia’s major destination markets
below). Under the current EU GSP Regulation, Georgia has qualified for the
enhanced preferences granted to countries applying the internationally agreed
standards for good governance and sustainable development (so-called GSP+)
offering particularly advantageous access to the EU market, i.e. unlimited, duty free
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14 Table 3 presents calculations of simple and import-weighted average tariffs applied to Georgia’s
major trade partners in 2004 (based on UNCTAD - TRAINS (Trade Analysis and Information
System) database). Particularly, effectively applied tariffs for imports from EU27, Turkey and Iran
equalled MFN tariffs since no tariff preference existed. Import-weighed average MFN tariff
ranged from 7.5% for the EU27 to 10.6% for Iran (7.8 % to 9.7% in case of simple average of
traded tariff lines). Under the preferential duty-free trade regime with Georgia, CIS partners
received preference margins measured as the difference between effectively applied tariffs and
MFN tariffs, which would have been imposed if no preference had existed. Effectively applied
tariffs to preferential trade with CIS countries were zero, and the weighted preference margins in
2004 were in the range between 11.1% for Russia to 17% for Ukraine (reflecting the fact that
Ukraine’s major imports to Georgia were food products, subject to highest tariff protection in
Georgia).                
15 The GSP arrangement between Georgia and Turkey will be replaced by the Georgia-Turkey FTA
concluded in November 2007 once this FTA has entered into force (following its ratification and
signature by the parties).
Source: UNCTAD - TRAINS (Trade Analysis and Information System).
Note:* Excluding specific tariffs on alcoholic beverages (HS 2208).
** TL – tariff lines.
Table 4.1. Applied tariffs and tariff preference margins* in Georgia, by country, 200414
Partner Imports,  
million US$ 
Effectively  
applied  
simple 
 average 
of traded  
TL** 
Effectively  
applied  
weighted 
average  
of traded TL 
MFN simple 
average 
of traded  
TL 
MFN  
weighted 
 average 
of traded 
TL 
Preference 
 margin 
 weighted 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)=(6)-(4) 
Armenia 25.4 0.0 0.0 9.1 13.3 13.3 
Azerbaijan 157.7 0.0 0.0 8.3 11.5 11.5 
Ukraine 142.0 0.0 0.0 8.8 17.0 17.0 
Russia 257.1 0.0 0.0 7.4 11.1 11.1 
Turkey 202.2 7.9 9.7 7.9 9.7 - 
Iran 15.1 9.6 10.6 9.6 10.6 - 
EU27 667.9 7.8 7.5 7.8 7.5 - 
access to the EU markets for the majority of goods originated in Georgia, with only
a few exceptions, mainly in the agricultural sector. Neither the EU nor other WTO
partners maintain any trade defence measures against imports from Georgia. 
The level of Georgia’s utilisation of the EU GSP/GSP+ has been gradually
increasing in the recent years and reached 77% in 2006 (75% in 2005, 80% in 2004,
78% in 2003, 31% in 2002 and 54% in 2001). This is rather good, but there is still
room for improvement, in particular as the scheme is hardly used by Georgia for
several sectors, e.g. textiles. Less than full utilisation of the opportunities offered by
GSP/GSP+ can be generally explained by low awareness of the GSP system by
Georgian exporters and foreign importers; administrative difficulties in obtaining
the special certificate of origin; desire of exporters to conceal their foreign trade
activities in order to minimize taxes (IBM report, 2004). Georgia’s penetration into
the EU market is still limited due to low product quality, underdeveloped marketing
networks, and high transport costs – all having detrimental impact on the
competitiveness of Georgian products on the European and world markets. 
Since the EU tariffs are already low, if not non-existent, for Georgian goods,
trade creation and trade diversion effects from the future EU-Georgia FTA are not
expected to be significant for the EU as well. 
Other barriers to trade in Georgia
Georgia’s regime of formal non-tariff barriers is similarly liberal: Georgia does
not maintain non-tariff barriers except for health, security, and environmental
reasons. At present, Georgia does not apply any quantitative restrictions on trade.
Licenses are required for imports/exports of only 8 items. No safeguards or
antidumping measures have been used for contingent temporary protection against
imports. In line with its WTO commitments, Georgia offers a very liberal
investment regime in almost all sectors (except ownership of agricultural land), as
well as non-discriminatory market access in the service sector (in banking,
insurance, security trade, auditing, legal services, and tourism). Georgia already
recognises technical regulations of the EU, the OECD and its trading partners
(which is a considerable reduction of technical barriers to trade in Georgia). The
export regime is similarly liberal: no export restrictions, no foreign currency-
surrender requirements, no discriminatory subsidies (ADB, 2007). 
Over the last two years, Georgia has also made large efforts to the reduce other
trade-restrictive barriers, which are widely prevalent in all CIS countries, such as high
transportation and border costs, large scale of smuggling, bureaucracy and
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corruption, an outdated transport infrastructure. In particular, the adoption of new
Customs Code in 2006 (effective from 1 January 2007) aims at reforming customs
administration and border police, simplification and speeding up of customs clearance
procedures to bring them in line with international and European standards. Most
significant changes include: the reduction of the number of documents needed for
export and import registration, facilitation of importers and exporters to conduct
customs transactions on credit or obtaining a refund within a month, elimination of
license fees for the inland transit transportation, adoption of the rules for resolution of
customs disputes16. As a result, the quality of customs services has been notably
improved: e.g., according to the World Bank’s Doing Business report (2008) the time
needed to meet administrative requirements for importing and exporting has been
reduced to 14 and 12 days respectively in 2007, down from 52 and 54 days in 2004 (see
also chapters 5.2 and 6.2.2.). Further efforts should be devoted for the effective
implementation and enforcement of the adopted legislation, as well as the institutional
capacity building in customs administration area. The regulatory convergence with the
European standards in other areas such as product standards and SPS measures,
competition policy, protection of property rights, etc. is also of a great importance for
the reduction of non-tariff barriers in Georgia (see appropriate chapters below). 
4.4. Existing FTAs 
The CIS bloc countries have traditionally been Georgia’s largest trade partners,
though their cumulative role has been gradually declining (trade with CIS countries
made up 38.8% of Georgia’s trade turnover in 2006 vs. 45% in 1996). Georgia has
concluded bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) with its major CIS partners:
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Moldova, the Russian Federation, Turkmenistan,
Ukraine and Uzbekistan17. All the agreements are almost identical and provide for
duty-free trade in goods (both industrial and agricultural), though with potential
exemptions18. Exemptions from free trade are introduced in the protocols to the
FTAs and can be changed annually19. The FTAs also contain provisions on
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16 http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/GEO_September%202006_Tax%20&%20%20
Legal%20news(2).pdf
17 Among them, the following FTAs have been ratified: with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,
Russian Federation, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine.  
18 Exemptions can be applied in the form of import (common tariffs) or export (export taxes)
restrictions. 
19 Exemptions from free trade regimes with Georgia were applied by Russia (sugar, alcohols, beer,
and tobacco products), Kazakhstan (sugar, alcohol and non-alcohol beverages, and tobacco) and
Ukraine (sugar). Also, Azerbaijan unilaterally applied a 15 percent tariff on steel products. Georgia
applied tariffs restrictions only to imports from Russia (alcohols).
contingent protection measures, including quotas, export taxes, safeguards and
anti-dumping measures, which countries can apply unilaterally. The CIS FTAs can
be described as minimal and quite basic; they do not cover trade in services,
investment or government procurement.
CIS countries have also signed the multi-lateral Agreement on Mutual Policies
in the Area of Standards, Metrology and Certifications (1992), amended in 2000,
which provides for the creation of the Interstate Council on Standards, the system
of harmonised standards and mutual recognition of certificates of conformity20.
Products standards are mainly former Soviet Union standards; however countries
are carrying out harmonization of their national standards with the international
ones. The mutual recognition applies only to standards approved at the interstate
level, rather than national standards, which are not often notified to trade partners
(Freinkman, Polyakov and Revenco, 2004), thus undermining the integrity and
efficiency of the whole system. Rules of origin within bilateral CIS FTAs are
governed by the Rules adopted on 30 November 2000 by all CIS countries, except
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The Rules stipulate that exports subject to the free
trade treatment must be conducted by tax residents in the free trade area21.
Although CIS FTAs and multi-lateral agreements provide for the national treatment
in transit, these provisions have mainly been dysfunctional (e.g., transit countries
usually maintain transit permits and quotas system for road transport22). 
Georgia has also signed the multi-lateral Agreement on the Creation of an
Economic Union (1993) and the Agreement on Creation of Free Trade Area within
the CIS (1994), but has not ratified them and does not intend to do so (as stated in
the Working Party Report on Georgia accession to the WTO, see www.wto.org). The
agreement on the Economic Union is a framework document envisaging that
47
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND GEORGIA 
CASE Network Reports No. 79/2008
20 Still, in practice certificates issued by the partner country can be questioned (Freinkman,
Polyakov and Revenco, 2004). 
21 According to the general rule of origin (tariff heading criterion), a product is considered to be
of CIS origin if it is fully produced in the CIS country or, when imports are used in its production,
if the designation of the product is different from the designation of the inputs according the 4-
digit CIS trade nomenclature. However, there is a list of goods, which are exempted from the
general rule of origin and are subject to two other rules – ad valorem rule (specified shares
(normally 50 percent) of imported materials or value added in the price of final production should
be met) and technological requirements (specified technological operations should be performed
in the free trade area). The products traditionally considered sensitive, such as footwear, textiles,
and clothing, are subject to the tariff heading criterion rather than more restraining technological
requirements (Freinkman, Polyakov and Revenco, 2004). 
22 Transit countries often use their geographical advantage to restrict movement of goods of the
transiting countries. Transit countries tend to create extra hurdles in customs clearance, often in
violation of such agreements. These hurdles include mandatory high-cost customs convoying,
insurance, and other high fees (IBM report, 2004).
parties move towards the establishment of a customs union and common market
among CIS countries, however, each party may exercise its own discretion on the
pace and timing of integration into economic structures of the CIS. The CIS FTA
Agreement aims at creating a free trade area, coordinating economic policy,
promoting inter- and intra-sectoral cooperation and harmonizing legislation and
regulations. It has been ratified by only Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz
Republic, Moldova, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, and remains ineffective so far. As a
result, preferential trading relations among CIS countries have been established
and determined on the bilateral level. However, if all the countries have bilateral
FTAs with identical rules of origin than de facto there is a CIS FTA. 
Overall, the CIS free trade bloc is characterised by weak administration, lack of
strict procedures for the application of non-tariff measures and temporary
protection measures under FTAs and underdeveloped multi-lateral and bilateral
institutions that do not have enough power to influence policies of the national
trade bodies. There is also a lack of transparency and efficiency due to parallel
existence of bilateral and multilateral agreements that overlap and sometimes
contradict each other, as well as a lack of permanency due to frequent changes in
the list of exemptions23 and of applied contingent measures (Freinkman, Polyakov
and Revenco, 2004). 
For the CIS countries, exporting to other CIS countries has certain advantages
compared to other destinations including historical ties and geographical
proximity, the proximity of product standards and the mutual recognition of the
mandatory trade and standardization documentation. On the other hand, being
competitors in many sectors CIS countries have little interest to grant preferential
access to imports from other CIS countries leading to trade wars and arbitrary
unilateral application of trade protection measures (especially pronounced in trade
with large CIS countries). Consequently, the possibility for welfare increasing
resource allocation and trade creation effect within the CIS FTA has been
undermined, especially in the sensitive sectors. Political and ethnic tensions
between CIS countries have also influenced negatively the efficiency of the CIS
FTAs. For Georgia, the advantages of the CIS FTA have been overtaken and
reversed by Russia’s blockage of the Georgian-Russian frontier since 2006, with no
direct road or air transport connections. The CIS trade agreements have been
inefficient in reducing excessively high border and transport costs within the CIS
(including customs delays, problems with mutual recognition of customs
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23 Countries have agreed schedules for mutual abolishing of exemptions.
documentation and application of rules of origin) negatively impacting on bilateral
trade and preventing countries from fully benefiting from scale and competition
effects on CIS huge markets. The CIS FTA countries are actively engaged in
economic integration with non-CIS partners, which is considered potentially more
welfare increasing by them, fist of all, due to the effects of deep integration (e.g.,
technology transfer, institutional and policy harmonization, productivity
convergence, etc.) and lock-in mechanisms for political and economic reforms.
Taking into account the lack of strong economic incentives and political will of CIS
countries to integrate, the prospects of the full implementation of the multi-lateral
CIS FTA seem rather weak. At the same time, to become fully functional and more
efficient bilateral CIS FTAs will require strengthening of their administration, and
bringing their legal and institutional framework in line with the WTO rules
concerning substantial coverage of the agreement, transit rules, application of SPS
and TBT measures, application of safeguards and antidumping measures, as well
as dispute settlement mechanisms.    
Georgia is a signatory to the GUAM free trade agreement, which Georgia
ratified at the end of 2002. The GUAM was created by Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan
and Moldova in 1997 (in 1999-2005, Uzbekistan was also a member of the group).
The GUAM leaders declare their mutual interest in developing bilateral and
regional cooperation to strengthen relations with the European Union, to enhance
regional security and develop political and economic contacts. In 2006, the GUAM
has been transformed into the international “Organization for Democracy and
Economic Development – GUAM”. The most important goals of this organization
include the energy security and transport initiatives such as establishment of the
Trans-Caucasus corridor throughout the countries’ territories to the Europe,
utilization of the oil and gas resources of the Caspian Sea region, creation of the
multiple pipeline system to the world markets, etc. The benefits of establishing such
a transport corridor can not be overestimated in terms of the improved access of
these countries to the European markets, but no progress has been made so far. The
ratified FTA agreement (2002) still remains ineffective, though, in 2006, the GUAM
members signed a protocol on its entry into force (rules of origin and common
customs formalities and procedures have not been yet adopted). The countries
continue to cooperate on bilateral rather than multi-lateral level and the GUAM
agreement has not been notified to the WTO. 
Georgia is also a member of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)
Organization, along with ten other countries (Albania, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria,
Armenia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine). This agreement
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does not stipulate for preferential trade among parties although it envisages the
possibility of free trade zones in the future. It covers a number of fields, including
economic cooperation and trade, investment, scientific and technical cooperation,
the establishment of a BSEC Bank, and cooperation on transport and
communications. Still, the BSEC have not advanced much in achieving the
declared goals due to lack of political support, unresolved border and territorial
disputes and ethnic conflicts among the member countries (Maliszewska, 2005).
Moreover, the creation of the BSEC FTA would require all members to have FTAs
with the EU (since some counties, Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania, are
already members of the EU customs union), which is not a short-run perspective
for some of them (e.g. Russia). 
Turkey is Georgia’s second largest trade partner after the EU, and accounts for
more than 14% of its trade turnover (2006 figures). Georgia and Turkey concluded
a FTA in November 2007. This FTA provides for a full liberalization of trade in non-
agricultural products, but includes significant exemptions from free trade
treatment for agricultural trade24. In addition, it does not provide for liberalisation
of services and investment and for regulatory convergence between the parties.
Also, bilateral trade between countries has been quite restricted by inefficient
border crossings, old and obsolete highways connecting the two countries, and
absence of railroads. In this regard, Georgia, Turkey and Azerbaijan signed an
agreement on construction of a railway line Baku-Tbilisi-Akhalkalaki-Kars that will
link the three countries and strengthen cooperation in the region. Apart from the
facilitation of the bilateral trade across countries, this railroad line will transform
Georgia into Turkey’s window to the greater market of Eurasia. It is also worth
noting that Turkey has been actively participated in supporting transport projects
in Georgia including the construction of oil and gas pipelines (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipelines) and modernization of airports)25. 
4.5. Trade Openness
The openness indicator is measured as the share of exports and imports in GDP.
A higher openness index tends to indicate a more outwardly-oriented economy.
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24 Most of the exemptions from free trade treatment (both in terms of complete exemptions from
liberalisation and tariff quotas (very limited)) are on the side of imports into Turkey. Exemptions
concern mainly such agricultural products as milk and cream, tomatoes, citrus, natural honey,
nuts, grape, tea, preservations nuts and fruits, cigarettes and other tobacco products, wine, fruits
and fruit juices.
25 There have been also attempts to launch FTA negotiations with the US. 
Trade liberalization reforms in Georgia have induced the increased openness of
Georgia’s economy. Particularly, the share of total trade of goods and services in
Georgia’s GDP has increased considerably (by +41.9%) over 2001-2006 and
reached about 90% of GDP in 2006 (see Table 4.2.). Imports of goods and services
have been playing more significant role than exports (e.g., 56.9% vs. 32.9% of GDP
respectively in 2006). Furthermore, the share of total imports has been expanding
faster than that of exports (by +46.3% vs. +34.3% respectively over 2001-2006).
Overall, Georgia’s trade openness has increased considerably over recent years,
with the higher degree of openness on the import side of trade.           
4.6. The geographical composition of trade 
The fifth rule of thumb focuses on the extent to which countries trade with each
other prior to the FTA. Where there is initially little trade with potential trade
partner, this signifies that the third countries are more efficient suppliers and thus
that the future FTA is more likely to result in trade diversion. Also, there may be
limited scope for trade expansion from forming a FTA between countries that do
little trade with each other. On the contrary, if in the initial situation the countries
trade significantly then it is more likely that they importing from the more efficient
suppliers and the chances for trade diversion are lower.
All calculations in this chapter are based on the World Integrated Trade
Solutions (WITS) database. However, it is important to note that the CIS countries
are known to have persistent problems in the recording of international
transactions explained by weak border control, a lack of control over parts of
territories (in the case of Moldova and Georgia), poor customs procedures and
evaluation techniques (Freinkman, Polyakov and Revenco, 2004). The consistency
of trade data over time is also a matter of concern. CIS countries anti-corruption
and customs reform initiatives influence the dynamics of their trade figures. As a
result, CIS trade statistics are often deficient and the exercise with comparing
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Source: ADB, 2007.
Table 4.2. Georgia openness (GDP decomposition, current prices)
 2001 2003 2006 % change  
2001-2006 
Exports of goods  
and services as % of GDP 
24.5 31.8 32.9 +34.3 
Imports of goods  
and services as % of GDP 
38.9 46.4 56.9 +46.3 
Total Trade as % of GDP 63.3 78.3 89.8 +41.9 
mirror trade flows confirms this26 (see Table 4.3) with mirror trade statistics for
Georgia’s main partners). 
As can be seen from Table 4.3., major discrepancies appear in mirror data on
Georgia’s trade with Armenia and Azerbaijan (on Georgia’s export side), the EU
(Georgia’s export side) and Turkey (Georgia’s import side). One of the possible
explanations of such discrepancies is the misspecification of the country of origin
after the transit trough the territory of a transit country regardless of the share of
its content that actually comes from this country. For instance, the WITS data on
the EU imports from Georgia report USD 350.5 million imports of mineral fuels
(HS 27) making up 54% of total imports from Georgia to the EU in 2006. At the
same time, according to the WITS data for Georgia imports of mineral fuels equal
only USD 15 million (or 5.9% of Georgia’s total exports to the EU) (see Table 4.7
and Table 4.8). Since Georgia is a main transit route for Azerbaijani oil exports to
the EU, the misspecification of their origin is likely to arise.    
Data discrepancies with Armenia and Azerbaijan are most evident for HS 87
commodity group “Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling-stock, and parts
and accessories thereof” and can be possibly explained with the fact that Georgia
imports used cars from the Western Europe and then re-export them to its
neighbouring countries (ADB, 2007). In 2006, reported exports of HS 87 group
from Georgia to Azerbaijan and Armenia are 38.4% (USD 35.4 million) and 11.1%
(USD 8.2 million) of total Georgia’s exports to these countries, while no such
imports from Georgia were reported by Armenia and Azerbaijan (see Appendix 2
Table 1 for commodity composition of trade with Georgia’s main trade partners). A
similar situation arises when looking at the data on exports of cereals (HS 10) from
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26 Imports are recorded in CIF prices while exports are recorded in FOB prices, thus imports
should exceed exports by transportation and insurance costs.
Source: WITS.
Table 4.3. Georgia mirror statistics for main partners, 2006 (USD million)
 Georgia trade 
 statistics 
Mirror trade statistics  
of trade partners 
 Export Import Balance Export Import Balance 
Armenia 73.6 40.2 33.4 47.5 34.7 12.8 
Azerbaijan 92.2 318.5 -226.3 285.3 49.2 236.1 
Ukraine 57.0 303.2 -246.2 295.8 70.3 225.5 
Russian  
Federation 
75.7 558.6 -482.9 446.4 68.4 378 
Iran 2.7 40.3 -37.6 48.3 7.7 40.6 
Turkey 124.9 522.4 -397.5 225.9 182.8 43.1 
EU27 255.3 1060.9 -805.6 1159.4 648.9 510.5 
Total 681.4 2844.1 -2162.7 2508.6 1062.0 1446.6 
Georgia to Armenia (Georgia reports USD 11.8 million exports of cereals to
Armenia in 2006 while no such imports from Georgia are reported by Armenia).
Georgia was a net importer of cereals in 2006 (USD 109.6 million imports vs. USD
11.8 million exports); moreover, all exported cereals from Georgia were directed to
Armenia. Similarly, data on Turkey’s exports to Georgia seem to be substantially
underestimated.
In order to provide a consistent set of measures for the remainder of this report
we use Georgia’s trade data for further analysis, however the reader should bear
the above considerations and caveats in mind.
Table 4.4 presents Georgia’s ten largest partners in 2006. The EU was Georgia’s
largest trade partner accounting for 28.7% of Georgia’s total trade in 2006. It was
followed by three neighbouring countries Turkey (14.1%), Russia (13.8%) and
Azerbaijan (9%). Trade with the five largest partners attributed for 73.5% of
Georgia’s trade turnover in 2006 signifying its high geographical concentration.
Over the last decade, the role of trade with traditional CIS trade partners Russia,
Armenia, and Azerbaijan has been declining. At the same time, Georgia has
increased its trade with Turkey, Ukraine and Turkmenistan. Georgia has also
diversified its trade towards other partners – United Arab Emirates, China, United
States and Rest of the World. The registered share of trade with the EU has slightly
declined compared to 1996 due to the reduction of EU weight in Georgia’s total
imports (see also Table 4.9 below).
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Source: WITS.
Table 4.4. Georgia’s 10 largest trade partners in 2006
Trade partner  Trade  
turnover 
Balance Balance  
as a share 
of bilateral 
trade  
Share 
in total 
trade, 
2006 
Share 
in total 
trade, 
1996 
 million USD million USD % % % 
EU27 1316.1 -805.64 61.2 28.7 33.3 
Turkey 647.3 -397.43 61.4 14.1 11.6 
Russian Federation 634.3 -482.97 76.1 13.8 20.8 
Azerbaijan 410.7 -226.35 55.1 9.0 11.6 
Ukraine 360.2 -246.26 68.4 7.9 5.0 
United States 188.5 -70.82 37.6 4.1 3.5 
Turkmenistan 172.9 -29.25 16.9 3.8 2.0 
United Arab Emirates 132.0 -86.23 65.3 2.9 0.1 
Armenia 113.9 33.37 29.3 2.5 4.3 
China 113.6 -92.95 81.8 2.5 0.1 
RoW 497.4 -199.7 40.1 10.8 7.7 
World 4586.9 -2604.2 56.8 100 100 
4.6.1. Export Structures by Main Trading Partners
On the export side, the EU27 is Georgia’s most important trading partner. The
registered level of Georgia’s exports to the EU27 has grown substantially over the
last decade – by almost 8 times. As a result, the share of Georgia’s exports to the EU
in total Georgia’s export has expanded from about 16% in 1996 up to 25.7% in 2006
(see Table 45 and Figure 4.2.). 
Traditionally, Georgia’s exports were largely oriented to the CIS markets;
however, their importance as Georgia’s dominant destination markers has been
decreasing. This is especially pronounced for the Russian market, which was the
first among Georgia’s destination markets in 1996 and in 2001 (28.5% and 23.0%
respectively in total exports) and moved down to the fourth position in 2006 (7.6%
of total exports). This is partly due to Russia’s trade restrictions, as well as
Georgia’s greater penetration into other world markets. At the same time, the share
of exports to the Ukrainian market has increased from 2.7% in 1996 up to 5.7% in
2006 (e.g., upon Russia’s trade embargo the Georgia’s wine and spirits market is
shifting from Russia to Ukraine). 
Turkey, Azerbaijan and Armenia were the second, third and fifth partners
respectively in 2006. The role of Turkey in Georgia’s export was almost the same in
2006 as it was in 1996 – about 13% (while in 2001 it made up 21.5% of Georgia’s
exports). Although in value terms, Georgia’s exports to Azerbaijan and Armenia
markets increased substantially (by about 3.7 times), still their shares in Georgia’s
total exports have declined as compared to 1996 and have increased as compared
to 2001. At the same time, there has been a considerable shift of Georgia’s exports
towards non-CIS partners such as United States, Canada and United Arab Emirates
(accounting for 5.9%, 4.9% and 2.3% respectively in 2006 vs. 0.7%, 0.0% and 0.0%
respectively in 1996). Also, Georgia’s export markets are becoming more diversified
(and thus less concentrated): the share of exports to the Rest of world has increased
from 4.4% in 1996 up to 13.3% in 2006. 
Given the considerable weight of the EU as an export market and its growing
importance for Georgia over time, we can expect in accordance with the Sussex
Framework that there are opportunities for Georgian exporters to create more
trade on the EU market if barriers to trade are further reduced between countries.
Still, since the pre-FTA tariff barriers in the EU on Georgian goods are already low,
shallow integration effects as a result of the EU tariff reduction will not likely to be
significant for Georgia. At the same time, the elimination or reduction of regulatory
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and institutional non-tariff barriers in the process of deep integration will enhance
Georgia’s export potential and improve its access to the EU market. There is also
the possibility of long term gains to the extent that opening up the domestic market
makes the Georgian firms more productive, and hence more competitive.
Becoming more productive (either because of reallocation effects or because of
firms increasing their productivity levels) will increase overall productivity in the
economy and raise levels of GDP per capita.
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Source: WITS.
Table 4.5. Geographical distribution of Georgia’s exports
1996 2001 2006 Country name 
million  
USD 
% million 
 USD 
% million  
USD 
% 
EU27 32.2 16.1% 64.3 20.1% 255.3 25.7% 
Turkey 25.9 13.0% 68.7 21.5% 124.9 12.6% 
Azerbaijan 24.3 12.2% 10.6 3.3% 92.2 9.3% 
Russian Federation 56.7 28.5% 73.5 23.0% 75.7 7.6% 
Armenia 21.0 10.6% 12.3 3.8% 73.6 7.4% 
United States 1.3 0.7% 9.5 3.0% 58.9 5.9% 
Ukraine 5.4 2.7% 11.7 3.7% 57.0 5.7% 
Canada 0.0 0.0% 0.04 0.01% 48.9 4.9% 
United Arab Emirates 0.0 0.0% 1.3 0.4% 22.9 2.3% 
Iran 2.2 1.1% 4.3 1.3% 2.7 0.3% 
CIS (other) 21.0 10.6% 36.3 11.3% 96.3 9.7% 
RoW 8.7 4.4% 27.5 8.6% 132.0 13.3% 
Total exports 198.8 100.0% 320.0 100.0% 991.3 100.0% 
Source: WITS.
Figure 4.2. Geographical distribution of Georgia’s exports, selected years 
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From the EU perspective, the low level of trade with Georgia and the current
low level of tariff protection (GSP+ system) applied to Georgian products suggest
that there will be little scope for both trade creation and trade diversion effects. At
the same time, it should be taken into account that Georgia, as a transition
economy, is only partly reconstructed following the devastating collapse of USSR
industrial structures; the development of new industrial structures under the future
EU-Georgia FTA could well enhance the Georgia’s export potential in the EU
market in a longer perspective.
4.6.2. Export Structures by Commodities 
The Sussex Framework suggests considering the sectoral pattern of trade in
order to help to identify (1) the sectoral distribution of likely trade creation and
trade diversion and (2) those sectors which are of particular importance to the
economies concerned. This is important from the perspective of economic
significance, but also important from a political economy perspective. 
Table 4.2 presents the 10 largest commodity groups of exports in 2006
aggregated at HS-2 level, as well as changes in their exports over time. The ten
largest export groups are comprised of non-energy mineral products, base metals,
vegetables and foodstuffs, machinery and equipments, and chemical products.
“Iron and steel” HS group, mainly ferro-alloys and ferrous metal scrap, were the
major source of Georgia’s export (16.6% of all exports in 2006 vs. 5.9 % in 1996).
Iron and steel exports have increased as much as 14 times over 1996-2006. In 2006,
the key destination markets for iron and steel were Turkey (37.3% of all group
exports), the USA (18.7%), and Russia (14.2%). 
The second most important export category in 2006 was “Beverages and spirits”
including wines and mineral waters, and made up 12.1% of total exports.
Beverages and spirits have lost its leading export position, though their exports
have grown by 7 times from 1996. The key markets for this group were Ukraine
(28.9%), Russia (28.2%), and the EU (22.6%). The second largest group of
agricultural exports included edible fruit and nuts (6.2% of total exports in 2006).
The key markets included the EU (77.4%), Russia (8.8%) and Ukraine (7.0%). “Ores,
slag and ash” group was the third and captured 8.2% of in 2006; its share almost
sustained over the period. The EU was the main destination market (85%). Vehicles,
aircrafts27 and machinery and mechanical appliances together comprised 19.2% of
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27 Major part of aircrafts was exported to Turkmenistan due to the barter deals with Turkmenistan
against the debt on gas supplied to Georgia in 90-es. 
total exports in 2006 vs. 3% in 1996 and 8.8% in 2001. Their exports showed the
strongest growth by about 30 times from 1996. The key markets of vehicles (HS 87)
were Azerbaijan (48.4%), Turkey (12.4%) and Armenia (11.2%). Aircrafts (HS 88)
were mainly exported to Turkmenistan (83%) due to the barter deals with
Turkmenistan against the debt on gas supplied to Georgia in 90-es. The EU (43.8%),
United Arab Emirates (15.2%) and Turkmenistan (12.1%) were the key markets for
machinery and mechanical appliances (HS 84). The importance of precious stones
and metals also has grown over the period in total imports (from 0.5% to 5.2%).
Canada was the key destination market for this group (94%).
Overall, in 2006 as compared with 1996 there have been considerable changes
in the export structure of Georgia. The ten most important commodity groups in
2006 captured 75% of all exports, while in 1996 they were only 36% of total exports
(67.7% in 2001). Furthermore, there has been a shift in the export composition
from foodstuffs and agricultural products toward resource-based and high-
technology products over the last decade. Noteworthy, the share of all agricultural
and foodstuffs exports in Georgia’s total exports declined from 30.2% in 1996 to
23.7% in 2006. 
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Source: WITS.
Table 4.6. The 10 largest commodity groups of Georgia’s total exports, by 2 digit HS
HS  
code 
Product description 1996 2001 2006 
  million  
USD 
% million 
USD 
% million  
USD 
% 
72 Iron and steel 11.7 5.9% 50.79 15.87% 164.8 16.6% 
22 Beverages, spirits  
and vinegar 
16.4 8.2% 53.59 16.75% 119.6 12.1% 
26 Ores, slag and ash 13.7 6.9% 23.32 7.29% 81.7 8.2% 
87 Vehicles other than railway 
or tramway rolling-stock 
2.1 1.0% 2.46 0.77% 73.2 7.4% 
84 Nuclear reactors, boilers, 
machinery and mechanical 
appliances 
3.4 1.7% 11.68 3.65% 62.5 6.3% 
8 Edible fruit and nuts; peel  
of citrus fruits or melons  
and watermelons 
10.9 5.5% 11.64 3.64% 61.7 6.2% 
88 Aircraft, spacecraft,  
and parts thereof 
0.4 0.2% 36.08 11.28% 54.9 5.5% 
71 Natural or cultured pearls  
precious or semi-precious 
stones, precious metals  
0.7 0.3% 14.11 4.41% 51.4 5.2% 
31 Fertilizers 11.9 6.0% 4.93 1.54% 46.6 4.7% 
74 Copper and articles  
thereof 
0.1 0.0% 7.67 2.40% 30.2 3.0% 
 Total 71.3 36% 216.28 67.6% 746.6 75.0% 
Bilateral trade with the EU is more concentrated compared to Georgia’s total
trade, though Georgia has diversified to some extent its exports to the EU over the
last decade (see Table 4.7). Non-energy mineral products (ores, slag and ash)
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Source: WITS.
Table 4.7. The 10 largest commodity groups of Georgia’s exports to the EU, by HS 2-digit
HS 
code 
Product description 1996 2001 2006 
  million  
USD 
% million  
USD 
% million  
USD 
% 
26 Ores, slag and ash 13.4 41.5% 9.74 15.15% 69.4 27.2% 
8 Edible fruit and nuts 0.7 2.2% 6.93 10.77% 47.7 18.7% 
84 Nuclear reactors,  
boilers, machinery  
and mechanical 
appliances 
0.9 2.7% 2.61 4.05% 27.4 10.7% 
22 Beverages, spirits  
and vinegar 
1.1 3.6% 4.67 7.26% 27.0 10.6% 
27 Mineral fuels, mineral oils 
and products of their 
distillation 
4.7 14.6% 0.86 1.33% 15.0 5.9% 
31 Fertilizers 2.7 8.5% 1.59 2.47% 13.3 5.2% 
72 Iron and steel 1.8 5.6% 4.90 7.61% 12.0 4.7% 
87 Vehicles other than  
railway or tramway  
rolling-stock 
0.0 0.0% 1.00 1.55% 6.1 2.4% 
20 Preparations of vegetables, 
fruit, nuts 
1.1 3.4% 1.02 1.59% 5.0 2.0% 
88 Aircraft, spacecraft,  
and parts thereof 
0.1 0.2% 0.11 0.17% 4.7 1.8% 
 Total 26.5 82.30% 33.42 51.96% 227.6 89.20% 
Source: WITS.
Table 4.8. The 10 largest exports of Georgia to the EU in 2006, by HS 2-digit (the EU mirror
statistics)
HS  
code 
Product description million USD % 
27 Mineral fuels, mineral oils 
and products of their distillation; 
350.49 54.02% 
26 Ores, slag and ash 69.81 10.76% 
8 Edible fruit and nuts 50.00 7.71% 
22 Beverages, spirits and vinegar 45.74 7.05% 
85 Electrical machinery and equipment 25.98 4.00% 
31 Fertilizers 19.28 2.97% 
72 Iron and steel 13.27 2.05% 
84 Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery  
and mechanical appliances 
10.75 1.66% 
76 Aluminium and articles  thereof  9.30 1.43% 
74 Copper and articles  thereof  7.41 1.14% 
 Total 602.03 92.78% 
traditionally led the list of most important exports to the EU (27.2% in 2006),
though its share has declined compared with 1996 (41.5%). At the same time, there
has been a considerable rise in importance of edible fruits and nuts as compared
with 1996 and 2001 (from 2.2% in 1996 up to 18.7% in 2006), and beverages and
spirits (from 3.6% in 1996 to 10.6% in 2006). Machinery and mechanical appliances
was the third largest group and their share expanded considerably from 2.7% up to
10.7% over 1996-2006. Among other important export products to the EU were
mineral fuels (5.9%), fertilizers (5.2%), and iron and steel (4.7%), etc. As previously
mentioned, there is a huge difference in countries’ reporting of Georgia’s exports of
mineral fuels (HS 27) to the EU (see Table 48 for the EU mirror statistics). 
Taking into the account the fairly low level of the EU tariffs on both Georgian
agricultural and non-agricultural commodities, the scope of shallow integration-
induced trade creation due to the tariff reduction is likely to be limited. In the
longer perspective, Georgia’s future comparative advantages still remain to be
created by investment in new economic structures (for example outsourcing by
Turkish industries) to take advantage of low Georgian labour costs. 
4.6.3. Import Structures by Major Trading Partners
Georgia is an import-oriented economy, with a merchandise trade balance
making up about 33% of GDP. The EU is Georgia’s largest supplier with a reported
29.5% share in Georgia’s total imports in 2006 (see Table 4.9, Figure 4.3). Georgia
is a net importer of the European products with the registered USD 805 million
negative trade balance in 2006 (or about 61% of bilateral trade). Over the last
decade, imports from the EU have grown by about 4 times, though the EU import
share has declined by almost 9 percentage points (from 38.3% to 29.3%). The
import share of Russia, the other principal supplier to Georgia, has also declined,
but to a lesser extent (from 18.5% in 1996 to 13.4% in 2001 and 15.5% in 2006).
Russia exports energy resources to Georgia and is also a significant exporter of food
products (mostly cereals and their preparations), machinery and mechanical
appliances, electrical equipment and vehicles (see Appendix 2 Table 1). Imports
from Turkey, third largest supplier in 2006, have risen by about 7 times from 1996
increasing its share from 11.2% in 1996 up to 14.5% in 2006. Turkey exports mainly
machinery and mechanical appliances, plastics, electrical equipments, chemicals,
paper and metal products. Azerbaijan is the forth largest Georgia’s importer with
share of about 9% in total imports in 2006 exporting mainly oil and oil products. 
Ukraine’s share in Georgia’s imports has been substantially increasing over
1996-2006 (from 5.7% to 8.4%). Ukraine exports metals and metal products,
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machinery and vehicles, and food products (vegetable oils, tobacco, dairy
produce) to Georgia. The share of other CIS countries has also risen (from 1.2%
to 4.6%). The strongest growth over the period has been revealed by imports from
the United Arab Emirates and China driving their shares up to about 3% for each
(from almost zero level in 1996). The three major groups of United Arab Emirates
imports to Georgia include electrical equipments, vehicles, and machinery and
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Source: WITS.
Table 4.9. Geographical distribution of Georgia’s imports 
Country name 1996 2001 2006 
 milion 
USD 
% million  
USD 
% million 
USD 
% 
EU27 263.1 38.3% 236.7 34.9% 1060.9 29.5% 
Russian  
Federation 
127.1 18.5% 91.2 13.4% 558.6 15.5% 
Turkey 76.6 11.2% 105.0 15.5% 522.4 14.5% 
Azerbaijan 78.7 11.5% 73.2 10.8% 318.5 8.9% 
Ukraine 38.8 5.7% 49.5 7.3% 303.2 8.4% 
United States 29.8 4.3% 27.8 4.1% 129.7 3.6% 
United Arab 
Emirates 
0.6 0.1% 8.2 1.2% 109.1 3.0% 
China 0.1 0.0% 3.8 0.6% 103.3 2.9% 
Iran 2.7 0.4% 6.3 0.9% 40.3 1.1% 
Armenia 17.2 2.5% 10.4 1.5% 40.2 1.1% 
CIS (other) 8.6 1.2% 26.6 3.9% 163.9 4.6% 
RoW 43.6 6.3% 39.9 5.9% 245.4 6.8% 
Total 686.8 100% 678.7 100.0% 3595.5 100.0% 
Source: WITS.
Figure 4.3. Geographical distribution of Georgia’s imports, selected years 
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mechanical appliances, while China supplies to Georgia machinery and
mechanical appliances, electrical equipments and footwear. The weight of United
States has almost sustained over the period (at about 4%), with such key imports
groups as vehicles, electrical equipments and machinery, and foodstuffs (meat
products, cereals, fish). Noteworthy, the share of the Rest of the world has been
also fairly stable (at about 6%). Overall, the share of CIS countries in total
imports has remained almost the same over the last decade, with a slight shift
from Russia to other CIS countries. There has also been a shift in Georgia’s
structure of import sources from the EU to new partners such as United Arab
Emirates and China.
The relatively high share of imports from the EU in Georgia’s total imports
suggests that there is some potential for trade creation arising from future EU-
Georgia FTA. At the same time, the fact that this share has been declining over
time may signify an increasing competitiveness of third country suppliers for
Georgia (Georgia has been shifting its sources of imports towards less-cost
imports from other partners). It is also the case that over 70% of Georgia’s
imports is from non-EU countries, which suggests scope for import supply
switching. Where this is from e.g. CIS countries with whom Georgia already has
an FTA (accounting for about 38% of total imports in 2006), then there is likely
to be welfare increasing trade reorientation. Where this is away from non-partner
countries than this would entail welfare decreasing trade diversion. The future
FTA may serve to increase the EU share in total imports and thus it is likely to
induce trade diversion as well; hence net welfare effect from this FTA for Georgia
will be ambiguous. 
Nevertheless, bearing in mind the current low level of pre-FTA tariffs (with zero
tariffs for non-agricultural trade) in Georgia for all its partners, the shallow
integration-induced welfare effects are not expected to be significant. It is worth noting
that the there may be significant effects still to come from the 2006 tariff reductions in
Georgia (first of all, for non-agricultural products) in the form of i) the increase of
Georgia’s trade with its main partners, as well as ii) the trade re-orientation from CIS
partners towards non-CIS partners due to the reduction of preferential margin earlier
received by CIS bloc. However, the magnitude of these effects depends on how much
the differences in competitiveness across countries (CIS and non-CIS) are actually
affected by tariff changes. It is also important how far the improvements in the general
business climate in Georgia through trade-related and other reform measures succeed
in triggering a sustained period of high economic growth. 
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4.6.4. Import Structure by Commodities 
Natural gas and oil products, followed by vehicles, machinery and mechanical
appliances and electrical equipment topped the list of Georgia’s imports in 2006 (see
Table 4.10). The largest part of Georgia’s imports traditionally has been accounted for
by energy products, but their share has been significantly falling over 1996-2006
(from 38.8% to 19.8%). The key suppliers of mineral fuels (HS 27) are Azerbaijan
(34% of all imported mineral fuels), Russia (32%) and Turkmenistan (14%). Imports
of machine-building produce were represented by three commodity groups (HS 87,
84, 85) whose total importance (28.5%) much exceeded that of energy products in
2006. Over the last decade, their share has been expanding substantially – by over 19
percentage points, and by 7 p.p. compared to 2001. The major suppliers of vehicles
into Georgia were represented by the EU (55%), the US (13%), and Japan (8%), and
Ukraine (5.4%); machinery and mechanical appliances – by the EU (53.2%), Turkey
(16.5%), Russia (6%) and China (5.9%), followed by United Arab Emirates and
Ukraine (4.7% each); electrical equipment – by the EU (35%), Turkey (17%), United
Arab Emirates (15.4%) and Ukraine (8%). Imports of pharmaceuticals comprised
3.5% of total imports in 2006, which is greater than in 1996 (2.3%) but lower than in
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Source: WITS.
Table 4.10. The 10 largest commodity groups of Georgia’s total imports, by HS 2-digit
HS 
code 
Product description 1996 2001 2006 
  milion 
USD 
% milion 
USD 
% million 
USD 
% 
27 Mineral fuels, mineral  
oils and products  
of their distillation 
266.3 38.8% 155.48 22.91% 713.3 19.8% 
87 Vehicles other than 
railway or tramway 
rolling-stock 
8.3 1.2% 21.82 3.22% 401.7 11.2% 
84 Nuclear reactors, 
boilers, machinery and 
mechanical appliances 
24.2 3.5% 69.46 10.23% 335.7 9.3% 
85 Electrical machinery 
and equipment 
30.8 4.5% 55.58 8.19% 286.5 8.0% 
30 Pharmaceutical 
products 
15.6 2.3% 40.44 5.96% 124.2 3.5% 
10 Cereals 65.0 9.5% 11.53 1.70% 109.6 3.0% 
39 Plastics and articles 
thereof 
4.9 0.7% 14.77 2.18% 102.8 2.9% 
73 Articles of iron or steel 4.6 0.7% 26.16 3.85% 98.4 2.7% 
17 Sugars and sugar 
confectionery 
35.4 5.1% 25.12 3.70% 76.6 2.1% 
72 Iron and steel 3.5 0.5% 11.34 1.67% 74.7 2.1% 
 Total 458.6 66.80% 431.70 63.61% 2323.5 64.60% 
2001 (6%). The main importers of pharmaceuticals included the EU (60%),
Switzerland (10.6%), and Turkey (6.5%) and Ukraine (6%). Only two agricultural
commodity groups were among 10 largest import groups in 2006 in accordance with
HS 2-digit classification: cereals, with the 3% share, and sugars, with the 2% share.
The importance of these groups has been falling over the last years.
Georgia’s imports from the EU are concentrated in machinery and transport
equipment, chemicals, manufactured goods, as well as mineral fuels. In 2006, the
major HS 2-digit commodity groups of Georgia’s import from the EU included:
vehicles (HS 87) accounted for 20.8% of total imports from the EU, machinery and
mechanical appliances (HS 84) – 16.8%, mineral fuels (HS 27) – 9.4%, electrical
equipment (HS 85) – 9.4%, and pharmaceuticals – 7.1% together capturing for over
63% of total imports form the EU in 2006 (see Table 4.11). The structure of main
commodity groups imported from the EU has changed notably over the decade. The
most pronounced changes in 2006 vs. 1996 import structures have been observed for
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Source: WITS.
Table 4.11. The 10 largest commodity groups of Georgia’s imports from the EU, by HS 2-digit
HS  
code 
Product description 1996 2001 2006 
  million
 USD 
% million
 USD 
% million
 USD 
% 
87 Vehicles other than 
railway or tramway 
rolling-stock 
2.7 1.0% 14.40 6.08% 221.0 20.8% 
84 Nuclear reactors,  
boilers, machinery and 
mechanical appliances 
12.3 4.7% 39.69 16.8% 178.4 16.8% 
27 Mineral fuels, mineral  
oils and products  
of their distillation 
80.4 30.5% 19.08 8.1% 100.0 9.4% 
85 Electrical machinery  
and equipment 
13.1 5.0% 21.35 9.0% 99.8 9.4% 
30 Pharmaceutical  
products 
3.8 1.5% 29.07 12.3% 75.6 7.1% 
90 Optical, photographic,  
cinematographic, 
measuring, checking,  
precision, medical  
instruments  
3.0 1.2% 10.54 4.5% 33.2 3.1% 
33 Essential oils and  
resinoids; perfumery,  
cosmetic 
1.0 0.4% 4.73 2.0% 32.0 3.0% 
94 Furniture 2.9 1.1% 3.98 1.7% 26.6 2.5% 
73 Articles of iron or steel 0.6 0.2% 12.10 5.1% 21.5 2.0% 
95 Toys, games  
and sports requisites 
0.2 0.1% 0.67 0.3% 18.9 1.8% 
 Total 120.0 45.7% 155.6 65.8% 807.0 75.9% 
vehicles (a rise of almost 20 percentage points from 1996), mineral fuels (a decline
of over 20% p.p.), and machinery and mechanical appliances (a rice of about 12%
p.p.). At the same time, 2006 import structure is much more similar to the 2001 one,
with only vehicles imports revealing a sharp change of 14 p.p. over 2001-2006.  
As can be seen, Table 4.11 does not contain agricultural products. When looking
at agricultural imports from the EU to Georgia in 2006, there are two major
commodity groups included – beverages and spirits, HS 22 (1.7% of total imports
from the EU) and dairy products, eggs and natural honey, HS 4 (1.1%). These
products are among those under the highest tariff protection in Georgia – hence
there is some scope for trade creation and trade diversion effects in regard to these
products if they are included into the FTA28. 
Under the future EU-Georgia FTA, trade creation and trade diversion are likely
to appear mainly in regard to those goods, in which the pre-FTA trade between
partners has been concentrated, that is in regard to machinery and transport
equipment, chemicals and manufactured goods. Furthermore, the EU will compete
with those partners, who import a similar set of goods into Georgia; hence the
future FTA may cause Georgia’s trade to divert from those partners. On the
contrary, less trade diversion is expected in regard to partners with dissimilar
structures of exports to Georgia. When we compare Georgia’s imports from other
main partners with that from the EU, we conclude that the EU competes with the
US, Japan and Ukraine in regard to vehicles; with Turkey, Russia, China, United
Arab Emirates and Ukraine in regard to machinery and electrical equipment; with
Turkey and Ukraine in regard to pharmaceuticals. Imports from the EU in these
products currently predominate. 
All the products referred to above are already exempted from tariff barriers in
Georgia suggesting that the current distribution of Georgia’s sources of those
imports does not incorporate tariff-induced distortions and imports come from
their most efficient suppliers. Therefore, we conclude that little direct shallow
integration-induced effects are likely to occur from any future Georgian FTA in
regard to these products. Distortions in trade are possibly created by non-tariff
barriers and thus cooperation between countries in this area should be welfare
increasing. 
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28 Imports of beverages and spirits made up 1.1% of total imports to Georgia in 2006; dairy
products – 0.9%.
4.7. Finger-Kreinin Indices
According to the third and fourth rules of thumb, the extent to which trade
creation on the production side will occur depends on the degree of overlap in
production and trade structures across the economies of future partners, and on the
differences in relative costs of production between them. The more similar the
production bundles of the economies and the higher the elasticities of supply, the
greater the possibility of trade creation from the PTA, since countries are able to
source the good to the more efficient partner supplier (Gasiorek et al, 2006).
Otherwise, trade diversion is likely to occur. 
The degree of similarity between two partners with regard to their trade or
production structures is measured by the Finger-Kreinin (FK) index. The FK index
is equal to 1 (or 100 if expressed as percent) when the structure of trade across the
two countries is identical, and is equal to 0 when the structure of trade is
completely different. Ideally, it is computed on the basis of production data, but
since it is not readily available, highly disaggregated trade data is used instead. We
have calculated the FK indices to measure similarities of export structures between
Georgia and its main trade partners – the EU27, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine,
Russia, Iran29, Turkey, as well as across these partners at the HS 6-digit and 4-digit
level. Given the higher level of aggregation at the 4-digit level, the reported degree
of similarity is inevitably higher when compared to the 6-digit level. We also carried
out the same exercise for imports (see Table 414 through Table 4.15).
The FK indices measuring export similarities between Georgia and its main trade
partners are extremely low (see Table 4.12, Table 4.13). The highest FK index (19.11
at HS 6 digit level and 31.33 at HS 4 digit level) is between Armenian and Georgian
exports. The FK index for Georgia and the EU is 16.13 at HS 6 digit level and 23.29
at HS 4 digit level. The low FK index for Georgia and the EU suggests a low level of
export similarity between them. Therefore, according to the fourth rule of thumb
there is not much evidence to suggest trade creation on the production side under the
future Georgia and the EU FTA. Due to recent trade liberalisation in Georgia, it can
be concluded that Georgia is already undergoing the process of switching towards
more efficient sources of supply and deepening its trade specialisation. In regard to
other partners, Georgia’s export structure also does not overlap much with their
export structures either. Not surprisingly, if we consider the degree of overlap with
regard to imports we see that this is significantly higher. This occurs because of the
common need across the CIS countries for imports of intermediates and final goods
which are not produced domestically (see Table 4.14, Table 4.15). 
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29 Trade data for Iran is of 2005.
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Source: WITS.
Table 4.12. FK indices for exports, HS 6 digit, 2006
 Georgia Armenia Azerbaijan Ukraine Russia Iran Turkey 
Armenia 19.11 -      
Azerbaijan 5.89 1.80 -     
Ukraine 10.03 5.00 9.26 -    
Russia 5.96 3.22 53.94 21.14 -   
Iran 4.26 1.56 62.63 4.94 38.90 -  
Turkey 7.95 7.58 3.47 16.38 5.51 4.49 - 
EU27 16.13 7.41 8.18 27.01 18.12 6.91 23.01 
Source: WITS.
Table 4.13. FK indices for exports, HS 4 digit, 2006
 Georgia Armenia Azerbaijan Ukraine Russia Iran Turkey 
Armenia 31.33 -      
Azerbaijan 7.35 2.49 -     
Ukraine 18.42 9.18 11.70 -    
Russia 11.60 5.23 55.83 25.50 -   
Iran 6.98 2.93 64.86 7.48 42.01 -  
Turkey 12.47 10.72 4.74 21.26 7.18 7.65 - 
EU27 23.29 10.08 10.42 34.49 20.77 9.76 27.89 
Source: WITS.
Table 4.14. FK indices for imports, HS 6-digit, 2006
 Georgia Armenia Azerbaijan Ukraine Russia Iran Turkey 
Armenia 53.31 -      
Azerbaijan 39.76 32.23 -     
Ukraine 37.92 35.52 38.41 -    
Russia 42.19 31.94 34.50 56.27 -   
Iran 20.25 18.24 26.59 34.00 35.11 -  
Turkey 22.29 20.87 24.39 50.16 38.61 42.06 - 
EU27 35.28 31.41 31.51 53.01 51.13 35.99 48.08 
Source: WITS.
Table 4.15. FK indices for imports, HS 4 digit, 2006
 Georgia Armenia Azerbaijan Ukraine Russia Iran Turkey 
Armenia 64.11 -      
Azerbaijan 51.97 47.65 -     
Ukraine 53.57 50.59 46.40 -    
Russia 54.62 44.17 44.36 56.27 -   
Iran 39.29 37.46 36.33 42.74 43.44 -  
Turkey 39.36 42.69 33.83 51.18 46.36 51.70 - 
EU27 53.26 46.43 43.05 62.96 60.33 43.84 55.75 
4.8. Revealed Comparative Advantage 
It is important to analyse the relative competitiveness of producers of the
partners of future FTA. Great differences in comparative advantage between
partners producing a similar mix of goods suggest that there may be a welfare
improving FTA (on the production side). When there are differences in production
efficiency and costs (i.e., relative competitiveness) between partners trade creation
arises since countries are able to source the goods from the most efficient and less-
cost FTA partner. In other words, countries have the potential to greater specialise
in those goods, in which they have a comparative advantage. The greater the
differences in comparative advantage the greater are the trade creation effect and
welfare gains.  
The relative competitiveness of producers is usually measured by indices of
revealed comparative advantage (RCA). The RCA compares a country’s share of
exports in a given good with the world share of exports of this good. A country has a
comparative advantage when its share is above the world share for that good, that is
when RCA is greater that 1; disadvantage is expressed by an RCA that is less than 1.
We calculated the RCAs for Georgia and for the EU, as well as for all Georgia’s main
partners, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Ukraine, Russia, and Iran, at the HS
6-digit level for 2006. Furthermore, to analyse the evolution of Georgia’s comparative
advantage over the last decade we also calculated its RCAs for 1996. We also
compared Georgia’s largest export items by export shares vs. exports with the highest
RCAs to show if Georgia exported products in which it had a comparative advantage.
In addition, we computed Georgia’s RCAs for non-agricultural exports in order to be
able to focus on this area. Finally we repeated the same exercise with respect to
Georgia’s exports the EU (see Appendix 1 Table 1 through Appendix 1 Table 13 and
Appendix 3 (Appendix 3 Table 1-Appendix 3 Table 6)).
The major conclusions about Georgia’s export structure and its RCAs are: 
• Georgia’s export are fairly highly concentrated at the HS 6-digit level, in
comparison to those of the EU, Turkey, or the Ukraine, but considerably less
so than other countries in the region. The 15 top export sectors accounted for
about 62% of total exports in 2006. For comparative purposes the
corresponding figures for the following countries are given in brackets: EU
(21.13%), Armenia (80.9%), Azerbaijan (93.4%), Russia (78.4%), Turkey
(35.5%), Ukraine (36.6%), and Iran (90.5%). For Georgia, the principal
exports consist of ferrous-alloys, copper ores and concentrates, ferrous and
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copper waste and scrap, hazelnuts and beverages, and some machinery (see
Appendix1 Table 1). In almost all of these goods Georgia has a comparative
advantage, except for petroleum oils, HS 270900. Furthermore, 4 among 15
largest export items are simultaneously belong to the list of exports with the
highest RCAs in 2006, namely ferro-silico-manganese, hazelnuts without
shells, ammonium nitrate, and mineral waters and aerated waters (see
Appendix1 Table 2). At the same time, there is some potential for Georgia to
enhance its specialisation in other exports revealing the highest comparative
advantage. 
• There have been significant changes in Georgia’s export structure in 2006 vs.
1996. The 15 largest export sectors in 2006 made up only 12% of exports in
1996 (see Appendix 1 Table 1). The most significant rise of export shares has
been observed for ferro-silico-manganese, ferrous waste and scrap, hazelnuts
without shells, gold in other semi-manufactured forms and certain
automobiles. At the same time, the greatest positive changes in RCAs have
occurred for: ferro-silico-manganese, hazelnuts without shells, isotopes, and
white and other hydraulic cements; and negative changes – for thyme, bay
leaves (see Appendix 1 Table 2). The RCAs have remained almost unchanged
for ammonium nitrate, mineral waters and aerated waters, and petroleum oils
(see Appendix 1 Table 3, Appendix 1 Table 4). Overall, there has been high
positive correlation between changes in export shares and levels of RCAs over
time. 
• The relatively high concentration of Georgia’s exports is also true if we focus
only on non-agricultural exports (see Appendix 1 Table 5, Appendix 1 Table 6).
Just over 66% of Georgia’s non-agricultural exports were accounted for by the
top 15 sectors. Ferro-silico-manganese, isotopes, ammonium nitrate and white
cement top the list of exports with highest RCAs. At the same time, Appendix
1 Table 6 also contains machine-building produce such as: helicopters of an
unladen weight, parachutes and their parts, trucks. We also see that there has
been considerable change over time in the composition of Georgia’s non-
agricultural exports. The top 15 sectors in 2006, only accounted for 24.9% of
exports in 1996, and eight of the 2006 sectors had no reported exports in 1996.
• In regard to the EU market: we can see again a higher concentration of
Georgia’s export to the EU: seven top export items (copper ores and
concentrates, hazelnuts without shells, waters, including mineral waters,
petroleum oils, ammonium nitrate, self-propelled bulldozers and angledozers,
track laying, and ferro-silicon-manganese) accounted for about 70% of all
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exports to the EU in 2006 (see Appendix 1 Table 7). Georgia’s most important
export items reveal even higher RCAs on the EU market in regard to the
following goods: hazelnuts without shells, nonradioactive and other isotopes,
hazelnuts in shell, copper ores and concentrates, and ammonium nitrate (see
Appendix1 Table 8). In addition, women’s or girls’ suits of synthetic fibres,
graders and levellers, other seeds, fruit and spores, self-propelled bulldozers
and angledozers, track laying, manganese ores, and mineral waters also have
high relative competitiveness on the EU market. Noteworthy, that top 15
Georgia’s exports to the EU revealed on average a considerably higher
comparative advantage than the total exports to the world markets (see
Appendix 1 Table 1 and Appendix 1 Table 7). On the other hand, the top 15
export items with highest RCAs made up 68% of Georgia’s exports to the EU
market in 2006, and only 27% on the world markets; 8 among 15 largest
export items to the EU market simultaneously belong to the list of exports with
the highest RCAs in 2006 (see Appendix 1 Table 2, Appendix 1 Table 8). This
signifies that Georgia specialises its trade with the EU in sectors in which it
exhibits greater comparative advantage. Once again, we also see important
compositional shifts if we compare the top 15 exports in 2006 to those in 1996. 
Next, we compare the preceding with the key exports for some of Georgia’s key
trading partners, in particular those in the region. Appendix 1 Table 13 and
Appendix 3, Appendix 3 Table 1-Appendix 3 Table 6 give the composition and RCAs
of the top 15 sectors for the EU, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, Turkey, the Ukraine,
and Iran respectively. From this we note that there is little similarity between the
countries RCAs, as well as between countries top export sectors. We then explore
this more formally by computing the bilateral correlation coefficients of the RCA’s
at the 6-digit HS level across all the pairs of countries (Appendix1 Table 14). Overall
we see that the correlation coefficients extremely low, and indeed in most cases
negative, suggesting very little similarity in both the export patterns, and in the
revealed comparative advantage they indicate. Once, again this is evidence to
suggest that there is little likelihood on the basis of existing patterns of trade and
production of considerable trade creation arising from greater regional integration
among these countries. The highest correlation coefficient, though still rather low,
is that between Georgia and Turkey RCAs (0.2). There is little correlation between
Georgia and the EU RCAs (the FK index was also among the lowest between
Georgia and the EU=0.02). 
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If we compare the FK indices and correlation coefficients, for example, for the
EU and Turkey: 16.13 and 0.02. (EU) vs. 7.75 and 0.2 (Turkey) respectively, we can
conclude that there is more overlap in exports between Georgia and the EU than
between Georgia and Turkey (see also Table 4.12 and Table 4.13). While for those
exports, which overlap, the RCAs are more similar between Georgia and Turkey. As
such, according to the third and fourth rules there may be more possibilities for
trade creation on the production side between Georgia and the EU than between
Georgia and Turkey.
4.9. Deep integration and Grubel-Lloyd index
With the reduction of tariffs to very low levels, coupled with the liberalisation of
services, capital and labour movements, it is possible that a new integration
dynamic in Georgian trade structures could be developing. However it is very
important to consider opportunities from the deep (positive) integration between
Georgia and the EU. The removal or reduction of existing non-tariff barriers
including regulatory, institutional and infrastructure impediments, could trigger
considerably higher welfare implications for Georgia than those induced by a
process of shallow integration. 
The potential for gains from deeper integration depends on the extent to which
the FTA leads to convergence of regulatory and economic policies among partners.
The greater the countries’ convergence of regulatory policies, the greater is the
potential for welfare gains as a result of the FTA. This convergence implies both a
removal of barriers to trade that operate beyond borders (such as discriminatory
regulations, institutional impediments, etc.) and undertaking common policies to
promote trade and investment and to generate positive externalities and
productivity gains (Gasiorek et al, 2006). 
Intra-industry trade (IIT) is a key indicator of existing and by implication
potential deep integration between partner countries in market terms. IIT takes
three forms. First, it is the exchange of similar goods of roughly similar qualities
and prices; secondly, it is the exchange of similar goods of different qualities and
prices; thirdly, it is the exchange of goods within a trade classification that
represents a vertically integrated supply chain (parts for finished or partly finished
goods). Each of these represents a way in which economic integration can
encourage the niche specialisation that generates productivity gains. These gains
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represent the main advantages of deep integration and may compensate for losses
to trade diversion from shallow integration (Gasiorek et al, 2006). The levels of IIT
are measured by the Grubel-Lloyd index ranging from 0 for no IIT between
countries to 1 (or 100 in percentage form) if all trade is IIT.
We computed the IIT indices for Georgia and its main partners in 2006 and in
1996 at the HS 6 digit level and in 2006 at the HS 4 digit level (for comparison). In
addition, for the purposes of comparison we calculated the IIT indices for the EU
and the same countries at HS 6 digit level. Table 4.16 shows the low level of IIT
between Georgia and the EU in 2006 (only 8.2% at HS 6 digit level and 9.9% at HS
4 digit level). Noteworthy, that in case of using the EU mirror trade data for
calculations of the IIT index between Georgia and the EU, the index equals 38.9%
for all bilateral trade and only 9.3% for all trade excluding mineral fuels, HS 27
group (reflecting the fact of that HS 27 group is the major discrepancy in Georgia
and the EU bilateral data). 
The highest levels of IIT were revealed between Georgia and Iran and Georgia
and Armenia (see Table 4.16) – 23.1% and 16.3% at HS 6 digit level. Again, these
indices are sensitive to the bilateral data used. For instance, if we calculated IIT
index on the basis of Armenia’s trade data, the appropriate index equals 27.2%. 
The low level of IIT between Georgia and the EU suggests about the low level of
existing deep integration between countries and confirms the earlier considerations
about the non significant overlap between Georgia and the EU trade patterns
(captured by FK index) and competitiveness (captured by RCAs). Nevertheless,
following the Deep EU-Georgia FTA the development of new industrial structures
in Georgia may strengthen intra-industry trade linkages. 
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Source: WITS Note: * excluding HS 27 group (Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation
Table 4.16. IIT indices for Georgia in 2006 (HS 6 digit and 4 digit levels), for Georgia in 1996
(HS 6 digit level) and for EU27 and Armenia in 2006 (HS 6 digit level), %
 Georgia,  
HS 6 digit, 
2006 
Georgia, 
HS 6 digit, 
1996 
Georgia, 
HS 4 digit, 
2006 
EU27, 
HS 6 digit, 
2006 
Armenia, 
HS 6 digit, 
2006 
Georgia - - - 38.89 (9.3*) 27.18 
Armenia 16.29 14.41 13.59 18.45 - 
Azerbaijan 7.78 12.38 4.74 3.21 - 
Ukraine 3.24 12.87 3.68 14.33 7.80 
Russia 13.44 23.05 15.37 6.16 15.24 
Iran 23.07 18.06 16.80 3.34 38.69 
Turkey 12.28 13.64 9.41 18.68 13.73 
EU27 8.17 11.65 9.88 - 16.27 
From the Georgia perspective, the eventual welfare implications from the future
FTA with the EU will depend on the success in converging its regulatory policies to
those of the EU, reducing trade-restricting barriers and creating the trade and
investment supporting regulatory and institutional framework. The effective
implementation of the above will result in closer relations between firms leading to
technology transfer; the creation of supply chains; the improved business
environment leading to the reduction of the risk premium on investment;
development of new industrial structures, etc. A greater level of Georgia’s regulatory
and institutional approximation with the EU would lead to higher welfare gains for
Georgia as a result of the future deep and comprehensive FTA with the EU.
Therefore, the continuation of the profound economic reforms in accordance with
the European standards and best practice, as determined by the PCA and ENP
Action Plan trade and investment provisions, is of primary importance for Georgia. 
4.10. Conclusions
Georgia has almost done free trade on its side already for non-agricultural
products and significantly liberalised also imports of agricultural goods as a result
of the tariff reductions implemented in mid 2006. About 90% of tariff lines are
presently exempted from tariffs. From Georgia’s perspective, the overall conclusion
is that the low level of tariffs in Georgia suggests there is little scope for significant
shallow integration induced welfare effects (both trade creation and trade
diversion) arising from a potential EU-Georgia FTA. There are likely, however, to
be greater gains arising from appropriate measures of deeper integration.
Georgia’s principal imports from the EU include: vehicles, machinery and
electrical equipment, pharmaceuticals, instruments and chemicals. All these
products are already exempted from tariff barriers in Georgia suggesting that the
current distribution of Georgia’s sources of those imports does not incorporate
tariff-induced distortions (thus little direct welfare effects are likely to occur from
any future Georgian FTA in regard to these products). Distortions in trade are,
however, possibly created by non-tariff barriers and thus cooperation between
Georgia and the EU on their reduction should be welfare increasing. 
The reduction of import tariffs by Georgia in 2006 is expected i) to increase
Georgia’s trade with its main partners, as well as ii) to induce some trade re-
orientation from CIS partners towards non-CIS partners due to the reduction of
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preferential margin earlier received by CIS bloc. Such a trade reorientation is likely
to be welfare-increasing since importers can now freely (in terms of tariffs) source
from the most efficient suppliers. Moreover, opening up of the domestic markets
results in greater competition and force the Georgian firms to restructure and
become more efficient.
Bearing in mind the relatively low level of Georgian tariffs, when we look in
more detail at the trade patterns, and trade and production structures, of Georgia
and its’ main trading partners we conclude, that trade diversion is on balance more
likely than trade creation from a future EU-Georgia FTA. This is for the following
reasons: i) over 70% of Georgia’s imports are from non-EU countries, which
suggest a greater likelihood of import supply switching (hence trade diversion). At
the same time, the declining share of the EU in Georgia’s imports implies the
increasing competitiveness of imports from third country suppliers for Georgia; ii)
the low similarity between the production and trade structures of Georgia and the
EU along with the low correlation between the countries RCAs suggests that there
is little scope for trade creation on the production side (for the shifting of
production and trade to the more efficient FTA partner). 
However, the EU is an important market for Georgia’s exports and its
importance has been growing over time. Access to the large EU market allows
Georgian producers to exploit greater economies of scale, resulting in productivity
gains. Mineral products, edible fruits and nuts and beverages and spirits, machinery
and mechanical appliances, and iron and steel products are the main sectors where
Georgia has an export interest in the EU market. Overall, the evidence shows that
Georgia specialises in its trade with the EU in those sectors in which it exhibits a
high revealed comparative advantage. This includes (as of 2006) copper ores and
concentrates, hazelnuts without shells, other nuts and seeds including mixtures,
ammonium nitrate, waters, including mineral waters, self-propelled bulldozers and
angledozers, track laying, and ferro-silicon-manganese, nonradioactive and other
isotopes. Overall, on the export side we would expect that closer integration with the
EU is likely in the first instance to benefit most those sectors with a clear revealed
comparative advantage and where trade growth is already positive. Nevertheless,
owing to the low levels of pre-FTA EU tariffs, and non-tariff protection measures
(such as quantitative restrictions), the direct shallow-integration induced impact of
the FTA on Georgia’s exports to the EU is likely to be comparatively small. In the
longer perspective, Georgia’s future comparative advantages still remain to be
created by investment in new economic structures (for example outsourcing) to take
advantage of low Georgian labour costs.
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Deeper integration is also likely to generate more substantial gains within the
Georgian economy itself arising from producing a more stable and attractive investment
climate and from increasing the competitiveness / contestability of the Georgian
economy. Probably, the most important issues in this regard includes harmonisation of
custom procedures and product standards, elimination of illegal payments, improving
trade-related infrastructure, reduction of border delays and transport costs and other
administrative barriers to trade. Here it is worth noting that Georgia has already
demonstrated substantial progress in addressing some of these issues in recent years.
Georgia and the EU also cooperate on the reduction of non-tariff barriers between them
in the framework of the PCA and ENP Action Plan’s implementation.
Not surprisingly, presently there is little evidence of significant deep integration
between the EU and Georgia as expressed by the intra-industry trade between
them. Nevertheless, following the Deep EU-Georgia FTA the development of new
industrial structures in Georgia may strengthen intra-industry trade linkages. 
From the EU perspective, since i) the level of trade with Georgia is low for the
EU and ii)  the EU tariffs are already low, if not non-existent, for Georgian goods
(GSP+ system), trade creation and trade diversion effects from the future EU-
Georgia FTA are not expected to be significant for the EU as well. 
Turkey is also a relatively important partner for Georgia (second largest trade
partner in 2006). As the second largest trading partner Turkey might be vulnerable
to trade diversion towards the EU. This vulnerability is clearly greater than that of
Russia (the third partner) due to the fact that Turkey’s exports to Georgia are quite
similar to those of the EU, much more so than in the case of Russia which is mainly
selling oil and agricultural products. However, the dangers of trade diversion are
likely to be well mitigated by the fact that the preference margins for the EU will be
low, if non-existent, due to the low (zero tariffs for non-agricultural products) MFN
tariffs, the operation of a Georgia-Turkey FTA, and the likelihood that any deep
integration benefits that promote trade with the EU will also facilitate trade with
Turkey which has undergone regulatory harmonisation with the EU. 
To conclude, the risks of welfare-decreasing trade diversion for both Georgia
and the EU as a result of shallow integration are low due to the current low level
of tariffs. Any big welfare gains therefore could come from deeper integration
between the parties, i.e. through a deep and comprehensive FTA and from the
reduction of the risk premium on investment as a result of the improved business
environment. The stylized implications of such scenarios are developed further with
the CGE model in chapter 9.
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5.1. Product standards
The system of standards, technical regulations and conformity assessment
serves two main objectives:
• Averting threats to public safety, health, and other public interests arising
from the use of product by ensuring product safety; and
• Recognition of Georgia’s products on international markets, which will bring
a better access to the EU markets.
The legislative base for standards system in Georgia consists of the following
(amended) laws, all adopted on 24 June, 2005: the Law on Standardization, Law on
Uniformity of Measurements (metrology), and the Law on Certification of Products
and Services (conformity assessment). The agency responsible for the system is the
National Agency for Standards, Technical Regulations and Metrology under the
Ministry of Economic Development (MoE; Agency’s Charter was approved by the
Minister of Economic Development in October 2005) and the Accreditation Center
under the same ministry. The Agency consists of the Department for Standards and
Technical Regulations charged with elaboration of standards (drawn up in
Technical Committees) and technical regulations, and the Institute for Metrology.
The Accreditation Center accredits private laboratories to conduct testing thus
ensuring separation of public and private functions in the quality assurance
infrastructure. 
According to the principle of voluntary standardization, local entrepreneurs are
now free to use a great variety of standards: international standards, GOSTs (ex-
Soviet standards), and even their own standards. ISO standards are available to the
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5. Institutional and regulatory
harmonization issues in trade with
the EU and Georgia
local producers through the Agency which has an access to the ISO standards
database. Each standard applied by the producer should be registered with the
Agency. The Agency also carries out the registration of international standards
(mainly ISO standards) as national standards. The Agency has already registered
around 20 000 GOSTs, 400 ISO and ASTM (petroleum product) standards. The
application of GOSTs is still very wide. Adoption of new national standards based
on European norms, shows very little progress.
Reformation of legal framework on standardization, technical regulation and
accreditation in 2005 had to be followed by extensive elaboration and endorsement
of mandatory national technical regulations in relevant fields. However, the
progress in this field has been slow. 
Government Decree No. 45 of 24 February 2006 recognized mandatory
standards and technical regulations which are being applied worldwide and, in
particular, by main Georgian trade partners, such as EU, OECD and CIS countries.
This has been a major trade-liberalization measure. Pursuant to the existing
legislation the domestic producers are entitled to produce according to EU and
OECD member states’ technical regulations and CIS GOSTs. The scheme of
application of foreign technical regulations is the following: the producer should
register the applied technical regulation at the Agency, which carries out the
expertise of the technical regulation in order to be sure that it is active. So far, there
has been only one case of registration of foreign technical regulation — Italian
technical regulation on gas stations. 
The adoption of national technical regulations is sporadic and there is no overall
governmental policy in this area. Although the Law gives the priority to EU
Directives as a model on which the national technical regulations should be based,
it is doubtful whether this approach is firmly followed. The Institute for Metrology
is performing a systematization of regulations issued by different government
agencies. Below are a few examples of recently adopted regulations. 
In 2006-2007, the MoE endorsed a number of technical regulations in the field
of metrology. The mentioned legal acts have been developed following the
recommendations of International Organization of Legal Metrology. In line with
relevant ISO and EU standards, new rules on accreditation of laboratories and
certification bodies have been introduced. In May 2007 the MoE adopted the Safety
Rules of Attractions, which is claimed to be based on German legislation. 
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In June 2007, the Transport Administration under the MoE adopted technical
regulations in the field of transport safety (technical requirements for motor vehicles,
testing methods etc.) The regulations meet the requirements of EU Directive 96/96/EC
(on roadworthiness tests for motor vehicles and their trailers), except for ecological
standards, which were considered unfeasible at the current stage.
In 2006-2007 the Ministry of Agriculture adopted a number of technical
regulations in the field of pesticides and agrochemicals, in particular, the rules of
marking; testing and registration; storage, transportation, placement and use. The
regulations are broadly in line with international standards and EU rules. 
As regards the ongoing legislative activity, the office of the State Minister for
Reforms is currently working on new architectural-construction rules. Soon, the
outdated Construction Norms and Rules (SNIPs) retained from the Soviet times will
be replaced by new technical regulations. New rules will be based on International
Building Codes of International Code Council (US standards) as well as Eurocodes.
Overall, however, Georgian quality assurance regulations are not consistent
with EU acquis. Georgia needs a solid regulatory strategy in standardization and
quality assurance consistent with deregulation policies. EU Directives on product
safety (2001/95/EC) and general product liability (85/374/EEC) should be
considered as the minimum framework for legislative harmonization between the
EU and Georgia. Further steps may also include the transposition into the national
legislation of some EU directives, including EU New Approach Directives, Global
Approach, Modular Approach and Sectoral Directives of Old Approach, as well as
the adoption of the Law on General Product Safety in line with Directive on product
safety (2001/95/EC). EU-Georgia ENP AP envisions establishment and
strengthening in Georgia a modern institutional system of technical regulation,
standardization, accreditation, metrology, conformity assessment, and market
surveillance system (which is completely inapt today) based on the practice of EU
Member States30.
Another grave problem is the poorly exercised market surveillance function.
Since the food safety control is suspended until the end of 2009, the market
surveillance function is mainly performed by two bodies, Architectural-Building
Inspection under the MoE, which is responsible for oversight of construction
works, and the Technical Supervision Inspection, which oversees hazardous plants,
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30 Other donors are also interested in this issue.  Thus the World Bank is to undertake an
assessment of standards and technical regulations in Georgia.
sites and works. However, current enforcement of safety regulations in Georgia is
weak by any measure. Even the SNIPs are not followed very thoroughly,
endangering the safety of new buildings.
In order to further streamline inspection methods and procedures, the office of
the State Minister for Economic Reforms is currently developing the concept of
reform of market surveillance system. According to the planned reform, these two
bodies will be merged while the functions of state administrative supervision and
conformity assessment will be separated. The latter will be carried out by special
inspection bodies (which may be private entities), which, along with already
existing laboratories and certification bodies, will constitute the conformity
assessment infrastructure. State administrative supervision will stay with a new
governmental body.
Regarding metrology, Georgia does not have a set of measurement standards
(“etalons”) and hence calibration of instruments lacks traceability. (Traceability is
a chain of measurements relating an instrument’s measurements to a known
standard.) Currently, the metrological services of neighbour countries, most
recently the Ukraine were used to compensate for this deficit.
In sum, while the separation of functions between the public and private sectors
in the quality assurance has been achieved, the state barely performs its regulatory
functions in the area of standardization and quality assurance. Conformity
certificates issued by Georgia are not recognized internationally. Domestic
consumers are poorly protected against risks associated with substandard products. 
Summarizing, the measures adopted for recognizing EU/OECD/CIS standards
is a radical liberalizing measure, which eliminated NTBs on their import side. At
the same time, standards for domestic market are poorly administered.
The commitment of Georgia to approximate its legislation with EU acquis in the
area of technical rules and standards is provided for by the PCA, which suggests
that “the required actions [in quality assurance infrastructure] will facilitate
progress towards mutual recognition in the field of conformity assessment, as well
as the improvement of the quality of Georgian products”. Unfortunately, this
progress has been insufficient. ENP AP further detailed necessary actions in
regulatory convergence. The list of the actions reads as a program of the
development of standards infrastructure that has not been implemented so far.
Besides the minimal approximation with aquis in the priority sectors detailed
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above, Georgia should create etalon laboratories of international classification in
order to ensure a compatibility with international system of measurements; and
emphasize the development of market surveillance capacities based on the practice
of EU Member States, all of which was stipulated in ENP AP.
A Simple FTA between the EU and Georgia under the current incongruities in
the standards systems will not remove associated non-tariff barriers, which now
pose much larger impediment to trade than the already low tariffs of both sides, i.e.,
EU GSP+ and Georgia’s MNF tariffs. Better access for exports to the EU will
depend on how well Georgian companies adopt EU standards voluntarily. Georgia
does not have a diversified export-oriented economy and adopting EU standards
will surely help to establish new product lines which might become competitive on
the European markets. A Deep FTA with substantial investment in standards
infrastructure may bring substantial benefits but only in the medium- to long-term. 
5.2. Customs 
Customs in Georgia is administered by the Customs Department of the State
Revenue Service, which was set-up in April 2007, by merging the tax
administration with the customs administration and financial police, in order to
improve coordination of these agencies. Multiple and serious problems facing
Georgia’s Customs after independence (such as the weak control over borders,
widespread smuggling, general inefficiency, poor management, personnel
problems, corruption) have been seriously reduced since 2004, with a
comprehensive Customs reorganization. The old Customs organization was in fact
dissolved (in order to cope with massive corruption) and after that 80 percent of
staff was recruited on the basis of short term contracts. It is still to be seen how
decision on replacement of 80% of staff will influence the operational capacity and
efficiency of customs service.
Although Georgia still lacks jurisdiction over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the
control over the borders of the rest of the country has been established, smuggling
and corruption drastically reduced, organization, management and human
resources strengthened, and efficiency improved. As a result, Georgia ranks
favourably in regards to the trade-related business environment - see, for example,
World Bank’s Doing Business survey (World Bank, 2008) and the American
Chamber of Commerce regional survey (U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 2008).
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Currently there are following Georgian normative acts defining main customs
matters: Customs Code and its secondary legislation, Tax Code (covering VAT,
Excise, customs duty, appeals, and fines), and the Law on Fees. New Customs Code
and subordinated legislative acts have been enacted on January 1, 2007. One of the
main goals of legislative changes was the harmonization of Georgian legislation
with European; consequently, the customs legislations of the EU and Latvia have
been used as the models for Georgia’s Code. 
The main body of the new Customs Code of Georgia is harmonized with the
European Community Customs Code and the revised Kyoto Convention on the
Simplification and Harmonization of Customs Procedures and serves both trade
facilitation and fiscal purposes. The structure of and terms used in the Georgian
Customs Code are in compliance with the Community Customs Code. Like the
Community Code, the Georgian Code defines customs procedures and the rules of
their implementation, namely as formalities related to entry of the goods into the
customs territory; customs approved treatment or use; summary declaring;
customs procedures31; methods of customs valuation; origin of goods etc. 
New customs legislation brought some elements of EU customs practice in
Georgia, such as: 
• Like in the EU legislation, there are no restrictions and barriers to movement
of the TIR Carnet goods in the Georgian territory. 
• Procedures defined for cargo clearance by the customs checkpoints (at the
border) and clearance groups (customs territory) are in full compliance with
European legislation. 
• Customs applies the customs declaration processing system ASYCUDA++
which is in concordance with the EU customs declaration format. The more
advanced ASYCUDA World system was launched on January 1, 2008. 
• Georgian Customs uses the commodity nomenclature which is in compliance
with the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding Systems of the
World Customs Organization, which means that it is also in compliance with
the EU goods commodity nomenclature. 
However, differences with EU acquis still persist. Despite the facts that the
provisions of Georgian Customs Code are in compliance with European legislation,
there are several issues defined by the European Community Customs Code but
missing in the Georgian Customs Code:
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31 Georgia applies all customs procedures defined in the Community Code, except for processing
under customs control.
1. Post clearance audit has not been yet been established in Georgia albeit work
in this area has started32. The related risk management system has been
introduced only very recently, in February 2008. 
2. While Georgian legislation on customs valuation is in full compliance with
EU requirements and the Agreement on Customs Valuation of the WTO, the
practice of customs valuation quite often contradicts legislation, especially in
the case of imports from high-risk countries. The Georgian Customs directly
jumps from the transaction value method (the first method in the valuation
sequence) to the computed method (the sixth method in the sequence) thus
forgoing preceding four methods. As a matter of fact, reference price lists are
being used instead of computed method, which is a further contradiction
with EU and WTO rules. However, since Georgia has already moved to zero
tariffs for almost all industrial goods, the issue of Customs valuation is
relatively unimportant for customs duties, it however matters for the amount
of taxation on imported goods calculated on the basis of the customs value. It
is mostly a matter of agricultural produce, construction materials, and
excised products.
3. Customs Code of Georgia defines CN22 and CN23 postal declarations
(adopted by the World Customs Organization and World Postal Union and laid
down in the Community Customs Code as well as secondary legislation) but
the rules of their application do not comply with the EU rules of application. 
4. Temporary admission procedure is fully in compliance with the European
Community Customs Code and Istanbul Convention33, except for one issue,
such as: upon temporary import of the goods with total relief from duties, in
case of extension of the pre-defined term, Georgian customs requests the
payment of 3% of import duties for each month, which contradicts relevant
provisions of the Code and Convention.
5. It is not possible to make deferred payment of customs duties in Georgia,
which is defined by the European Community Customs Code and its
secondary legislation. 
As a general matter, the provisions of secondary legislation frequently
complicate customs procedures defined by the Customs Code of Georgia.
Regulators try to explicitly define specific details of each and every case in the
secondary customs legislation, which causes inflexibility of normative acts,
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32 With the assistance of the EU Georgian Customs Project.
33 Convention on Temporary Admission, 26 June 1990, Istanbul.
collision between provisions and, consequently, frequent changes to the legislation.
This is a major drawback of Customs regulations. Until clear and straightforward
implementation provisions are put into place, the implementation of Customs
legislation will be severely hampered.
Finally, the Ministry of Finance of Georgia is aware of the above legislative
incongruities and is currently working on solving them. The Global Competitiveness
of the Financial Sector Act, currently in the Parliament, is expected to bring
Georgian Customs regulations closer to the Community Customs Code.
An important issue of Customs control is the existence of the breakaway regions
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia which formally are included in the Georgian
Customs area. However, for practical reasons, the current situation of trade in the
region is not in line with internationally recognised rules. On the one hand,
Abkhazia and South Ossetia allow imports of goods from both Russia and Georgia
free of customs duties. On the other hand, Georgia considers all goods that enter
Georgia proper via Abkhazia and South Ossetia as smuggled, irrespectively of their
origin as there is no customs control between the breakaway regions and Georgia
proper. All goods that come into Georgia through South Ossetia and Abkhazia are
therefore considered by Georgia as illegally entering the country. Certificates of
origin are theoretically issued by Georgia for the whole country (including South
Ossetia and Abkhazia) although in practice no such certificates are issued for goods
originating in the breakaway regions.
The ENP AP envisions reinforcing customs controls on imports and exports of
pirated or counterfeit goods; developing an integrated border management strategy
by strengthening co-operation between customs and other agencies working at the
border; and developing EU-Georgia cooperation with regard to risk-based controls.
The Customs has implemented a new project on combating counterfeit importation.
Any company can now register their product with the Customs34 in order to protect
the product from counterfeit importation. For example, the official exclusive
representative in Georgia of lighter brand “Cricket” has registered their product.  
Border management has undergone serious changes in the last three years. A
multitude of Government agencies controlling the border gave way to just two – the
Customs and Border Guard under the Ministry of the Interior. However, some
functions at the border (most notably, phytosanitary and veterinary controls) are not
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34 The procedure includes submitting photos of the product, its detailed description, etc.
being adequately carried out. Risk-based controls have been successfully introduced
in the late 2007 and an EU-funded project is helping Georgia to further develop the
risk-assessment system and launch post-clearance audit. Nevertheless, the above
efforts represent just initial steps in reaching the goals spelled out in the ENP AP.
Georgia has signed Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Custom Matters with a number
of EU Member States. It remains to be seen if Georgian Customs are able to fully
implement those Protocols. Any future free trade agreement with the EU will contain
a protocol on mutual assistance in customs matters which will replace all existing
agreements with EU Member States for all matters of Community competence.
Customs reform in Georgia proceeds independently of the prospect of an FTA
with the EU. An impact of Simple FTA on the Customs will be minimal. A Deep FTA
could have a significant effect if it leads to a surge in trade between EU and Georgia
which would require a further harmonization in Customs matters, and especially in
the area of secondary legislation and practices.
5.3. Competition policy
The basic law governing competition policy is the Law on Free Trade and
Competition adopted on 3 June 2005. This Law replaces all previous laws,
regulations and decrees developed and adopted over more than a decade with
extensive international support. The new Law, however, is a step back with regards
to previous legal arrangements. It only touches on the regulation of monopolies and
its main thrust is in regulating state aids instead.  The main issues of competition
law, such as the abuse of the dominant position, concerted practices, restrictive
agreements, mergers, publicly owned enterprises, and, to a large extent,
monopolies, were not addressed in the new Law. 
The implementing agency of competition policy is the Agency for Free Trade and
Competition. According to the Law, the primary role of the Agency is to issue
recommendations to the central and local government authorities exercising state
aid programs. The authorities then make decisions on if and how to follow these
recommendations. The Agency’s investigative powers are limited. The Agency has
powers to regulate itself as well as proceedings under its auspices but has not
exercised those powers yet. The functions of the Agency require strengthening and
improvement in terms of efficiency and transparency. The independence of the
Agency should also be strengthened.
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It is clear that current legal and institutional framework does not provide for a
solid basis for an effective competition policy. As a result, powerful companies will
seek dominant positions on the market and eventually abuse them for profit reasons
reducing product variety and increasing prices. In the provision of public services,
economic rents for certain players may emerge fuelling rent-seeking and
corruption. Liberalization and de-regulation process undertaken by the
Government can not succeed in the end without a sound competition policy.
Georgia’s legal framework is clearly non-compliant with EU competition policy
in disagreement with Georgia’s obligations under the PCA and ENP AP.
Competition policy framework should be stressed in the review of the
implementation of these agreements, which give clear guidelines for strengthening
competition policy and its legal base. 
Potentially, a Deep FTA+ with the EU may serve as a powerful tool to influence
Georgia’s policy in this respect. However, the impact of a Deep FTA+ may not be
sufficient to tip the scales, as the experience of the new EU Member States shows.
Problems with competition in those countries started to resolve only after the
accession, when the European Commission took control over competition policy.
In another perspective although, openness is the primary instrument of competition
policy for a very small economy, and here Georgia has done very well.
5.4. Property rights, corporate governance and accounting standards
Property rights
While the inviolability of property rights is guaranteed by the Constitution of
Georgia as well as adequately safeguarded by a number of legal acts, there have
been many cases of arbitrary depravation of property by the state in the recent
period. Hence there is a common perception that if the Government decides that it
wants to take possession of a particular property, for any reason, it will always find
a way of doing it. 
The situation is aggravated by serious deficiencies of the judiciary system.
Judges are allegedly under undue influence from the executive thus seriously
jeopardizing the independence of the courts. Besides, after the reorganization of the
common courts in 2005, high level positions were given to relatively inexperienced
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judges. As a result, the level of competence and professionalism among judges has
dropped significantly.  
However, foreign investors’ rights are protected better than those of domestic
investors, as the current Government actively seeks to attract foreign investment
and is very sensitive towards its international reputation.
Corporate Governance
The key normative act that defines the legal framework for companies is the Law on
Entrepreneurs, which is only partly compatible with EU company law. Since there is
no separate law on joint stock companies, their regulation falls under the purview of the
Law on Entrepreneurs. Joint Stock Companies in Georgia are rather poorly regulated,
with the Law providing only general or vague formulations on some important issues,
or none at all. The Law has been amended a few times since adoption.
According to the amendments on 30.03.2007, the partners whose shares
comprise at least 5% of the charted capital of joint stock companies has been made
entitled to request from the managing body of the company the copies of and
information on all transactions concluded or planned to be concluded on behalf of
the company. Another instrument aimed at protection of minority shareholders has
been introduced by the amendments on 24.06.2005 on mandatory tender offer,
which was later on refined by amendments on 11.07.2007. According to the new
regulation, if upon the acquisition of shares of the company the shareholder
becomes a controlling shareholder (with one-half of the voting rights), he/she is
obliged to make an offer to the remaining shareholders. Price of shares shall be
determined by independent expert or securities brokerage company. 
On the other hand, a series of amendments to the Law on Entrepreneurs
reduced the level of protection of minority shareholders as well as the interest of
creditors and third parties. The requirement to pay up the half of the charter capital
of limited liability and joint stock companies have been abolished (amendments of
30.03.2007). According to the amendments on 24.06.05, the convocation of the
general meeting of shareholders is not any more obligatory if the shareholder with
75% of charter capital agrees with the issues to be discussed at the meeting.
However, this provision seriously damages the interests and rights of minority
shareholders, since the general meeting of shareholders is not a merely decision
making forum but an important mechanism for the minority shareholders to obtain
information about company. A newly established electronic entrepreneurial
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registry under the Tax Department of Ministry of Finance improves significantly
access to companies’ information. 
The basic law for security regulation in Georgia is the Law on Securities Market
adopted in 1998 and amended in 2000, 2003, and 2007. In general, the Law shows a
considerable degree of comparability with EU legislation but not without gaps and
inconsistencies. Lober (2007) carried out a legal review of the harmonization of the
Georgian regulation on security market with that of the EU and made over a hundred
recommendations on bringing Georgian legislation up to European standards.
According to the recent amendments to the Law on Securities Market
(28.03.2007), the regulation of transactions with related parties has been introduced.
The amendments introduced the obligation of interested person to disclose to the
supervisory board of the company (or if the price of transaction exceeds certain
threshold - to the general meeting of shareholders) any transaction in which he/she
is an interested party. Such transactions should be approved either by the
supervisory board or by the general meeting of shareholders depending on the price
of transaction. However, the scope of application of the mentioned regulation is
limited to reporting companies35 only. 
Discrepancies between Georgian law and EU acquis include the scope of
information to be disclosed by companies. The scope is much more limited in
Georgia. Also, issues related to maintenance and alteration of capital of limited
liability companies are not adequately regulated and does not meet EU standards.
The regulations on reorganization of companies (mergers and divisions) are also
inadequate and incompatible with EU directives.
Here again, implementation is the central issue and the general weakness of the
legal system exacerbates the matters. Harmonization with the EU law has a long
way to go in this area.
Accounting standards
Accounting framework in Georgia is not very consistent. The joint stock companies
as well as other designated entities are required to use International Financial
Reporting Standards (IFRS) and publish audited annual financial statements.
However, there is a persistent gap between the IFRS version used by Georgian
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35 Company the securities of which have been placed trough public offer or are admitted to trading
to stock exchange.
companies and up-to-date version of IFRS, which is caused by delays in translation
and official enactment of IFRS as national standards. Thus, since 2005 Georgian
companies are required to use IFRS issued in 2004, which is rather outdated. 
Another problem relates to compliance with IFRS, which is generally very low.
The compliance problem is mainly caused by the poor knowledge of company
accountants of the basics of IFRS, which often leads to low quality and unreliability
of financial statements. In addition, qualification requirements for audit firms
which carry out statutory audits were abolished in 2005. Nowadays an audit firm
without adequate technical expertise is entitled to audit a bank, an insurance
company, a brokerage house, or a public joint stock company. 
In order to address existing shortcomings the draft law on accounting and
auditing was prepared by the government and submitted to the parliament. The
draft law assigns special powers of regulation to the accounting and auditing
profession to professional body.
The PCA and ENP AP contain provisions regarding property rights, company
law, corporate governance, and accounting standards. Georgia still has to carry out
deep domestic reforms  in this area, with the help from the EU and other donors.
Effective implementation of the PCA and ENP AP is an important milestone on this
road, which has yet to be achieved.  
A Simple FTA will have only limited effect in this regard. A Deep FTA+ might
help over a long term by exposing Georgian companies even more to the scrutiny
of their European partners and a change in business culture and judicial practices.
5.5. Intellectual property rights
Georgian legislation in Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) is largely compatible
with EU requirements, including EU Directives on enforcement of IPRs
(2004/48/EC) and Customs Regulation concerning customs action against goods
suspected of infringing IPRs (1383/2003). Recent harmonization steps included the
following:
Amendments to the Law on Copyright and Related Rights (adopted in June
2005) introduced and updated terminology in line with WIPO conventions of the
new copyright and related rights, regulated the copyright and related rights on the
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Internet, the intellectual rights of the authors of audio-visual works, intellectual
right protection of databases, rules on collecting societies, and lending right and
improving administering cable retransmission with proper procedures. These
changes brought the Georgian copyright law in line with the following EU
Directives: on the legal protection of computer programs (91/250/EEC); on rental
right and lending right and on certain rights related to copyright (92/100/EEC); on
the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights (93/98/EEC and
2001/29/EC); on the resale right for the benefit of the author of an original work of
art (2001/84/EC); on copyright applicable to satellite broadcasting and cable
retransmission (93/83/EEC); and on the legal protection of databases (96/9/EC).
Amendments to the Law on Trademarks (2005) strengthened procedures on
enforcement of trademarks, helped to combat production and distribution of
counterfeit goods, harmonized legislation with the First Council Directive
89/104/EEC on trademarks. It implemented the recommendations of the Caucasian
Brand Protection Group on legal practice in anti-counterfeiting measures. 
Amendments to the Law on Custom Border Measures Related to Intellectual
Property (TRIPS; December 2005) fulfil TRIPS requirements (introduction of ex
officio procedures), introduce suspension procedures and establish product
registry. Any intellectual property right holder would have the right to register
objects of intellectual property and the right to require that the customs suspend
goods produced in violation of intellectual property. The amended Law complies
with EU Customs Regulation 1383/2003 concerning customs action against goods
suspected of infringing certain intellectual property rights and the measures to be
taken against goods found to have infringed such rights and the Resolution of the
representatives of the Governments of the Member States of 24 July 1984 on
measures to combat audio-visual pirating. It also incorporated the
recommendations of the Caucasian Brand Protection Group. Changes in the
Criminal Code of Georgia (passed together with the above amendments)
incorporate these three laws into the Criminal Code. 
On 11 November 2005, Georgian Parliament ratified International Convention
for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV). In order to implement the
obligations assumed under the Convention, the Law on Protection of New Varieties
of Plants was adopted (29 December 2006). In 2007, the Law was found in
conformity with the 1991 Act opening the way for Georgia to deposit its instrument
of accession. Georgia has recently deposited its instrument to the UPOV secretariat
and is supposed to become a member of UPOV shortly. 
Under the new legislative framework the function of granting the selectionist
rights was transferred from the Centre of Protection of Plant Variety Breeder’s
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Rights of Georgia (Sakjishtsentri) under the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) to the
National Intellectual Property Centre (Sakpatenti). According to the new law,
Distinctness, Uniformity and Stability test should be carried out by special
accredited body according to the rules set forth by the MoA on the basis of UPOV
Guidelines, however, the relevant rules have not been promulgated so far.
Therefore, plant varieties bred in Georgia cannot be confirmed as Novel (New),
Distinct, Uniform and Stable. The issues related with protection of selections
achievements in animal breeding have been regulated by the Law on Protection of
New Species of Animals (29 December 2006). 
The lead agencies implementing the IPR policy include the Georgian National
Intellectual Property Centre (Sakpatenti) - in the area of industrial property rights,
patents, and appellations of origin; the Copyright Agency - in charge of copyrights;
Cultural Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs - responsible for copyrights
on literary, artistic, musical, photographic, and audiovisual works; and the Ministry
of Agriculture in charge of plant variety protection. Enforcement is carried out by
the Ministry of the Interior and the Customs Department as regards trade.
For further harmonization of the Georgian IPR legislation with EU standards
Sakpatenti is currently working on draft amendments to the Law on Patents on
industrial designs (in line with EU Directive 98/71/EC on legal protection of
designs), the protection of utility model, and streamlined procedures related to
granting rights, expertise and opposition. Another legislative initiative being under
consideration at Sakpatenti relates to revising the Law on Appelations of Origin
and Geographical Indications of Goods in line with WTO panel decision of March
2005 on a case brought by Australia and the United States on EU regulation related
to the protection of geographical indications for agricultural products and
foodstuffs. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that the major problem related to IPR protection
in Georgia lies not in statutory framework, which is quite well-designed and rather
compatible with EU and WTO rules, but in poor enforcement, especially in the
areas of computer software, audio- and video-works. This is a complex issue related
to lack of capacity of law-enforcement bodies and judiciary system to deal with IPR
infringements. This is not uncommon for most post-Soviet and many developing
countries. However, as a small economy, Georgia does not attract much attention
of large international companies whose IPRs are violated there, so there is not
enough pressure to improve the situation.  
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Georgia is under obligation in the PCA to provide the protection of IPRs at the
level similar to that of the Community but this obligation did not materialize. ENP
AP stresses the importance of the enforcement of IPR legislation conformant with
Georgia’s obligations under the PCA and TRIPS. Full realization of Georgia’s
commitments under the PCA and ENP AP is an absolutely necessary measure to
ensure compatibility with EU acquis.
A Simple FTA is unlikely to improve enforcement of IPRs in Georgia. As a small
market, Georgia is unlikely to attract attention of big international players even
under an FTA, which would exert pressure on the Government to dramatically
improve enforcement of IPRs. Flanking measures in a Deep FTA+, if implemented,
will have more substantial impact. However, much progress can be achieved by
implementing the existing PCA and ENP AP commitments without Georgia taking
additional obligations under yet another agreement.
5.6. Public Procurement
Public procurement is regulated by the Law on State Procurement, adopted by
the Parliament in 2005 and put into force on January 1, 2006. The major innovation
in this Law over the old procurement Law (1998, amended in 2001) was that
restricted (close) tender as a method of state procurement was abolished and the
open tendering recognized as the primary method of implementation of state
procurement. Single source procurement was envisaged for Force Majuro cases.
Other amendments include reduced tender fee, increased monetary ranges for
procurement objects, and shorter tender period. The Law is harmonized with
UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of Goods, Construction and Services. It
provides for equal treatment of foreign and domestic bidders.
The implementing agency is the State Procurement Agency (SPA), an
independent body for coordinating the public procurement and tendering process.
The State Procurement Agency elaborates regulatory instruments and standard
bidding documents, carries out supervision, monitoring, and administrative
reviews, conducts training and disseminates information on procurement system.
Nevertheless, the Law and evolving practices of public procurement do not fully
conform to the EU standards in the areas of procurement procedures (selection
criteria for procurement methods, qualification requirements, and advertising
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rules) and access to legal recourse. In general, SPA’s employees do not have a
sufficient knowledge and understanding of EU regulatory framework in the area of
public procurement. Enforcement is rather weak in certain aspects due to
inadequate training of officials and the low level of awareness of this law. Although
the tender system has become more transparent, circumvention of the procurement
regulations on competitive bidding still exists as well as instances of corruption. So
far, there have been no serious developments in the introduction of the appropriate
legal and institutional framework for e-procurement.
There is much to be desired in the effective implementation of the relevant PCA
and ENP AP provisions, which envision conversion to the European legislative
principles in the area of public procurement. A Deep FTA could serve as an extra
impetus for change via involvement of EU companies in state procurement in
Georgia and associated pressure to implement Georgia’s commitments in this area.
5.7. Rules of origin
Georgian customs legislation on rules of origin is in compliance with the WTO
and EU legislation. Georgia issues three different types of certificates of origin for
different countries:
• (All countries) As a WTO member country, Georgia adheres to WTO rules
related to the determination of country of origin. The Customs Code and the
Governmental Resolution No. 256 (of 27 December 2006) define the criteria
for determination of the country of origin as well as the rules for the issuance
of non-preferential certificate of origin. Certificate of origin defined by WTO
Agreement is issued by the Georgian Chamber of Commerce. 
• (CIS countries) As a member of a free trade area in the Commonwealth of
Independent States, Georgia issues preferential certificate of origin for the
CIS free trade area in accordance with the rules of origin defined by the
Decision of Council of Governments of CIS countries, 30 November 2000.
• (EU countries) In addition, certificate of origin Form A is issued in Georgian
territory, which is used for application of the preferences assigned by the EU
General System of Preferences (GSP/GSP+). This form is issued by the
Ministry of Economic Development. All the procedures of determination of
country of origin are in compliance with EU legislation. 
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There is a new Free Trade Agreement concluded between Georgia and Turkey on
November 21, 2007, in Tbilisi. The Agreement contains exclusions from free trade
regime. It shall be ratified by parliament of Georgia and after this relevant changes
shall be made in national legislation. It is not clear yet if there will be new form of
certificate of origin regarding this agreement or usual certificate of origin will be used.
Our survey shows that the Georgian exporters do not find it particularly difficult
to obtain certificate of origin Form A for export to the EU. As Georgian exports to
the EU are comprised mostly of simple products and raw material, the most
complicated requirements of rules of origin for the EU GSP de facto do not apply.
It would also be highly beneficial if the rules of origin under an EU-Georgia FTA
allowed for cumulation within Paneuromed system of origin (on condition that
Georgia had the capacity to negotiate and implement these rules) avoiding the
adverse effects of the hub-and-spoke model36 which tends to allocate the benefits
from integration to the largest markets.
On the import side, the rates of customs tax defined in the Tax Code of Georgia
are the same for every WTO member or non-member countries. Practically speaking,
there is no point in having Certificate of Origin for tariff preference purposes during
importation of the goods into the territory of Georgia (other than from CIS countries). 
In case of an FTA with the EU, the certificate of origin is ought to be issued by
the Customs Department rather than the Ministry of Economic Development.
Currently, the Customs Department does not have capacity to issue such
certificates. Therefore, if the FTA is to be signed, it will be necessary to build the
capacity of the Customs in this area, including staff transfer from the Ministry of
Economic Development to the Customs. The impact of the break-away regions
Abkhazia and South Ossetia on the management of preferential rules of origin by
Georgia will have to be carefully appraised.
5.8. Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
The framework Law on Food Safety and Quality was adopted in December 2005
after an intense public debate on food security issues and considerable involvement of
the donor community. The Law is generally compliant with EU legislation, Codex
Alimentarius, and other international standards and conventions. The Law
incorporates key elements of the EU Regulation 178/2002/EC, which laid down the
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36 Baldwin (1994).
general principles and requirements of food law and established the European Food
Safety Authority. The Law, however, is more limited in scope than Regulation
178/2002/EC. It excludes primary and artisan food production (instead of full HACCP
system, a simplified version of HACCP - Internal Control System - is to be implemented
by the food producers), does not require mandatory approval and licensing of the food
establishments, and does not include animal and plant or plant products identification
and traceability systems. However, in order to meet the EU regulations on imports of
food products of animal origins, Georgia will be required to introduce a system for
approval/licensing of slaughterhouses, dairies, meat cutting plants etc. This would be
a necessity if Georgia is able to develop relevant export potential in the future. 
In accordance with the Law, important institutional changes were introduced,
such as the creation of the Food Security Department in the Ministry of Agriculture
and the National Service of Food Safety, Veterinary and Plant Protection. The Food
Security Department was charged with the responsibility to elaborate policy and
regulatory measures, including secondary legislation which was almost absent. The
Department has prepared a large number of secondary legal instruments necessary for
the functioning of the Law and is currently working on the Veterinary Law, with a help
of donor community. The new Veterinary Law will replace the acting Veterinary Law,
adopted in 1995 but substantially limited in scope in the process of subsequent
revisions. The goal is to harmonize the Veterinary Law with the Food Safety Law as
well as EU regulations. Secondary legislation passed up to date includes: The Rules for
destruction of harmful food; Rules for traceability, hazard analysis and critical control
points; Risk assessment and communication procedures in the framework of the risk
analysis; Rules and procedures to be implemented by Authorized officials to exercise
their authority; On adoption of food monitoring, supervision and control procedures;
Rules for food/animal feed sampling and transfer to the laboratory; Rules and
procedures for inspection; Rules and procedures on methods of official control;
Procedures for food border control (joint with the Ministry of Finance); Rules for
issuance of hygienic certificate on food and food related packaging; Pesticide and
agrochemical labeling rules; Pesticide and agro-chemical storage, transportation,
sales, and application rules; Charter of pesticide and agro-chemical registration test
expertise and registration; On rules for introduction into Georgia samples of
pesticides, etalon preparates and analytical standards for testing purposes; State
catalogue of pesticides and agro-chemicals permitted for use in Georgia; Veterinarian
(veterinary sanitary doctors, and veterinary pharmacists) State Certification. Although
not without deficiencies, the secondary instruments provided a workable framework
for the enforcement of the Food Safety Law.  
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Since December 2005, responsibility for SPS controls at the territorial borders
and ports rested solely with the Customs Department of the Ministry of Finance,
with exception for the inland terminals which are still under the purview of the
Ministry of Agriculture. The new Law on Customs, adopted in 2007, brought all
controls under the Customs Department and they since then have been performed
only at the borders. Although bringing controls within a unified management is in
line with EU policies, the Customs Department does not have necessary capacities
to make checks regarding animal health, food safety, and plant health other than
documentary checks, exposing the country to significant risks to animal, plant and
human health. Furthermore, Georgia does not have a long-term development
strategy of the SPS import control system. This situation is not only inconsistent
with EU regulations but contradicts important multilateral conventions, such as
International Plant Protection Convention37 and the requirements of International
Office for Epizooties, which call for adequate levels of SPS and veterinary controls. 
The National Service of Food Safety, Veterinary and Plant Protection, set up in
2006, is charged with responsibility over inspections and controls. However,
inspections have never started. The consecutive amendments to the Food Safety
Law deferred the start of inspection inspections till further and further dates, now
the end of 2009. Moreover, current regulations do not allow inspectors to enter
establishments before a lengthy legal procedure involving court hearings and
lasting over two weeks. Even in the case of inspectors entering the premises and
finding violations, the National Service does not have the right to impose sanctions
but only transfer the case to financial policy or another authoritative body.  
The National Service issues export SPS and veterinary certificates. However, the
Service representatives in the regions of Georgia do not have equipment for testing and
issue certificates based on the known presence or absence of harmful pests, epidemics
and epizootics in the regions under their purview. Such system rightfully renders these
certificates invalid in the eyes of many importer countries, including the EU.
Licensing of veterinary laboratories and pharmacies has been discontinued.
Veterinary medicines are regulated by the Ministry of Health based on documentary
evidence; however; the Ministry, however, does not have a laboratory for testing.  
At the same time, both the Food Security Department and the National Service
have been restructured and substantially downsized. For instance, Food Safety
Department in the National Service has been almost completely disbanded and its
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37 Georgia has recently adhered to the International Plant Protection Convention.
functions eliminated. The personnel of both agencies are subject to frequent
turnover. In its current shape, the National Service is unlikely to be able to carry
out meaningful inspections even if directed to do so.
Lack of official controls and inspections poses significant health risks for
humans, animals, and plants in Georgia and countries importing Georgian
agricultural products. The 2007 outbreak of African swine fever with inadequate
Government response capacity was an example of Georgia’s vulnerability
regarding animal health safety. 
The deferral of controls and inspections contradicts EU-Georgia ENP AP and
the PCA. It severely restricts the capacity of Georgian products to be exported to the
EU market. Georgia has a long way to go to convergence towards EU food safety
requirements. Two main regulations should be taken as an initial guide for such
process and adhered to the fullest – the aforementioned Regulation 178/2002/EC
(especially in parts of animal and plant or plant products identification and
traceability systems; hygiene in food processing) and “General Guidance for third
country authorities on the procedures to be followed when importing live animals
and animal products into the European Union”, DG SANCO/FVO October 2003
(EU requirements on animal health and for the processing of animal products).
It is clear that the establishment of the SPS system in Georgia compatible with
the EU could take a long time. This severely restricts the capabilities of Georgian
food products to be exported to the EU market. Only those products that do not
require official health certification and for which the exporting industries in
Georgia could ensure that they meet EU food safety criteria are currently exported
to the EU, most importantly wine (with specific standards of the wine industry) and
hazelnuts (where the producer can prove conformity). Other prospective food
exports could follow similar course. Most of animal origin products require official
health certification and their exports into the EU could be ruled out. Therefore,
unresolved SPS issues in Georgia would lead to the effective exclusion of
agriculture and food products from the benefits of an FTA. 
5.9. Institutional capacity to negotiate and implement commitments   
under an FTA
Georgia would not have problems in negotiating and implementing its
commitments under a Simple FTA with the EU. As a member of the WTO and a party
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to FTAs with CIS countries and Turkey, Georgia has considerable experience in
trade negotiations and agreement implementation. Agency-wise, foreign trade issues
fall under purview of the Ministry of Economic Development. Other line Ministries
and agencies such as the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Finance, and the
Customs Department would play an important role in FTA negotiations and
implementation. Other agencies mentioned in this chapter will participate as well.
The human resources of the Government bodies are uneven in terms of education,
qualifications, and international experience. There is a small group of internationally
educated young cadres occupying high positions while the majority of staff has
limited understanding of European regulations, international practices, and foreign
languages. However, this situation could be eased with technical assistance. 
In a Deep FTA, flanking measures will probably go along the path outlined in
the PCA and ENP Action Plan, so the implementation of Georgia’s commitments
taken under PCA and ENP AP could serve as a guide of the Government capability
to implement a more challenging agreement. As recent experience shows, Georgia
has been progressing in harmonizing its legislation with EU. However,
implementation of statutory laws and obligations remains a problem in many areas,
as was stressed in this report. Laws on the books and obligation under PCA and
ENP AP did not stop Georgia from effectively scrapping the enforcement of SPS
measures and product standards until the time when the markets demonstrate the
need for such institutions and export capacity develop. Therefore, implementation
of the flanking measures would be seriously influenced by the stance of the
Georgian Government on the practical economic policies of the day.
The most important issue today is the implementation of the adopted legislation.
The SPS example highlighted the non-triviality of this task. The Government of
Georgia has greatly liberalized the economy and undertook a largely successful anti-
corruption effort. At the same time, doubts within the Government remain about the
degree of regulatory harmonization with the EU that is appropriate for Georgia.
Heavy regulations are seen as excessive and burdensome under the current
underdeveloped state of the economy, and fragile and immature institutional
structure. Therefore, a Deep FTA would probably require finding a balance between
the views of the Georgian Government and the EU on the feasible degree of
harmonization. The position of the EU, as reflected in the European Commission’s
Communication “On Strengthening European Neighbourhood Policy” endorsed by
the EU Member States is that ”implementation of ENP AP, particularly on
regulatory areas, will prepare the ground for the conclusion of a new generation of
“deep and comprehensive free trade agreements” with all ENP partners”38.
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6.1. Survey method
This section presents the results of the survey of exporters in Georgia. By sample
design, the majority of firms were exporting to the EU and the minority – to CIS
countries. Some firms exported to both destinations. The sample consisted of about 100
firms exporting to the EU and the rest exporting to the CIS. The survey was conducted
in October-November, 2007, by CASE Transcaucasus, Tbilisi. Detailed description of
the sample is presented in Appendix 4.
The questionnaire was modelled on CASE (2006) study of non-tariff barriers in
Ukraine, which, in turn, was based on a survey of recent surveys on NTBs carried out
in developing and transition countries. Respondents answered questions on export
destinations and sectors, certificates of origin, customs procedures, standards and
technical regulations, conformity assessments, sanitary and phytosanitary measures,
and antidumping and countervailing measures. They also provided background
information about their companies covering ownership, staff, and time in business, etc.
The questionnaire is included in Appendix 4.
6.2. Results for Georgia
6.2.1. Certifying origin of goods
A significant proportion of Georgian goods entering the EU market benefits from
the General System of Preferences. The EU's General System of Preferences (GSP)
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6. Survey of non-tariff barriers 
in trade between EU-Georgia and
Georgia with neighbouring countries
facilitates the access to the EU market for certain countries, and for specific products.
It allows applying reduced, preferential or zero tariffs to goods, which were produced
or manufactured in a beneficiary country. In order to benefit from the EU GSP upon
importation into the EU, the following conditions must be fulfilled: 
• goods must originate in a beneficiary country defined in accordance with the EU
GSP rules of origin, 
• goods must be transported directly from the beneficiary country to the EU, and
• a valid proof of origin must be submitted (certificate of origin – issued by the
competent authorities in the beneficiary country, or invoice declaration).
The interviewers inquired whether exporting firms from Georgia have experienced
any difficulties in regards to the above, and whether these regulations constituted a
nuisance in terms of time and expenses. Actually, 91 % of all firms in the sample
obtained certificates or origin during the last year, although only 81 reported exports
to the EU. Only 4 % did not obtain them and only 5 % were either not able to answer
this question or were not familiar with this subject. The firms, which did not obtain
certificates, belong exclusively to the both groups of firms with a maximum of 25
employees.
Within the group of firms that obtained a certificate of origin, on average each firm
obtained such a certificate 22 times per year, whereby the dispersion was high and
ranged from 1 to 200 times per year. The median, however, was only 12, meaning that
50 % the firms obtained between 1 and 12 certificates per year. Furthermore, only ten
firms obtained more than 40 certificates per year. The larger values of certificates are
concentrated in the group of firm with more than 50 employees. Here, the mean is 79
and the median is 50. Thus, not surprising, larger firms tend to make more frequent
deliveries to the EU.
The questionnaire also asked for the costs of obtaining the certificate of origin for
one delivery. The firms reported costs between 50 GEL and 2100 GEL with a mean of
263 GEL and a median of 200 GEL. Actually, the distribution is clearly skewed towards
lower values. On the one hand, 38 firms reported costs of only 50 GEL, and, on the
other hand, three firms reported costs of 500 GEL and four firms the costs of 2000 and
2100 GEL, respectively. There seems to be no relationship between the size of a firm
and the costs of one certificate. The extreme high costs are found within the group of
firms with 10 to 25 employees and the next group with 26 to 50 employees. Otherwise,
the cost structures of these groups are very similar to the others with a median of 200.
Only the first group of very small firms has a higher median of 275.
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When asked about the perception of costs of obtaining the certificate of origin, most
firms answered that they are not at all important (82 firms or 89 % of the firms
obtaining a certificate). Only 10 firms answered that the costs are somewhat important
(11 %). No firm found the cost important or very important. Firms, which did not
obtain certificates, did not answer this question. With regard to firm size, the 10 firms
considering costs somewhat important are scattered across all classes. The same holds
for the costs of one certificate.
When asked about indicating difficulties in obtaining a certificate of origin, 91 firms
(99 % of the firms obtaining a certificate) reported no difficulties. Only one firm
complained about time-consuming procedure.
Summing up, the interviewed firms seem to use extensively the EU trade
preferences, and are familiar with the procedure of certifying origins of goods.
Obtaining a certificate of origin was neither considered as an important nor costly
obstacle to trade.
6.2.2. Customs procedures
Export customs costs seem to be very low for Georgian exporters. The 102 firms in
the sample reported that they spent between 0.005 % and 1.1 % of their export value to
pass the Georgian Customs, with the mean of 0.183 % and standard deviation of 0.168
%. Sector-wise, companies in agriculture and food paid much less than average why
companies in the metals industry paid more than double the average.
With regard to the length of customs procedures, nine firms reported that their
carrier spent less than one day at their countries’ border while exporting products.
Seventy-six firms reported one day and further 17 firms more than one day. Figure 6 1
shows that there is obviously a certain link between time spent at the border and firm
size. The share of answers reporting waiting times of more than one day decreases with
firm size, while the share of answers reporting waiting times of less than one day
increases with firm size.39
With regard to exports the EU, for all 80 reporting firms the ordering party based
in the EU country is carrying all costs related to import customs procedures. Things
look a little bit different for the costs of passing CIS country import customs procedures
when exporting to one of those countries. Here, ten firms reported that they or their
representative in CIS countries is carrying all the cost related to import customs
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39 Results for larger firms with more than 101 employees should be treated with caution since the sample size was
very small even in comparison to the groups with 26 to 50 employees and 51 to 100 employees.
procedures, while 41 firms indicate that the ordering party is carrying these costs.
However, the costs, which the ten firms had to carry, were rather low. On average, they
spent less than 1 % of their export value to pass import customs procedures in CIS
countries. Nevertheless, these procedures seem to be a little bit time consuming. These
firms reported 1 day for most CIS countries, but 2 to 3 days for Ukraine.
To conclude, Customs costs and clearance times appear to be quite modest and do
not represent a major barrier to export.
6.2.3. Technical standards
Observance of technical standards in the domestic and the EU market
The term “technical standards” has a rather broad meaning in the context of this
survey. When asking about technical standards we meant any norms (formal and
informal) with regard to the characteristics of products or processes that producers
have to account for to be able to sell at the market. Such requirements are not
necessarily fixed in official documents and obligatory to producers or exporters.
Out of all firms in the sample, 11 reported that they have to meet domestic technical
regulations in order to sell in domestic markets. Further 12 firms do not have to take
such regulations into account, while 77 firms indicate that they do not sell at the
domestic market. With regard to the EU market, things look a little bit different. Out of
the 91 exporters to the EU, 12 firms reported that they have to meet regulations to sell
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Source: Survey results.
Figure 6.1. Time spent at borders while exporting products
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to the EU market; further 24 are not confronted with such regulations in their EU
export business, while 55 firms indicated that they do not know.40 At the first glance, it
could be assumed that larger firms are often affected by technical regulations; however,
it should be taken into account that the number of surveyed firms is rather small for
the three classes of firms with more than 25 employees. Due to the larger sample size,
the finding seems to be more robust that very small firms (one to nine employees) are
more affected from EU technical regulations than small firms (10 to 25 employees),
while the situation is reversed for technical regulations concerning the domestic
market.
Costs of ensuring compliance with the EU technical standards and ease of access to
information
The relative costs of domestic technical regulations compared to foreign regulations
seem to depend on the area of regulation (Figure 6.3). Domestic regulations concerning
performance and labelling are considered by the majority of responding firms as more
expensive than the same type of foreign regulations, while those concerning product
quality are regarded as inducing the same costs. However, these conclusions should be
treated with caution, since just ten to eleven firms answered these questions.
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40 Nine of these twelve firms belong to the sector “Manufacture of food products and beverages”, two to the sector
“Agriculture, hunting and related service activities” and one to the sector “Manufacture of basic metals”. Since
the twelve firms form the subsample for the next 20 questions, it does not make sense to differentiate in their
statistical evaluation between the different sectors. 
Source: Survey results.
Figure 6.2. Shares of firms by size that have to comply with technical regulations in order to
sell at the market
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Firms were also asked what types of EU technical standards were most burdensome
and expensive. Product quality and labelling seem to play an important role here,
followed by performance as well as testing and certification (Figure 6.4). On other
hand, the respondents did not separate health and consumer safety regulations from
overall product quality requirements. But again, these conclusions should be treated
with caution, since just twelve firms answered these questions.
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Source: Survey results.
Figure 6.3. Costs of compliance with domestic technical regulations compared to foreign
technical regulations for exports
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Figure 6.4. Burden and expensiveness of EU technical standards
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However, even if certain EU technical standards were qualitatively considered as
burdensome and expensive, actual relative costs of meeting the EU requirements were
quite low. Four firms reported that the approximate costs of meeting the product
characteristics amount to between 0.01 % and 1 % of their total sales, with a mean of
0.528 %. In agriculture, the cost was 1%, that is, double the average while it was
negligible in the metals industry. With regard to marking, labelling and packaging
requirements, 10 firms estimated that their relative costs were in the range between
0.01 % and 5 %, with a mean of 1.554 %. These costs amounted to 1 and 2 %,
respectively, for agriculture and food and were negligible for the metal industry. One
firm answered that other technical requirement costs amounted to 1 % of total sales.
All other firms either had zero costs to meet the EU requirements or did not answer
these questions.
A final important question with regard to technical regulations is the ease of access
to the necessary information. Here, 3 out of the relevant 12 firms reported that the
access was easy, 7 that it was not very easy, and 2 found it difficult.
In sum, EU technical standards do not seem to be too burdensome. This might be
explained by the nature of Georgian exports to the EU which include mostly mineral and
raw materials, as well as niche products that a priori satisfy EU regulations. However,
technical requirements in the destination market prevent the majority of Georgian firm
from exporting to the EU but non-exporters were not presented in the survey.  
Testing for conformity with technical regulations
This group of questions was additionally answered by a large group of “volunteers.”
Although only the twelve firms answering that they had to meet domestic technical
regulations in order to sell in the EU Market were urged to answer them, actually up
to 72 firms filled in this part of the questionnaire.
With regard to the question whether their products were tested for conformity with
the foreign technical regulations before they were shipped to the EU, 57 firms indicated
yes and only three firms no. Twelve firms reported that they did not know. However,
the importance of the resulting costs was considered as rather low. Fifty firms reported
that they are not at all important and further eight firms that they are somewhat
important. No firm answered that they are important or even very important.
Furthermore, the acceptance of test results and conformity certificates issued
domestically by the customs authorities of EU countries did not seem to be a problem.
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This was at least the opinion of all 56 answering firms. But the willingness to release
information came to a halt with the question whether the products of the firms were
tested over the last year for conformity with the EU technical regulations in the
destination country. Here, 56 firms answered that they did not know, while one firm
respectively indicated yes or no. The same holds for the importance of the costs these
tests. Only one firm considered the costs as somewhat important, while 10 firms
answered that they did not know. 
Furthermore, nine firms reported that they need to have several product tests if they
export to more than one EU country, while two firms answered that this is not
necessary. Altogether, the relative costs of product testing (% of last year’s sales) were
again rather low. Four firms placed them between 0.01 % and 0.5 %, while the other
firms reported no costs or did not answered this question.
The problem of duplication of testing to meet both domestic and foreign technical
requirements does not seem to be relevant. Two firms answered that there was no
duplication and seven firms observed only minor duplication. Finally, more as
anecdotic evidence, one firm reported that technical regulations conformity
inspections lasted on average two to four days upon arrival in an EU country.
Sanitary and phytosanitary measures
None of the 12 firms, which answered the question about the implementation of the
HACCP system, had implemented it. Furthermore, none of them encountered
burdensome sanitary and phytosanitary regulations when they were exporting to the
EU. Consequently, they also did not spend anything to ensure compliance with the
respective regulations. Three of the firms accentuated this by answering additionally
that the costs of meeting the sanitary and phytosanitary regulations in the EU were not
important for their company, while the others did not answer this question.
Sanitary and phytosanitary requirements affect mostly food and agriculture exports.
In this product group, Georgia exports only wine and hazelnuts to the EU. In case of
wine, the exporters set up special labs furnished with European equipment to test for
conformity with EU requirements. In case of hazelnuts, satisfying EU requirements
does not take much extra effort due to the nature of the product.
At the same time, despite being an agricultural country, Georgia is unable to export
other food and agricultural products, because Georgian producers cannot meet the
SPS and standards requirements of EU countries. However, it is not reflected in the
survey results, since the survey covers active exporters only.
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6.2.4. Other NTBs
The questionnaire also asked briefly about other impediments to trade, namely
• antidumping duties,
• countervailing duties, and
• other measures affecting prices (e.g. minimum import prices, voluntary export
price restraints).
However, no firm reported that it is subject to any of these measures. No firm
indicated any other type of restriction.
6.3. Conclusions
Export sector in Georgia, at least as represented in our sample, is differentiated
from the domestic sector. The majority of surveyed firms (77 out of 102) do not sell on
domestic markets. Since exports to EU represent a small part of Georgian economy,
these firms stand out from the average firm.  
Business relations of the reporting firms with the EU have been in most cases
established rather recently. Georgian exporters do not seem to experience much
difficulty in obtaining certificates of origin. Customs barriers appear to be low as well.
The survey results indicate that the firms do not feel much burden resulting from
NTBs in European markets. This perception might be explained by the nature of
Georgian exports to the EU which include mostly mineral and raw materials that
satisfy EU regulations with little difficulty. There are just two agriculture products
exported to the EU – wine and hazelnuts, which have special (and rather easy to
comply with) arrangements for SPS conformity certification. 
Manufactured products are often produced under special arrangements similar to
the outward processing scheme. Under such arrangements, the Georgian firms provide
production services rather than the finished product. The European partners take care
of the most of the logistical issues and requirement certifications. Hence, Georgian
counterparts are not even familiar with full costs involved in exporting to the EU.
EU requirements act as an export barrier for firms producing products currently
not represented in the exports to the EU, and comprising the bulk of the Georgian
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economy. The average Georgian company does not export to the EU, partly because it
cannot offer an attractive product meeting quality and safety standards of the European
market.  
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Introduction
This section discusses current developments in the services sectors in Georgia
and the likely implications of free trade agreements with the EU or regional trading
agreements. We also analyze current laws, regulations, and practices with respect
to the establishment of business and, where relevant, cross-border issues affecting
services and investment. We identify the areas where increased convergence of
regulatory oversight may assist in promoting services and investment flows.
Georgia undertook very wide-ranging commitments to liberalise trade in services
in acceding to the WTO. At the general level, therefore, the study focuses mainly on
the Deep FTA+ scenario, and on the flanking measures that will be necessary to
make liberalization a reality. In this section we are working with the Simple FTA
and the Deep FTA+ scenarios as defined in the Introduction. In the area of services
a Simple FTA means no formal barriers to trade and reinforcement of the principles
of market access and national treatment. A Deep FTA+ scenario describes
significant degree of regulatory convergence and introduction of flanking measures
leading to a considerable improvement of the business climate in Georgia.
Services made up 65.9% of Georgian GDP in 2006. This is an unusually high
figure for a transition economy – the corresponding figure for Russia is just 55% -
and it puts Georgia within sight of the UK (corresponding figure 75%), one of the
leading service economies in the world, on this indicator. Of course, many of the
services sold in Georgia are labour-intensive, low-tech services, and these will fall
in importance as the Georgian economy develops. Georgia has a small surplus on
balance of services within the current account, probably largely reflecting income
relating to the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, but there is no indication of revealed
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7. Services in Georgia
comparative advantage for the services sector as a whole. Some services sectors,
however, are set to become the growth points of the future, because they seek to
exploit Georgia’s unique natural and geographical advantages and/or because they
bring  to bear key generic technologies on the Georgian economy as a whole. So
any agreement between the EU and Georgia which aims to facilitate the process of
economic catch-up in the latter country must devote substantial attention to the
services sector.
The discussion focuses on a number of sectors deemed to be of particular
importance for the Georgian economy, viz.-
7.1. Tourism 
7.2. Information and communications technology (ICT) 
7.3. Construction and engineering services
7.4. Financial services and banking 
7.5. Energy-related services 
7.1. Tourism 
7.1.1. Introduction
This is an area of great natural advantage for Georgia, with considerable
potential for both sea-side tourism on the Black Sea coast line and mountain
tourism on the southern slopes of the Caucasus Mountains. In the Soviet period
mass tourism was a major industry, with some 5 m visitors a year, mostly from
other parts of the Soviet Union. It is now a rapidly growing service export sector,
though tourist numbers are now only a fraction of what they were in Soviet times.
The total number of foreign tourist visitors to Georgia grew from 298,469 in 2002
to 548,107 in 200541. Some two-thirds of Georgia’s foreign tourists come from the
CIS (on the basis of 2005 data – but this must have been subsequently affected by
the Russian economic blockade). The number of tourists coming from Europe
excluding the CIS grew from 98,913 in 2002 to 158,820 in 2005.  
There are some restrictions on foreign nationals and companies in the WTO
accession agreement, mostly with reference to presence of natural persons, but they
do not appear to be onerous.  
The main issue facing the Georgian tourist industry is the development of the
related services needed to exploit the full tourist potential of the country, and that
108
Maryla Maliszewska (ed.)
CASE Network Reports No. 79/2008
41 NB all foreigners entering Georgia are classed as tourists.
means close cooperation between the public and private sectors. Foreign direct
investment in tourism has been growing rapidly in Georgia over the last few years.
And the government is also making big investments in tourist infrastructure,
notably in Batumi and Sighnaghi, an old town high up in the mountains on the
eastern side of Georgia, near the border with Azerbaijan. In March 2008 a national
programme for marketing tourism was adopted. However, Georgia still does not
have a facility capable of hosting a large conference, congress or exhibition.  
A new hotel school opened in Tbilisi in late 2007. But there are no general
tourism development programmes in Georgia (Tait and Miller, 2007). An FTA
would have no direct effect on these key training issues. Any national tourist
training facilities that do exist will obviously benefit from provision for student
exchange with EU countries. It is again not clear, however, that such exchanges
would be facilitated by a free trade agreement, whether simple or deep. 
7.1.2. Tourist infrastructure
A Deep FTA+ would effectively involve Georgia signing up for the ‘common
aviation area’ (although technically this could be negotiated as a separate
agreement). The EU is currently negotiating on the common aviation area with the
countries of the Western Balkans, and aims to get all the countries covered by the
Neighbourhood Policy into it by 2010. Prices of flights to and from Georgia have
been going down steadily, and one may expect that one of the big budget airlines
will start flying to Georgia soon. Batumi Airport is managed by a Turkish company,
and is classified by the Turkish authorities as being within their air domain. This
means that Turkish carriers can run scheduled flights between Batumi and Turkish
airports (e.g. Batumi-Istanbul). 
Road transport infrastructure is a major bottleneck for Georgian tourist
development. While international trunk roads are in reasonable condition and well
signposted, smaller roads, including city roads, are often in poor condition and
poorly signposted.  
The inadequacy of the road network for tourism is most acute in relation to the
Svaneti region of the high Caucasus. This has potential at the level of the best parts
of the Swiss and French Alps, but today it can only be accessed by helicopter or by
a road up the Kodori valley on the edge of Abkhazia, where there is a real danger
of hostage-taking. Among other prime tourist sites, Uplistsikhe, Vardzia and David
Garedja are also very difficult to get to.
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Until recently road travellers, both Georgian and foreign, were subject to the
deplorable tendencies of the traffic police to use their powers arbitrarily to extort
petty bribes. This practice was so acute that the government took the drastic
measure of sacking the entire traffic police force on the grounds that the problem
could not be cured in any other way. This is illustrative of the government’s
determination to attack the corruption problem, even at considerable cost of social
frictions with the targeted group. A cultural dimension which intensifies the road
transport problem is the Georgian way of driving, which is generally too fast, and
tends to ignore the existence (or indeed the right to exist) of pedestrians. Road laws
seem to be largely unenforced. There is scope here for international harmonization,
backed up by technical assistance. Clearly, none of this has anything to do with a
Simple FTA. But it could plausibly feature as a flanking measure for a Deep FTA+,
with a significant potential effect on the development of tourism. It should be noted
that the EU/Georgia Action Plan predicates a specific action plan on road safety. 
There are also some specific issues in relation to sea transport. There are plans
to develop Batumi as a cruise ship port, but these plans are being held up by the
insistence of the port authorities on charging cruise ships the same docking fees as
cargo ships.42 It is expected that this issue will in any case be resolved over the next
year or so.
Overall, infrastructure is a critical bottleneck for the tourist industry. A Deep
FTA+ could help here, because it would make it easier for foreign investors to
commit themselves to long-term, infrastructural projects. The EU/Georgia Action
Plan contains quite specific goals in relation to transport infrastructure and
regulation. To that extent a Deep FTA+ can be seen as complementary to the ENP
Action Plan in this area.
7.1.3. Abkhazia
As in other areas, the Abkhazia problem rears its head in relation to tourism.
There are plans to build new hotels in Abkhazia to house guests at the 2014 Winter
Olympics in Sochi, in Russia. The Georgian government has condemned these
plans as an infringement of Georgian sovereignty in Abkhazia, and is threatening to
organise a boycott of the Sochi Games on these grounds. But Georgian sovereignty
in Abkhazia does, of course, mean that any FTA signed by Georgia would cover
Abkhazia as well. Since many of the visitors staying at these hotels would be EU
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42 International practice is not consistent on this point.  In Lebanon, passenger ships pay 65% of the standard
docking fee for cargo ships.  In Norway, they pay slightly more than cargo ships.
citizens and many of the related hotel bookings would be by EU travel agents and
tour operators, any measures by the Georgian government to block the business
activity of those (as yet unbuilt) hotels would contravene any FTA with the EU that
might in the meantime have been signed.
In conclusion, the potential impact of a Simple FTA on the Georgian tourist
industry could only be minor. A Deep FTA+ could have a much greater impact,
notably in the key areas of tourist infrastructure and deregulation of air travel,
which would tend to increase with time.
7.2. Information and Communications Technology (ICT) 
7.2.1. Introduction
This is a uniquely important sector, because it provides a whole range of
essentially technological services, which can be used to upgrade production and
management systems in virtually every sector of the economy. If we accept that
dissemination of world best practice is the key to sustained growth in productivity
and GDP in Georgia, then we must place special stress on the ICT sector.
7.2.2. The sector in outline
There are some minor restrictions on provision of computer services by foreign
firms and nationals in Georgia under the WTO accession agreement, mainly in
relation to presence of natural persons, but overall the Georgian computer services
sector is already highly liberalized. There are six internet providers in Georgia. One
of these, Caucasus Online, does have an effective monopoly over the provision of
ADSL internet services, with over 90% of the market. And the service offered by
Caucasus Online does not seem to be particularly good. It will no doubt improve
once the company has finished laying its new fibre-optic cable on the Black Sea bed
between Poti in Georgia and Varna in Bulgaria.43 In any case Caucasus Online only
has 30% of the total internet access provision market, with Telenet also on 30%, and
the other 40% shared between a number of smaller providers (Hardabkhadze and
Kvemadze, 2006, p.23). So the overall structure of the market is duopoly rather
than monopoly. The conclusion must still be that only a Deep FTA+, with
substantial flanking in terms of a strengthened competition and monopoly
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43 In conjunction with the US company Tyco Telecommunications
authority, would be of significant benefit to Georgian internet users. As Table 7.1.
shows, Georgia is comparatively well endowed with computers, but has a low rate
of internet use. 
The Georgian telecoms sector is already highly liberalized. But there is a feeling
in the industry that the system of regulation needs to be reformed. The National
Communications Commission (GNCC) is seen as weak, as lacking vision, and as
unable to implement its own regulations (but as incompetent rather than corrupt).
One specific issue which has been recently resolved is that of allocation of frequencies.
This was previously done on a bureaucratic basis, with applicants having to justify
their requests. Now frequencies are auctioned on a purely financial basis.
In the context of all this, regulatory convergence with the EU is an immediate
flanking issue for Georgia, within the framework of the ENP Action Plan commitment
to developing a national telecommunications and IT policy. Here, the best way
forward would be full adoption of the relevant parts of the acquis communautaire, but
on the basis of the 1998 telecom regulation package rather than the current 2002
package. The 1998 package is at once more detailed and more appropriate for a
country at an earlier stage in development. The European Commission could support
this process of regulatory convergence in the way that it has done for the non-EU
countries of South-Eastern Europe, by preparing detailed annual reports on the
progress of convergence, backed up by regular meetings of a working group and
selective technical assistance as required (CEPS, 2006, p.93). In principle, therefore,
full convergence could be achieved soon after the signing of a Deep FTA+.  
It is unclear to what extent convergence in technical standards for telecoms
equipment is an issue for Georgia. As evinced by the case of Russia, there are huge
differences between GOST and EU standards in this area. Since the great bulk of
telecom products come under the EU New Approach to conformity assessment,
however, and since Georgia in any case produces very little telecoms equipment
itself, convergence should be an essentially technical problem. But it may be a very
complex technical problem, involving on-going cooperation between the Georgian
authorities and the European Commission and EU-sponsored user-groups.
Standards issues of a technical nature have been reported in relation to e-
commerce – not strictly a technical standards issue, but closely related. The
approach of the Georgian government here has been to draft new legislation based
on the principle of harmonization with EU law, and using the model UN law on e-
commerce (Hardabkhadze and Kvemadze, 2006, p.19). But the issue is very
complicated, and this may help to explain why passage of the law has been delayed.
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Full convergence in this area, as in the area of technical standards per se, may well
require a Deep FTA+, and might only be achieved some time after the signature of
such an agreement.
As Table 7.1 shows, Georgia is comparatively well endowed with telephone land
lines. The long-distance carrier, Telecom Georgia, is owned by the US-Russian
company MIG. The local fixed-line carrier is United Telecom Georgia (UTG), owned
by the Kazakh Bank Turan Alem. UTG, which owns the national cable
infrastructure, is official designated by the GNCC as having ‘significant market
power’. The kinds of problems to which this can give rise were recently highlighted
by a dispute between UTG and two independent operators – Highline and Telenet,
which use mobile technology to provide fixed-line services. UTG tried to increase its
rates for Highline and Telenet from two to twenty tetri per minute. The issue went
to GNCC, and the regulator found in favour of Highline and Telenet, pending the
decision of a special committee set up to review the case. Clearly there are real
monopoly problems in the fixed telephony sector, but in this case at least GNCC
acted quickly and decisively in favour of competition. And it should be stressed that
these problems touch only on the relationship between the common carrier and the
operators. Among the latter, there is  a wealth of competition, with 34 international
providers and 30 local providers. Nevertheless the interests of Georgian fixed
telephony users would clearly be served by a Deep FTA+ involving specifically a
significant strengthening of the competition and monopoly authority, in line with the
ENP EU/Georgia Action Plan. A total of 35.2% of total telecoms revenue in Georgia
is generated by fixed-line telephony (Hardabkhadze and Kvemadze, 2006, p.32).
Table 7.1 shows that Georgia is comparatively poorly endowed with mobile
phones (NB the figure for mobile phones per 1000 persons seems to have more than
doubled between 2003 and 2005). The Georgian mobile phone market is dominated
by the Georgian/Turkish Geocell and the Georgian/US Magticom, which have
roughly equal shares in the market. The Russian Beeline entered the market in
2007, with lower prices but more limited coverage. It does not seem to have made
a big impact up to now, taking only about 5% of the market. Local sources suggest
that the mobile market is effectively a duopoly, with significant barriers to entry.
There is no suggestion that this duopoly situation is improperly supported by the
state. But the competition and monopoly authority has not been able to make a
decisive impact on the problem.
It is clear that there are significant problems of excessive market power in both
fixed and mobile telephony markets in Georgia. Local institutions are not powerless
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in the face of these problems, but comprehensive liberalization of the telecoms
market will require significant strengthening of competition policy, in line with the
goals of the EU/Georgia Action Plan. This would be surely on the agenda for a Deep
FTA, but given the seriousness of the issue the government should try to act as soon
as possible. Even in a Deep FTA+ there would probably be some lag here, with
flanking measures (like reinforcement of the executive power of the competition
authority) taking some time to bite. Our conclusions for the ICT sector as a whole
are similar.
7.3. Construction and engineering services  
This relates primarily to the import of construction services, where cross-border
supply is generally unbound under the Georgian WTO agreement, with regard to
both market access and national treatment. For most construction service sub-
sectors, national treatment is qualified in relation to commercial presence by the
requirement that at least half the staff should be Georgians. So there are some
Simple FTA issues here at the general level. 
Provision of management services for building projects: there is only one specialist
construction project management company in Georgia, and construction project
management is clearly an area where free market access for foreign companies is
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Source: IBM Business Consulting Services (2007), p.79
Table 7.1. Telephone and computer endowment: some regional comparisons
 Azerbaijan Armenia Georgia 
Lower 
Middle 
average 
Average 
for the 
ECA 
region 
High 
Income 
Average 
World 
Average 
Communications 
Telephone Mainlines 
per 1000 peoples (2003)  
114 148 133 175 228 560 183 
Mobile Phones per 
1000 peoples (2003) 
128 100 (2005) 107 207 301 708 223 
Computers and Internet  
Personal Computers 
per 1000 peoples (2003) 
n/a 15.8 31.6 35.6 73.4 466.5 100.8 
Internet users per 
1000 peoples (2003) 
37 37 31 75 161 377 150 
Monthly price for  
20 hours of use of 
Internet UD $ (2004) 
108 45 26 30 26 23 37 
very important. It might require a Deep FTA+, to guarantee this. Export of
management services for building projects does not seem to be an issue at the
present time.
Organisation of distribution of imported building materials: import of building
materials into Georgia is tariff-free, except for a 12% tariff on imported stone for
building. This tariff may be unilaterally removed in 2008. Georgia took on no
binding commitments in relation to presence of natural persons in wholesale trade
on joining the WTO. It is improbable that this would significantly affect freedom of
trade in building materials, but it might have to be addressed in an FTA.
Organisation of export of building materials: this issue has arisen in relation to
one very specific and politically highly charged way. The Russian authorities have
announced that they intend to import cement and gravel for the 2014 Sochi Winter
Olympics from Abkhazia, the breakaway region of Georgia. Any such shipments
will obviously be classified as Georgian exports to Russia. The Georgian
government has reacted very strongly to the announcement, threatening to organise
a boycott of the Sochi Games in retaliation. A free trade agreement with the EU
would have little immediate bearing here, because the dispute is essentially a
bilateral one between Georgia and Russia. But it raises a general issue which could
create difficulties once an FTA is signed. Since Abkhazia is legally part of Georgia,
it would be covered by such an FTA. That means that any measures taken by the
Georgian government to limit trade between Abkhazia and the EU (e.g. export of
Abkhazian citrus fruits to the EU by Russian companies operating in Abkhazia)
would be in contravention of the agreement. By the same token, however, any
agreement between the EU and Georgia on property rights and intellectual
property rights would hold in Abkhazia, and claims on property in Abkhazia could
be pursued on that basis.
Provision of design and architectural services: there are three or four Georgian
companies active in this area, so that there may not be a great deal of competition
on the domestic market. There is probably no export activity. Only a Deep FTA+
with significant reinforcement of competition policy could establish real
international competitiveness in the area.
As we have seen, Georgia does not export construction services. But she does
export aircraft maintenance services. She does so, however, only to Turkmenistan,
in payment of an old debt relating to gas supplies. When that debt is paid off, the
provision of these services to Turkmenistan will probably cease. The circumstances
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here are, therefore, very specific, and the impact of a possible FTA difficult to
gauge, but probably negligible.
In conclusion, engineering services is an area where a Simple FTA would have
little or no effect. To take the process further, particularly in relation to effective
market access, would require a Deep FTA+. 
7.4. Financial services and banking 
7.4.1. Introduction
The Georgian financial sector is among the smallest relative to GDP in the
World Bank’s Europe and Central Asia region.  Under the WTO accession
agreements, the banking sector is largely liberalized in Georgia. But the Georgian
banking sector remains about 50% domestically-owned. Comparison with the
experience of other transition countries, where banking liberalization has generally
been followed by overwhelming foreign penetration, suggests that there is room for
flanking measures here, such as might be incorporated into a Deep FTA+. Under
the WTO agreements the Georgian insurance sector remains subject to some
restrictions, mainly in relation to presence of natural persons, but these do not
appear to be onerous.  
7.4.2. The banking sector in Georgia
There are currently 18 banks in Georgia. The six largest banks hold around 87%
of the total assets of the sector, 90% of the total outstanding loans, and about 89%
of deposits. Pressure for consolidation in the sector comes from the new minimum
capital requirement regulation, which requires all banks to have paid-up capital of
at least US$6.5 m by 2008. At the same time the National Bank lists maintenance
of competition in the banking sector as a priority in its Banking Strategy for the
Period 2006-9. There are also 42 credit unions, working mainly in the countryside,
and some small finance companies that lend money to SMEs. There is a high rate
of dollarisation of bank business – 72% in terms of deposits and 76% in terms of
loans in December 2005 (Billmeier and Ding, 2006, p.8). But the rate of
dollarisation is going down – to 70.8% in terms of deposits in the first quarter of
2006 and 68.7% in terms of deposits in the first quarter of 2007 (Georgian Economic
Trends, 2007, p.29). Spreads are high – in 2004 they were averaging nearly 20% on
short-term lari deposits/loans, before coming down to something above 10% in
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2005 and early 2006; from late 2006, however, they started to rise again (see Table
7.2). Short-term lending rates of interest in lari are typically in the range 20-22%.
Lending rates and spreads are generally lower on foreign-currency denominated
deposits/loans. Liquid assets are a high proportion of total assets – 76% at the end
of 2005. At the same point in time the non-performing loan ratio (to total loans) was
surprisingly low, at 3.8%. There has been a rapid expansion of credit recently – at
an annual rate of around 45% (43% year-on-year in the first quarter of 200744),
possibly due partly to increased efficiency in the system, and to improvements in
the (still unsatisfactory) legal environment, especially with respect to the recovery
of bad loans. The Georgian banking sector is moderately profitable, with a rate of
return on assets (ROA) of 3.1% and a rate of return on equity (ROE) of 14.9% in
2005 (National Bank of Georgia, 2006, p.11). 
Banks have generally become more willing to lend without collateral in recent years.
The share of long-term credit (more than one year) in total credit has also increased –
from 27% in 2000 to 64.2% in December 2005 (National Bank of Georgia, 2006, p.9).
But more than 70% of SMEs and around 60% of big companies never go to the banks
for credit (Billmeier and Ding, 2006, p.5; confirmed by interview with local bankers in
October 2007). Micro loans are a growth area, and picked out as a priority area in the
Banking Strategy for the Period 2006-9, but there is a long way to go. In terms of bank
credits to particular sectors, health care and social services saw the most rapid year-on-
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44 Georgian Economic Trends, July 2007, p.29
Source: Georgian Economic Trends, 2007, p.31
Table 7.2. Commercial bank interest rates (annual weighted average)
On loans On deposits 
Lari Foreign currency Lari Foreign currency 
 
Short- 
term 
Long- 
term 
Short- 
term 
Long- 
term 
Short- 
term 
Long- 
term 
Short- 
term 
Long- 
term 
2000 22 17 30 20 11 2 11 13 
2001 24 17 27 21 8 3 11 12 
2002 25 16 25 20 11 12 11 12 
2003 25 19 23 19 10 12 10 11 
2004 27 20 22 17 8 12 9 11 
2005 22 21 20 16 9 12 8 10 
2006 21 20 18 16 10 13 7 10 
  Q1 21 20 19 15 10 13 8 11 
  Q2 20 20 19 16 7 13 6 10 
  Q3 20 20 18 16 7 13 6 10 
  Q4 22 19 18 16 7 13 7 10 
2007         
  Q1 22 19 18 16 7 12 7 10 
year increase in the first quarter of 2007 – 213%, with education, construction and
hotels and restaurants also showing rapid growth. (Strikingly, the key transport and
communications sector showed a fall in credits of 8% over the same period.) (Georgian
Economic Trends, 2007, p.29) But around half of total credits still go to the trade sector
(National Bank of Georgia, 2006, p.9). The government would like to see the banking
sector becoming more flexible, and more prepared to take risks – but on the basis of
proper risk assessments. The National Bank of Georgia is currently drafting a
Methodological Manual of Risk Management Evaluation.  
There are no direct restrictions on foreign bank ownership in Georgia, and 50% of
the total capital of the Georgian banking sector was held by foreign organizations at
the end of 2005. As much as 76% of the gross assets of the sector were held by banks
with foreign participation at the same point in time (National Bank of Georgia, 2006,
p.10). But there is only one first-tier foreign bank in the country – the French Société
Générale, which holds about 11% of the market in terms of deposits and over 30% of
the plastic cards in circulation in Georgia through its subsidiary, Bank Republic. The
Austrian Creditanstalt bought the EBRD’s 11.8% stake in the Bank of Georgia, the
second biggest bank, in May 2006, on behalf of a range of institutional investors. The
Russian Vneshtorgbank (VTB), the German Procredit, the Kazakh Turan Alem Bank
and the Armenian Cascade Bank are also present, in addition to a number of
multilateral funding organisations. There are branches of the Turkish Ziraat Bank and
the Azeri Development Bank of the Caucasus in Tbilisi. HSBC will enter the Georgian
market in early 2008. But they plan to open just one branch, so that they will not be
challenging Société Générale’s premier position for the time being. The old rule that
non-bankers were not allowed to own more than 25% of a bank may have acted as an
effective barrier to foreign investment in the past. That was removed in March 2006. 
Georgian banks are primarily regulated on the basis of the Basle-1 rules of risk
assessment.  A law of 1 January 2004 on Facilitating the Elimination of Legalisation
of Illegal Incomes provides the basis for the work of the Financial Monitoring
Service of the National Bank in countering money laundering.  Société Générale,
which is supervised by the National Bank of Georgia but also reports to the French
Commission Bancaire, is regulated on the basis of Basle-2, which is more self-
regulatory than Basle-1 but better suited to the operations of highly sophisticated
first-tier banks. It is unclear whether this is also the case for the other foreign banks
active in Georgia.  
Recent positive developments in the Georgian banking sector include the
creation of a credit information bureau in 2006, to help banks with risk assessment.
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Measures have also been taken to strengthen the process of bank audit. Georgia
now has Standard and Poor’s and Fitch Ratings sovereign credit ratings of,
respectively, B+/B with stable outlook and BB-/B with stable outlook. Among the
commercial banks, Société Générale has, of course, an AA- rating, but the mainly
domestically-owned Bank of Georgia also has good international ratings - B+/B
rating with stable outlook from Standard & Poor’s, and B-/B with positive outlook
from Fitch Ratings. All of this makes it easier for banks to borrow on international
financial markets. The government originally proposed to introduce a deposit
insurance scheme in 2007, but the idea has been dropped for the time being. It
remains an element in the Banking Strategy for the Period 2006-9.    
The fact that, even with virtually 100% liberalisation, there is only one first-tier
foreign bank in Georgia suggests that a Simple FTA would have little impact on the
sector. Flanking measures are again the key here, but they would have to be very
thorough-going, including fundamental legal reform, e.g. on recovery of bad loans,
to have any impact. It is clear, however, that the stakes are high. Georgia
desperately needs first-tier foreign banks to improve the flow of investment finance
to its rapidly emerging economy. Nearly 99% of the financial intermediation in
Georgia comes through the banking system (National Bank of Georgia, 2006, p.5).
This pattern is not going to change in the medium term, so that Georgia’s
development prospects depend crucially on the evolution of the banking system. If
that evolution is in turn dependent on a Deep FTA+, then the latter may emerge as
a key condition of sustained economic development in Georgia.
7.4.3. The insurance sector in Georgia
The insurance sector in Georgia is very small, with total premia collected in
2004 amounting to just 0.5% of GDP. In 1999 Georgia had the third lowest gross
premium volume in the CIS, with only Armenia and Kyrgyzstan below it (Mu et al.,
2004, p.14). There are foreign insurance companies in Georgia – BCI and GPI, and
there are also some joint ventures. Their limited impact, despite the liberality of the
related clauses of Georgia’s WTO accession agreement, suggests that a Simple FTA
would have little effect here. Georgia does have actuaries, grouped together within
the Georgian Association of Actuaries, so that there is a professional basis for
developing life insurance. The generally low level of living standards in Georgia
means, however, that there is scant short-to-medium-term prospect of the
development of a significant market for life insurance in Georgia. There is little that
an FTA could do to change this except for indirect impact of a Deep FTA+ on the
purchasing power of the population.
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7.4.4. The stock market in Georgia
The Georgian stock exchange is tiny, and accounts for less than 1% of total
financial intermediation in the country. The government is anxious to develop it,
and the Banking Strategy for the Period 2006-9 includes an ambitious programme
of related legislation, concerned mainly with electronic means of payment. But on
the most optimistic assumptions, the Georgian stock market will remain a minor
element in the Georgian financial system for the foreseeable future.
7.4.5. The financial regulatory framework
The Georgian Banking Strategy for the Period 2006-9 envisages harmonization
of the Georgian banking framework to EU banking legislation, in accordance with
the provisions of the EU/Georgia Action Plan. In this context, it is in fact probably
not appropriate for Georgia simply to copy all the sections of the acquis
communautaire relating to the financial sector. As has been argued in relation to
Ukraine (CEPS, 2006, p.9), the EU’s Financial Services Action Plan (comprising 42
legislative measures) was drafted to take account of the needs of countries with
highly sophisticated financial markets. Georgia is not in that category, and will not
join it for some time to come. The important thing for Georgia is that legislation
should be acquis-compatible, reflecting passive compliance with the EU system. In
essence that means simply ensuring that there are no serious inconsistencies
between the Georgian and EU systems. Even so, on the more substantive issues of
financial regulation, progress will be slow, and the conclusion of an FTA would not,
in itself, do much to accelerate it. A Deep FTA+would have a significant impact.  
Among key corporate governance/audit/accounting flanking measures, Georgia
has already made the EU International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)
compulsory for listed companies. Of course, the number of listed companies in
Georgia is very small, and it would likely take several years of a Deep FTA+ to make
a significant impact on this situation.
With the sector already highly liberalised, the effect of a Simple FTA on financial
services would be negligeable. A Deep FTA+, involving key flanking measures on
the legal dimension (corporate governance overall financial regulation, recovery of
bad loans), would have a much greater effect. That effect would probably grow over
time as legal reform began to impact on actual patterns of behaviour.
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7.5. Energy-related services 
This covers a wide range of transit issues, and also issues relating to domestic
distribution of energy. 
Under Georgia’s WTO accession agreement energy-related services are largely
liberalized, and the electricity industry is mainly privately owned, apart from high-
voltage transmission lines. The Czech Energo-Pro controls 60% of power
distribution in the country, having bought two distribution companies in July 2007,
and also owns six hydroelectric stations.    
The new oil pipeline to be built from Supsa to Odessa and north-east Europe will
have major implications for Georgia in terms of international energy services.
There is a pipeline through Georgia which comes out at Poti/Batumi, but it might
not be big enough to take the increased traffic once the Supsa-Odessa pipeline is
on-stream, and it might be necessary to build another pipeline across Georgia.  
The strategy of the government is to develop the country as an exporter of
energy,45 and as a transit country for energy. That means that Georgia’s energy
strategies have to be placed firmly in regional context. The natural pattern is for
Georgia to export electricity in the summer and import it in winter. Turkey is
expected to have a big energy deficit 2010-2011. If the Russian embargo could be
settled, Russian electricity could transit through Georgia to Turkey. The Georgian
government wants to develop a circle of transmission lines for export, and to increase
the reliability of these lines. It extends cheap loans to public-sector organizations for
development of the energy sector in accordance with these priorities.  It is unlikely
that that would give rise to any difficulties in terms of the issue of subsidization within
the context of an FTA. Georgia is also a transit country for gas with gas currently
going from Russia, through Georgia, to Armenia. NB the price of this gas to Georgia
is twice the price to Armenia. Georgia obtains most of its gas from Azerbaijan and is
also a transit country for Azeri gas, via the South Caucasus gas pipeline. Clearly the
government’s vision of Georgia as an energy-exporting and transiting country cannot
be realized without much better regional cooperation at the political level. In
principle, a Deep FTA+ between Georgia and the EU would buttress regional energy
cooperation, especially if it were flanked by similar agreements with Armenia,
Azerbaijan and Russia. But the improved political cooperation would probably have
to come first, and the whole process would be very long-term.
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45 In the recent past, Georgia has been a net importer of electricity, but this year (2007) it is a net exporter.
As with most service sectors, it is the Deep FTA+ scenario that counts for energy-
related services. But in this case the effectiveness of a Deep FTA+ would be critically
dependent on political developments at the regional level, such as would establish the
necessary conditions for regional energy cooperation, so that it would be unrealistic
to expect a substantial immediate effect from the signing of such an agreement. 
7.6. Likely changes to investment climate due to FTA
Consideration of international experience shows that there is no clear pattern of
response to FDI flows to trade agreements. The FDI boom in China predated the
accession of that country to the WTO by a number of years, and accession did not
produce any clear-cut upward shift in the FDI trend. In the Central-East European
countries, the FDI boom started as soon as transition began (Poland was something
of an exception), and accession to the EU did not result in any sharp break in the
FDI trend. (There was a leap in FDI inflow in Poland in 2004, but it was not
maintained.) Likewise in Russia, we have seen a very sharp upward trend in FDI
over the past few years, culminating in a jump to a total of over $30 bn and a per
capita level comparable to that of the CEECs in 2006, during a period in which
Russia’s relations with the rest of the world have come under strain, and in which
concerns over the special difficulties of doing business in that country have
increased rather than decreased.  
How do we make sense of these patterns? In Central-East Europe companies
may, with some justification, have anticipated ultimate EU accession on the part of
those countries. The same thing can be said of FDI in China and Chinese accession
to the WTO. It may equally plausibly be argued that multinational firms use FDI
primarily in order to gain access to the specific resource endowments of particular
countries, or to the markets of those countries. Cheap labour in the case of China,
(relatively) cheap skilled labour in Central-East Europe, energy resources in
Central Asia, access to CEEC markets, have clearly all been important drivers of
FDI in the transition countries. In the Russian case, access to energy resources, and
to the large Russian domestic market, have been of central importance. Cheap
labour has been less important in Russia because of uncertainties about Russian
productivity and anxieties about how easy it would be to develop modern
management systems in Russian conditions. Reference to patterns of factor
availability hardly explains, however, the huge leap in foreign investment in Russia
over the last year or so. High oil prices, leading to high economic growth and
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rapidly increasing domestic consumption, may lie at the heart of the process, but it
is, again, difficult to adduce conclusive evidence.  
CEEC accession to the EU put FDI in the new Member States under the legal
protection of the acquis communautaire as well as admitting them to the Single
Market. Still, there was no dramatic leap in FDI. Remaining legal uncertainties and
widespread corruption in China have not stopped FDI continuing to grow in that
country. Improvements in the business environment must surely ultimately have
positive effects on investment flows. But they may have relatively minor effects on
the strategies of oil companies used to fishing in troubled waters and retailers
working on relatively short planning horizons. Where the business environment may
be much more important is in relation to the scope for building whole complexes of
companies in the form of supply chains and design/production matrices.
One of the major impacts of FDI in CEEC has come in the form of a build-up of
supply networks centering on major investments, especially in the automotive and
consumer electronics sectors. Leading these new supply hierarchies have been the
first-tier suppliers, making complex components and cooperating actively with lead
companies in relation to technological development and design. Examples from the
car industry include engines and gear boxes. Below that level, second- and third-tier
suppliers have been engaged to make individual components (ranging from
technologically advanced down to simple) for the finished products. Patterns of
development of supply hierarchies in CEEC have not been wholly satisfactory from
a development point of view. The great majority of first-tier suppliers are
themselves wholly or partly foreign-owned, and Slovenia is the only new Member
State of the EU to boast of a significant number of domestically-owned first-tier
suppliers. In China FDI has given a tremendous boost to the development of supply
hierarchies. But here, there is a significant number of Chinese-owned first-tier
suppliers, some of them exporting all over the world (Dyker, 2006).
How do these various factors affect Georgia? She has no significant oil or gas
reserves, but is a key transit country for hydrocarbons, especially with regard to
pipelines, and it is clear that recent trends in FDI into the country have largely been
driven by investment in the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. Georgia cannot offer a big
domestic market, though this has not stopped substantial foreign investments in
retail distribution and mobile telephony. There appears to be no significant degree
of supply network-building in Georgia. A Simple FTA could help to kick-start this
kind of development, and a Deep FTA and Deep FTA+ would help to sustain it, once
started. But as the CEE and Chinese experience have demonstrated, patterns of
capability and relative wages are more important here than free trade agreements.
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7.6.1. MFN pre-establishment
Georgia’s WTO membership should in principle guarantee MFN for the great
majority of sectors, and a Simple FTA would require removal of any residual
discriminatory constraint on inward investment. The dispute with Russia has
introduced a whole range of discriminatory elements into the bilateral trading
relations of the two countries, but do not appear to have affected Russian FDI in
Georgia to any great extent. Since Russia is a member of neither the WTO nor the
EU, however, this matter is tangential to present concerns. More important, and
still involving Russia, is the Abkhazia issue, in its various manifestations, as
discussed above, which could impinge seriously on any level of FTA. 
7.6.2. National treatment
Again, Georgia’s WTO membership should in principle guarantee this, and a
Simple FTA would merely reinforce this guarantee. The big problem here, however,
is the complexity and difficulty of doing business in Georgia (see Table 7.3). In
principle, this factor affects foreign companies and domestic companies equally. In
practice, it is always easier for local companies to find ways round regulations. A
more directly discriminatory factor in the local business environment is the
inefficiency and corruptibility of courts. Again, the latter factor generally tends to
favour insiders, to the detriment of the level playing field principle. Finally, it is
easier for local firms to evade taxes than for foreign firms. On all these counts, only
a comprehensive Deep FTA+ would make a significant impact.
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Source: World Bank Doing Business database
Table 7.3. Selected indicators of doing business in Georgia, with regional comparisons
 Georgia Armenia Azerbaijan Baltic countries 
Starting a business 
    Procedures  (no)      8.0 10.0 14.0 6.3 
    Duration (days) 21.0 25.0 115.0 25.7 
Dealing with licenses  
    Procedures  (no)      29.0 20.0 28.0 15.7 
    Duration (days) 282.0 176.0 212.0 142.3 
Registering property 
    Procedures (no)      6.0 4.0 7.0 5.3 
    Duration (days) 9.0 6.0 61.0 40.7 
Enforcing contracts 
    Procedures  (no)      18.0 24.0 25.0 20.7 
    Duration (days) 375.0 185.0 267.0 163.3 
   Cost (% o  debt) 31.7 17.8 19.8 10.0 
7.6.3. Market access restrictions
Again, these have largely disappeared in formal terms with WTO accession. A
Simple FTA would in principle clear up any remaining formal obstacles. Problems
of business environment as discussed under the last sub-heading might continue to
impose some informal market access restrictions, hence a Deep FTA+ could be
critical here.
7.7. Conclusions
A Simple free trade agreement would have only a very marginal impact on the
services sector. Deep FTA could have a very substantial impact, and could
transform some sub-sectors. An effective Deep free trade agreement would,
certainly, need far-reaching flanking measures which would be difficult to
incorporate into a trade agreement. But many of these flanking measures –
strengthening the rule of law, improving the general business climate, combating
corruption and reinforcing the authority of the competition policy -, are listed
under the priorities of the EU/Georgia Action Plan. A Deep FTA+ could therefore
be seen as essentially complementary to continued implementation of the ENP
Action Plan.
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Up to 2006 FDI inflows to Georgia had been rather modest, totalling below
USD0.5 billion a year. From the countries that are geographically closer to the EU,
inflows of similar magnitude were recorded in recent years in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. In the early 1990s, FDI coming to Romania were also in this range.
Year 2006 brought a change with FDI inflows to Georgia totalling USD1.2 billion.
If trends observed for the first half of 2007 are sustained, incoming foreign
investment in 2007 may be just this high. For additional statistics on FDI see
Appendix 5 (Appendix 5 Table 1 through Appendix 5 Table 3).
By 2006 FDI stock per capita in Georgia was around USD800, which was close
to the average for the European transition economies. Around 20-30% of total
investment in the economy has been due to FDI. The share of foreign investment in
total investment may seem high, but is comparable to Armenia. Georgia has been
much less dependent on FDI than Azerbaijan, where energy-resources driven share
of foreign investment has been extremely high.
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8. Likely changes in FDI flow due 
to an FTA in Georgia
Source: UNCTAD and Ministry of Economic Development of Georgia
Note: * - own estimate
Table 8.1. FDI statistics, Georgia, 1998-2006
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
FDI inflows  
in million of USD 
265 83 135 133 167 340 499 450 1190 
FDI stocks  
in million of USD 
512 595 730 863 1031 1371 1870 2320 3510
* 
FDI stock  
in USD per capita 
106 125 155 185 223 300 414 519 785* 
FDI inflows in %  
of total investment 
28.7 11.3 17.4 15.2 20.1 32.3 33.6 24.0  
Until recently, the most important foreign investment was connected with the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil and gas pipeline projects. The main pipeline became
operational in 2006 (although has not yet reached its full capacity), so that the
amount of FDI connected with the BTC projects is expected to decrease. Inflows of
non-pipeline FDI started to rise strongly in 2006. The situation is reflected in Table
8.2, where the share of BP (dominant owner of the consortium that operates the
BTC pipeline) in total foreign direct investment falls sharply in 2006-2007.
A significant part of inflows has thus been connected with pipeline
transportation. The rest has been dominated by the sales of state-owned assets
either in the network industries (telecom, energy generation and distribution, oil
terminals, media), real estate (hotels), and low-processed industries and extraction
of mineral resources (ferrous metals, fertilisers, copper, cement; (Schmidt, 2007)).
New FDI inflows in the second quarter of 200746 went mainly to the energy sector,
various services (of which half to banking), construction and to the industrial
sector.
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46 Statistics on FDI by sectors startedto be compiled from 2Q2007.
Source: Ministry of Economic Development of Georgia
Table 8.2. Pipeline and non-pipeline FDI inflows, 2000-2007
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 IQ 
BP's Investments     61 231 360 265 306 26 
Other FDI 131 110 107 109 139 185 884 260 
BP's Share, %     36.1% 67.9% 72.1% 58.9% 25.7% 9.1% 
Total FDI 131 110 167 339 499 450 1190 286 
Source: Ministry of Economic Development of Georgia
Note: * - The Department of Statistics launched to survey FDI by sectors from 2007 Q2
** - Property purchased through privatization, which profile is not determined yet
Table 8.3. Foreign investment in Georgia, by sectors, in USD million, 20072Q
 2007 Q2 
  USD million Share 
Total  370.5 100% 
     In which   
Agriculture 0.0 0% 
Production 53.6 14% 
Energy  136.4 37% 
Construction 72.8 20% 
Services 95.9 26% 
Other** 11.7 3% 
In terms of nationality of investors, British and American firms lead, followed
by Turkish and Azeri enterprises. This structure in large part still reflects the
ownership of the BTC consortium. Kazakh firms accounted for 7% of FDI in
Georgia, while Russian firms for 6%. Other important home countries of investors
are: Norway, Italy and Cyprus (this last one being probably Russian/Georgian/other
CIS offshore capital).
8.1. Motives driving foreign investment
The reasons driving foreign direct investors into Georgia may be of various
types. One can broadly classify them into those that seek markets, resources, and/or
efficiency (Dunning, 1993). In the case of still high barriers to external trade,
foreign investors are usually market-driven, aiming at overcoming high costs of
trading across borders. However, it is possible that along with economic expansion
of host economies and a fall of barriers to trade, investors may be willing to make
use of existing resources (like cheap labour) with the outsourcing parts of
production processes there.
Resource-seeking FDI
Resource-seeking investors have been putting capital in the pipeline transport
for years. As it is clear from the sectoral distribution of inward FDI in Georgia
this motive has been dominant in the past, yet probably started to lose its
significance in 2006. This type of opportunity is rather of a ‘one-off’ nature, and
is not likely to continue once projects are finished, if one puts aside maintenance-
related flows of FDI. There are, however, chances that a new pipeline going from
Baku through Supsa to Odessa (and then to Plock in Poland and/or to Germany)
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Source: Ministry of Economic Development of Georgia
Table 8.4. Countries of origin of foreign investors, 2000-2006
2000-2006   
FDI inflows  
in USD million 
share 
Great Britain 796 18% 
USA 693 15% 
Turkey 400 9% 
Azerbaijan 388 9% 
Kazakhstan 305 7% 
Norway 255 6% 
Russia 251 6% 
Cyprus 221 5% 
Italy 208 5% 
will be constructed. This could create opportunity for another increase in
resource-driven FDI. Anyway, any FTA between the EU and Georgia would not
seem likely to have any direct impact on investment in the pipeline
transportation.
If labour is cheap and its productivity is high and/or quickly growing, we can
expect conditions for major growth in labour-intensive FDI. Georgian labour is
indeed cheap (see Table 8.5) and labour code is fairly liberal. However, labour
productivity is relatively low. The productivity of Georgian labour seems to be even
lower than that of the Armenian workers (see IMF 2007a: 8, when comparing GDP
per employee). The situation is due to low skills and low productivity of Georgian
agricultural workers (56% of employees), with many of them being subsistence
farmers. On the other hand, productivity in manufacturing (industry accounts for
7% of employees) seems to be growing in 2000-2006 (Tokmazishvili and Archvadze
2007: 51-52). Similarly, productivity in 2006 is higher than in 2000 in financial
intermediation, real estate and in mining (Tokmazishvili and Archvadze 2007: 51-
52). However, these seem to be the only sectors that registered increase in
productivity in recent years (Tokmazishvili and Archvadze 2007: 51-52). In general,
labour productivity seems to be improving in manufacturing and some service
sectors only, which – taken together – account for the minor share of Georgian
labour force. It means that gains from investment in labour-intensive industries and
services are for the moment limited to certain sectors only and there are no
prospects that the situation will change soon in this regard.
Skills may have been improving, although it is not certain. Secondary and
tertiary school enrolment ratios increased in 2005 when compared to 2000,
probably signalling higher skills of at least the younger workers. These higher skills
can translate into higher labour productivity soon. However, the number of
students per teacher in the secondary schools increased in the same period
(according to World Bank data on education). So it is not clear whether the quality
of “average” education in Georgia has been increasing as well. It is also not clear
whether education is matched by the needs of the labour market, since we were not
able to find the relevant data. Generally, we cannot state with the significant degree
of confidence that cheap Georgian labour and rising labour productivity are a very
important advantage when locating investment there. Simple FTA with the EU will
not change the prospects in this regard. Deep FTA+ (addressing also
approximation of regulations and practice on technical and sanitary and phyto-
sanitary standards with these of the EU, functioning of customs, regulations
concerning some service sectors, competition policy, public procurement; all
129
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND GEORGIA 
CASE Network Reports No. 79/2008
already listed in the EU-Georgia Action Plan47) will, however, increase chances for
this labour-seeking motive, by creating conditions for sustainable increases in
productivity and gradual improvement of skills of the Georgian workers. However,
this would be rather mid- to long-term attainment.
The third “resource” that may be exploited in the future is connected with the
geographical location of Georgia and with the opportunities that may arise in the
transport and commercial infrastructure. Georgia has access to the Black Sea
through the Kolkhida lowland in the West and spreads over 500 km to the East. The
country may serve as an important transport and commercial hub linking Southern
and Eastern Europe with the Middle East and Central Asia. While it would be best
if all three countries of the Caucasus could integrate together, in the present
situation Georgia has the privileged position of having normal bilateral relations
with both - Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as Turkey, and so it has special
opportunities  to develop as a service sector hub of the region. 
Market-seeking FDI
Although recently Georgia freed its import regime (see earlier parts of this
report), the tariff protection was causing a barrier up to that time. But even in tariff-
protection free Georgia, other barriers to trade continue to exist. Georgia has poor
road and railway infrastructures, and new construction requires massive funding.
Two of its border regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have uncertain status. All
these factors elevate costs of trade, make deliveries lengthy, and cause the barriers
to trade to be still of significant size (see Appendix 5 Table 4). We expect this motive
to lose its relative importance with respect to the tradables soon and stay important
for the non-tradable sectors in Georgia.
Tradables. We expect the market-seeking motive with the relation to the tradable
sector to decrease in the foreseeable future, following recent elimination of
Georgian import tariffs for the majority of goods. This is for the reason that lower
protection combined with uncertain expectations about domestic business
environment make imports from more developed regions economically more
profitable.48 The motive will stay important only for the sectors where other costs
of trade (like transport costs or sector-specific regulations) will stay high. This can
be the case of some food products. For this reason, FTA with the EU will have a
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47 See also parts 8.3 and 8.4 for the description of the Deep free trade scenario and how the effect that originates in
harmonisation works through prices of goods and services.
48 As compared to starting economic activity in Georgia.
negligible additional impact. Even the Deep FTA will not make a noticeable
reduction in the market-seeking motive of foreign investors in Georgia, since
Georgian regulators already accept the EU technical standards.49 The newly agreed
FTA between Georgia and Turkey may however raise the prospect of outsourcing
investment from Turkey in Georgia, given the combination of geographic proximity
and the very low wages in Georgia.
Non-tradables. The market-seeking behaviour of investment has been evident in
FDI inflows into the traditional non-tradable sectors to date. Investment in
telecoms, energy generation and distribution, and real estate have been
predominantly driven by the will to capture domestic market/and or use
possibilities created by sale of state property. In the close future  a few opportunities
for foreign investors will soon open in the hydro-power generation. Foreign
investors will most likely continue to secure access to the Georgian market in the
non-tradable sectors. Simple EU-Georgia FTA will not change the outlook in this
regard. However a Deep FTA50 may enhance this motive, by creating more
business-friendly environment in Georgia.
Efficiency-seeking FDI
It seems that for the moment, there is little scope for efficiency-seeking foreign
investors in Georgia. Partly it is due to the country’s geographical location and to the
natural and “infrastructure” barriers to trade outlined above. Transport costs are
high and will stay high for some time. Therefore, there is limited scope for just-in-
time deliveries and effectively integrated production processes with those located
elsewhere. Turkey, given its proximity and recently concluded FTA with Georgia, is
the most plausible source for FDI of this type. In addition to weaknesses in the rule
of law within Georgia, there are the still unresolved conflicts affecting all three
countries of the South Caucasus, which makes investors cautious about expanding
businesses there. Therefore, it is hardly possible that the whole Southern Caucasus
will soon transform itself into an integrated regional economy, which could exploit
economies of scale and scope.
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49 And will not make a difference for investors from other countries.
50 Addressing also or building on the provisions on services, on the right of establishment and company law,
taxation, competition policy etc. of the EU-Georgia Action Plan
8.2. Black Sea regional integration and future FDI flows
The previous section of this chapter mentioned that the Black Sea regional
economic integration may create additional incentives to invest in Georgia. This
section examines such possibility in greater detail, recalling the experience of the
early years of CEFTA.
Experience of CEFTA
CEFTA – the Central European Free Trade Agreement – was signed in December
1992 and was designed to re-build economic integration between Poland, Hungary
and Czechoslovakia (and later the Czech Republic and Slovakia) and to revive trade
between these countries after it had collapsed with the dissolution of the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), an economic organisation made up of
several communist countries.51 The elimination of tariffs for industrial goods and
reduction of tariffs for agricultural products in the first half of the 1990s within the
CEFTA had no significant immediate impact on bilateral trade flows. In general, trade
flows among the early CEFTA members started to grow intensively only a decade later
when accession to the EU was imminent, and the multilateral trade agreement was
widely viewed as disappointing in terms of an immediate boost to trade.
However, the effects of the early years of CEFTA’s functioning were not limited
to trade in goods. The regional trade agreement brought other indirect gains as
early as the 1990s. For example, it facilitated inflows of foreign direct investment
(FDI) from developed economies (Dangerfield, 2004). These FDIs have had many
positive effects in terms of increasing production and modernisation of
technologies in the CEECs. In the case of smaller countries, like Hungary or the
Czech Republic, FDI has been primarily export-oriented with foreign investors
often targeting the regional CEE markets (but the EU was at the beginning the most
important export market). With a free trade area in place, producers have been able
to serve all CEE markets from a single location. Damijan et al. (2006) document the
importance  of structural reforms and FDIs that - combined with improved market
access – are a major factor explaining the remarkable export performance of
CEECs. Moreover, the existence of the CEFTA allowed for the development of
vertical production chains, with plants located in different CEE countries. The
development of the automotive industry in the region is a good example. These
investments were behind the boost in intra-CEE trade in the 2000s. However these
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51 Later on, Balkan states joined CEFTA, and from 2007 geographical coverage of CEFTA has been ex-Yugoslavia
(except Slovenia) plus Albania and Moldova.
developments were crucially favoured by geographic proximity to main producers
in Germany and France and to the credible prospect of early EU membership.
Possible gains from Black Sea integration to Georgia
There are no comparable prospects for Georgia, but the matrix of bilateral free
trade agreements in the Black Sea region and with the EU could be largely
completed over a medium-term period, with the main exception of the EU-Russia
relationship for which the prospect of free trade is most uncertain. In addition the
Black Sea Synergy programme of the EU could see in due course a wide-ranging
improvement in infrastructures and other business conditions for trade and
investment. This would be especially the case if the model of Deep FTA+ with the
EU advanced across much of the region.
Anyway, if this set of FTAs starts to operate efficiently, it can lead to increase of
production and modernisation of technologies. When located in a relatively smaller
country (like Georgia), FDI can be export-oriented, with producers being able to
serve a larger regional market from a single location. Similarly, FDI can create
intra-regional linkages and production chains supporting export to the EU.
The natural candidates for the relatively close regional partners are first of all
Ukraine, Russia, Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan and the new EU Member States of
the Black Sea – Bulgaria and Romania. Russia and Ukraine are expected to follow
sooner or later the regulations on technical standards that are similar to the EU
ones. Turkey has already progressed a lot in aligning its technical regulations with
those of the EU. Sharing the same rules on technical standards can further facilitate
trade relations.
Further factors in the regional context:
Cumulation of origin of goods produced in the region and the EU. Additional gains
could be achieved if the origin of goods exported either to the EU or to Turkey or
to the countries covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy could be
“cumulated”. That is, if material from say Georgia used to produce an Armenian
good, could be treated as of Pan-European origin while exporting either to the EU
or to the ENP/Black Sea countries. This is to say that inclusion of non-Paneuromed
ENP countries in the Paneuromediterranean system of cumulation of origin would
create additional incentive to consider Georgia as a host country for the
development of business activities.
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Infrastructure improvements. The construction of new railways connecting Baku,
Tbilisi and Kars in Turkey should further be of value in this connection.52 Any
productive initiative within TRACECA should also indirectly support investment
flows into Georgia.
Agricultural trade. Regional integration of the Southern Caucasus and Black Sea
countries would be more beneficial (also in terms of FDI) if agricultural markets
were not protected. 
Gains take time to materialise. However one should not have overly optimistic
expectations. It is possible that even if FDI inflows continue to increase year by
year, their result on boosting export to the region or to the EU can be seen with a
lag. A lowering of trade barriers among relatively poor partners with similar
comparative advantages may result in little immediate gains (little chances for
modern intra-industry trade).
8.3. Perspectives for spillovers from FDI in Georgia
It is well known that FDI can generate important spillover benefits into the
domestic economy. These spillovers are most likely to originate:
• due to the cooperation with local domestically-owned firms (when foreign-
owned technologically superior firms buy local supplies and make a supplier
acquire new technologies), and/or
• due to higher competition (thus forcing local firms to invest more and be more
productive), and/or
• due to the outflow of efficient managers from foreign to domestic firms.
Such spillover effects can make locally-owned firms more productive due to the
presence and/or cooperation with foreign-owned enterprises. And higher
productivity leads to higher economic growth (with the same labour and capital
input). Here, we try to assess whether we can see the possibilities of such spillovers
from FDI in Georgia. Because of the low initial overall FDI stock in Georgia and
the lack of data, and also for the fact that we try to foresee the future, this section
is speculative in nature.
There is evidence that these types of spillovers have been significant in the new
EU Member States in the 1990s. The most relevant examples may be those of
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52 Although the railway going through Armenia would be of higher value to the whole region.
Romania and of Lithuania (see Javorcik and Spartaneu 2006, Altomonte and
Pennings 2006, Smazynska-Javorcik 2004). Are then any chances for the existence
of these types of spillovers in Georgia?
Looking at the sectoral distribution of FDI, one can think of services as the main sector
that may generate spillovers in Georgia. This is for the reason that for the spillovers to take
place, there must be established foreign presence. Also, personnel have to learn some
universal on the job skills, in order to be able to use them elsewhere. On the top of it, use
of ICT equipment is correlated with higher productivity, and highly productive sectors are
more likely to generate technological spillovers. Hence we can expect spillovers to
originate in sectors that are intensive ICT-users. Therefore the spillovers are most likely to
originate in communication, hotels and services or financial intermediation.
One may imagine a flow of local managers from the major pipeline projects to some
other industries, and more generally from the surge of new investment since 2006.
Looking at the change in Georgian human capital the signs are positive. Skills
of the workers employed by the foreign firms in Georgia have probably improved
(see the earlier section  on resource-seeking FDIs). On the top of it, average
earnings in foreign-owned firms are roughly double the earnings in the
domestically-owned firms (see Table 8.5), probably indicating employment of more
productive workers doing more sophisticated tasks.
Expected educational reforms should increase overall human capital in Georgia
further, thus raising country-wide absorption capacities and increasing chances for
positive spillover effects. However, we cannot be sure on that issue, since the
educational reform can also worsen rather than alleviate job mismatching
problems, similarly as has happened in other CIS countries, e.g. by producing too
many graduates in business studies and not enough in engineering. 
Summing up, we can be moderately optimistic about the fact that conditions for
the transfer  of managerial knowledge from foreign-owned firms exist in Georgia,
although they are limited to certain sectors only at the moment.
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Source: State Department for Statistics of Georgia http://www.statistics.ge (wages in GEL) and National
Bank of Georgia www.nbg.gov.ge (GEL/EUR exchange rates)
Table 8.5. Average monthly earnings in Georgia in euro, 2006-2007
 state-owned 
enterprises 
private  
domestically-owned firms 
foreign-owned 
firms 
2006 105.5 123.8 240.4 
1H2007 126.7 148.5 279.7 
However, there is no evidence yet of workers leaving foreign-owned firms and
then being employed in domestically-owned enterprises. Neither there are signs of
customer-supplier linkages, of the type that may generate positive spillover effects.
Few representatives of foreign-owned firms that we interviewed do not buy supplies
for their production in Georgia. When asked about reasons, they point to low
quality of Georgian-made products, constrained capacities of local factories and
irregular deliveries. We even heard extreme examples of foreign-owned wineries
being unable to buy locally neither corks, nor bottles, nor labels. It is worth noting
that eventual spillovers are also constrained by the current unwillingness of
Georgian authorities to implement modern regulations on technical standards on
the domestic market. Imposing higher technical requirements on domestic
production will most likely lead to the improvement of products quality and better
organisation of production processes.53
Deep FTA will help in this regard, through additional impulse to trade and by
creating conditions for spillovers in manufacturing. Moreover, the possibility for
spillover effects increases greatly with the regional integration. However, at the moment,
only non-tradable sector seems to develop quickly due to FDI, and there is little chance
for knowledge spillovers on the scale seen in the current new EU Member States.
8.4. Potential FDI in Georgia
We will now proceed with a numeric estimation of the impact potential FTA
between the EU and Georgia might have on FDI inflows into Georgia. There have
been numerous studies which analysed an impact of a free trade agreement on the
level of inward foreign direct investment. The most widely studied areas (and
corresponding agreements) are North America (NAFTA) and Europe (EU). There is
a widespread agreement that FTAs are conducive to foreign direct investment as
outsider multinational firms take advantage of the increased market size of the area
(Globerman and Shapiro 1999, Buckley et al. 2001). Furthermore, third party
countries may be drawn to invest into FTA members with lower effective
production cost to optimise their production in the region, i.e. shift it to locations
with lower cost of production (Buckley et al. 2001, Dunning 1997, Eden 2002). 
In the CIS/CEE context the research of inward FDI had rarely analysed a direct
impact of an FTA on FDI. We were able to track down just one econometric study
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53 Although it will also impose additional cost on meeting these standards on all local producers.
conducted by Brenton and Manchin (2002), who investigated an impact of an EU-
Russia FTA on FDI inflows into Russia using the Economic Freedom Index as a
benchmark. The authors see  an FTA between Russia and the EU as an enabler of
‘locking-in of economic reforms and achieving a higher degree of liberalisation
than would otherwise be possible’. Based on this logic, the authors make an
estimate of the impact of a corresponding enhancement  of reform (as measured by
the Economic Freedom Index) on FDI into Russia using a gravity model of FDI into
the CEECs. The impact is believed to be similar to the one a Deep FTA+ would have
had. This study employs a comparable approach to estimate how a Deep FTA+
between the EU and Georgia will affect FDI inflows into Georgia. 
The prospect of a Deep FTA+ between the EU and Georgia may be viewed by
potential investors as reducing country risk. Firstly, because it can be seen as an
external validation of progress in the reform process, and secondly, because it
signals higher macro-economic, institutional, legal and political stability.
Therefore, in our econometric work, we relate the impact of a Deep FTA+ (on FDI)
to the country’s transition progress. Consequently, and following Brenton and
Marchin (2002), we employ a transition progress index (TPI), which is published by
the EBRD, to estimate an impact of a Deep FTA+ on FDI inflows to Georgia.
We anticipate the Deep FTA+ to have a stimulating effect on FDI inflows into the
country. An increased market size of the area will encourage international investors
to invest in Georgia following the Deep FTA+ as well as Georgian low production
cost will attract investors seeking lower cost locations. Also, the enhanced economic
growth and trade within the integrated region following a Deep FTA+ provide a
demand stimulant to FDI (see earlier sections of this chapter for details).
A gravity model is employed to estimate the effects under investigation. The model
was estimated for 10 Eastern European countries being FDI recipients and 31 OECD
donor countries. Please refer to the Appendix 6 for a detailed description of the model.
The FDI model employs the following explanatory variables: donor and recipient GDP,
geographic distance between them, corresponding populations, labour cost, the host
country’s indebtedness, a degree of openness of its economy, EU membership, WTO
membership and host country’s progress in transition (TPI). The dependent variable in
our analysis is FDI inflows. Both FDI inflows and stocks have been successfully used
as dependent variables in the earlier analysis of FDI determinants (Bevan and Estrin,
2002; Carstensen and Tourbal 2004, Janicki and Wunnawa 2004, and Kaditi, 2006).
FDI per capita is not normally used as a dependent variable in this analysis, as there
are no economic models which would explain this type of flows.
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For the purposes of our analysis, the EBRD transition progress index (TPI) is the
most important variable in the model as it will be used later on to make forecasts
regarding FDI inflows. The TPI index is calculated as an average score of different
EBRD transition indicators which are published annually in the EBRD Transition
Report. Transition indicators are developed by the EBRD to track progress of its
member countries in transition to a market economy. Progress is assessed by the
EBRD country economists against the standards of industrialised market economies. 
The assessment is carried out on a scale of 1 to 4+ (4.33) with 1 being assigned
to countries which made no or little transition from a rigid centrally planned
economy. The following eight areas are included: large scale privatization, small
scale privatization, governance and enterprise restructuring, price liberalization,
trade and foreign exchange system, competition policy, banking reform and interest
rate liberalization, and securities markets and non-bank financial institutions. 
We show the evolution of the TPI since its introduction in 1989 until the current
period (2007) in Figure 8.1 All countries (except Hungary and Poland) were assigned
TPI values of 1 in 1989. Hungary and Poland obtained slightly higher assessments of
1.33 and 1.29 respectively. Yet, the progress in transition varied among the CEE
countries. The current new Member States (NMS) have significantly advanced in
their transition by the year 1993, which was reflected in the TPI values, which went
beyond the value of 3 for the majority of them. However, the progress in transition
was much more sluggish for the post-Soviet countries. They made a comparable
advancement in their transition to the market economy only a decade later in 2003-
2004 as is reflected in the TPI values. At the moment, the majority of NMS are
finalising their transition to free market economies as is indicated by the TPI values,
which are close to 4 for the majority of them. At the same time Georgia (similar to
other ex-USSR republics) was assigned the value of 3.17 only in 2007.
Georgia has made a considerable leap in its transition during 1995-1998 when
its TPI went from 1.46 to 2.87 in 3 years. However, the country did not advance
much after the year 2000 (when the Georgia TPI hit the value of 3). The progress
was very slow-paced over the past 7 years, which is not highly surprising as it takes
more time and effort to implement more advanced reforms than the basic ones.
Therefore we expect that it still will take a number of years for Georgia to approach
the level of NMS in its transition efforts. 
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The results of our model are consistent with the conclusions of other studies
analysing determinants of FDI in transition/developing countries (Bevan and
Estrin, 2002; Carstensen and Tourbal (2004)). In line with previous research we
find the gravity factors (GDP of home and host countries, and distance between the
two countries) to have a significant effect on FDI flows. We also find the level of the
domestic debt, degree of country’s openness and labour costs to affect significantly
FDI flows (Bevan and Estrin, 2002; Carstensen and Tourbal 2004, Janicki and
Wunnawa 2004, and Kaditi, 2006). The impact of the EBRD transition progress
index (which is our key variable of interest) is significant and positive, which is in
line with our expectations. 
Our model produced estimates which are similar to the estimates received by
comparable studies (see for example Brenton and Manchin 2002). According to our
model, one percent increase in the value of the transition progress index (TPI)
brings in 3.89 percent increase in the amount of FDI inflows into Georgia. This is
in line with Brenton and Manchin’s (2002) estimate as well as with Bevan and
Estrin’s (2002) estimate of the impact of a country credit rating on FDI into the
CEEC (gravity models similar to the one used in this analysis were employed by
both studies). Other studies, i.e. Janicki and Wunnawa (2004) and Carstensen and
Tourbal (2004) report somewhat higher estimates of the impact of country risk on
FDI in the CEEC, which is explained by a different scale on which country risk
index is measured.
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Source: EBRD Transition Reports - various issues.
Figure 8.1. Transition Progress Index (TPI): Evolution
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As was stated above, the impact of a Deep FTA+ on FDI flows into Georgia is
approximated by the impact of a significant improvement in its transition progress
(assuming it will approach the level of the CEE countries). Accordingly, we estimate
a change in FDI inflows to Georgia considering its progress in transition improving
by 5%, 10%, and 15%. Correspondingly, an increase by 5% in the Georgia’s TPI
(from 3.13 to 3.29) brings the level of transition progress in Georgia to the level
slightly above that of Armenia, whereas an increase of 10% (from 3.13 to 3.44)
corresponds to Georgia being perceived by international investors nearly as
advanced in transition as Bulgaria (still on a low side of it). The largest improvement
considered in this study is 15% (TPI value of 3.60). It sets Georgia’s progress in
transition slightly above (this time) the level of Bulgaria, which is still significantly
below the level of the other NMS (Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary). Please see
Table 8.6 for corresponding values of the EBRD Transition Progress Index.
Consequently, we estimate the changes in FDI inflows into Georgia using 3
different scenarios, which correspond to the Georgian TPI increasing by 5%, 10%
and 15% respectively. Using the estimated equation, we calculate the impact (a
change) in the dependent variable (FDI flows) as a result of changes in our key
independent variable – TPI index. As our model is estimated in logarithms, we then
interpret the estimated coefficients as elasticities and estimate the percentage
changes in the dependent variable (FDI flows). Our calculations show that the
amount of potential FDI inflows into Georgia will increase by 21%, 45% and 72%
respectively or that annual FDI flows into Georgia will increase from USD 450mn
(in 2005) to USD 544mn, 652mn and 775mn corresponding to 5%, 10%, and 15%
improvement in its progress in transition (see Table 8.7). 
This is, of course, a lower bound estimate for FDI as it does not include potential
changes in other variables (which have a sizeable impact also), like, for example,
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Source: EBRD Transition Report
Table 8.6. Transition Progress Index, EBRD, 2000-2006
Country 2000 2003 2006 
Armenia 2.75 3.04 3.21 
Bulgaria 3.17 3.42 3.54 
Czech Republic 3.67 3.75 3.87 
Georgia 3 3 3.13 
Hungary 3.87 3.87 4 
Kazakhstan 2.87 2.96 3.04 
Poland 3.62 3.71 3.83 
Russia 2.67 3 3.08 
Slovakia 3.5 3.67 3.83 
Ukraine 2.67 2.87 3.04 
GDP, GDP per capita etc. For instance, our estimates are below the actual amount
of FDI inflows into Georgia in 2006 (which stood at USD 1,190 million), which was
more than 160% increase on the amount of FDI flows into Georgia year-on-year. It
was an exceptional year for Georgia and we do not expect this dynamics to persist
(for example, FDI inflows dropped by 11% in 2005), hence our estimates offer a
medium projection which is likely to be true on average.
Finally, we have calculated the impact of the Deep EU-Georgia FTA+ on FDI
stock in Georgia until the year 2020. Having taken the estimated annual increases
in FDI inflows according to our three scenarios, we have estimated that FDI stock
will increase from USD 2,320mn in 2005 to USD 10,272 mn, 11,136mn and
12,120mn in 2020 or 443%, 480% and 552% increase of the current value (please
see Table 8.8). The calculations are based on an assumption of Georgian transition
progress being gradual over the next 15 years (2005-2020) that corresponds to a
gradual increase in FDI inflows starting from their current level (i.e. 2005, USD
450mn) to their estimated levels according to our 3 scenarios (Table 8.7), i.e. USD
544mn, 652mn and 775mn in the year 2020. We assume a linear annual increase
in FDI flows. Again, the numbers represent the lower bound estimate of an increase
in FDI stock due to the impact of EU-Georgia Deep FTA+ only (as we do not
estimate an impact of changes in other variables, e.g. GDP, GDP per capita etc.).
8.5. Summary
Up to 2006 FDI inflows to Georgia had been totalling below USD0.5 billion a
year. Year 2006 brought a change with FDI inflows of USD1.2 billion. If trends
observed for first half of 2007 are sustained, incoming foreign investment in 2007
may be just as high.
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Source: own calculations.
Table 8.7. Estimated changes to FDI flows to Georgia
TPI  change % increase in FDI flows to Georgia  Estimated FDI flows, USD mn  
5% 21 544 
10% 45 652 
15% 72 775 
Table 8.8. Estimated changes to FDI stock, Georgia, 2020 Assumption 1
TPI  change % increase in FDI stock in Georgia Increase in FDI stock, 
 USD mn 
5% 443 10,272 
10% 480 11,136 
15% 522 12,120 
At the moment, foreign direct investors into Georgia seem to be primarily
resource and market driven. The opportunities in the pipeline transportation sector
can soon diminish, and might significantly increase only with the construction of
the planned Baku-Supsa-Odessa pipeline (a part of Baku-Supsa-Odessa-Brody). In
the very short run we predict that this motive will lose its significance. 
Given the level of development of the country, and the fact that barriers to trade
will stay important for some time54, market-seeking motive will most likely be a
dominant one for the non-tradable sectors in Georgia, even if an FTA with the EU
is signed. The most plausible opportunities for increased FDI are in the service
sectors, both for business services if Georgia becomes a regional transport and
commercial hub and for tourism. Already the major (unilateral) liberalisation of
service sectors and trade in goods is helping here.
A Simple FTA will not create an immediate impetus for foreign investors to use
the relatively cheap Georgian labour on a large scale and outsource part of
production there, similarly as it has been happening in China, notwithstanding high
corruption and transport costs there. It is possible, though, to imagine cases of
labour-seeking motives at some point in the future, along with the implementation
of the Deep FTA+. Though, at the beginning, efficiency-seeking investment will
most likely be limited to certain industries, like for example textiles.
A copy of the experience of CEFTA in terms of boosting FDI into Georgia due to
the regional integration is a remote prospect, due to distance from EU markets and
the lack of the EU membership perspective. However a maximum extension of the
matrix of bilateral FTAs in the Black Sea region (and notable with the EU), as well
as other regional economic initiatives envisaged in the EU’s Black Sea Synergy
initiative will be helpful. Due to foreign investment, processing industries in
Georgia can develop their export capacities, similarly as it happened so far in few
isolated cases such as food processing (wine, hazelnut, mineral waters/glass
production) and textile sector. The Simple FTA would probably have a negligible
impact on this. The Deep FTA+ could have a positive impact. However, for
maximum benefit even a Deep FTA+ would have to be accompanied by additional
initiatives such as major improvement of regional infrastructure, introduction of
diagonal cumulation of origins of goods, and deeper trade integration in the region
(covering also agricultural goods).
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54 Connected with poor transport infrastructure, problems with South Ossetia and Abkhazia etc. At present they
make deliveries lengthy and elevate costs of trading across borders.
We can be moderately optimistic about the fact that conditions for the transfer
of managerial knowledge from foreign-owned firms exist in Georgia, although they
are limited to certain sectors only at the moment. However the transfer of
knowledge from the FDI has not taken place yet. There is no evidence of workers
leaving foreign-owned firms and then being employed in domestically-owned
enterprises. Neither there are signs of customer-supplier linkages, of the type that
may generate positive spillover effects. Only deep regional integration resulting
from a Deep FTA will help in this regard, through additional impulse to trade and
by creating requirements for technical standards in manufacturing.
Potential inward FDI to Georgia following the Deep free trade agreement with
the EU could be substantially higher than the current flows. As a result, FDI stock
in Georgia might increase from USD 2,320mn in 2005 even up to USD 11,136mn
in 2020. However, this five-fold increase is feasible under the condition that
Georgia succeeds in its transition reforms and moves towards the level of Bulgaria.
Hence the domestic reforms should have the most significant impact on Georgia’s
progress in transition and, consequently, on FDI inflows. Therefore, a Deep EU-
Georgia FTA should be regarded as a complement to domestic reforms, not a
substitute. The major effort remains to be done by Georgia itself.
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9.1. CGE Model
The model employed in this study is a standard static computable general
equilibrium model. It includes several price-wedge distortions such as factor taxes
in production, value-added taxes, import tariffs and export subsidies. Factor taxes
in production and value-added taxes remain unchanged across simulations.
Production involves combination of intermediate inputs and primary factors
(capital, skilled and unskilled labour). We assume a Constant Elasticity of
Substitution (CES) function over primary factors and a Leontief production
function combining intermediate inputs with factors of production composite.
Primary factors are mobile across sectors within a region, but immobile
internationally. Each region has a government, whose revenue is held constant at
the benchmark level and a single representative consumer. The trade balance is
also held constant in counterfactual simulations.
Demand for final goods arises from a Cobb-Douglas utility function. The
demand structure is illustrated in Figure 9.1 Within each region, final and
intermediate demands are composed of the same Armington aggregate of domestic
and imported varieties. The composite supply is a nested CES function, where
consumers first allocate their expenditures among domestic and imported varieties
and then choose among imported varieties. In the imperfect competition case firm
varieties enter at the bottom of the CES function. This approach allows for the
differentiation in preferences for home and imported goods. 
A detailed description of the model equations, calibration and parameters
employed is provided in the Appendix 7 CGE model equations. It is built on the
basis of the MRT – Multiregional Trade Model – by Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr
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9. CGE Model and Simulations
(HRT) implemented in their evaluation of the impact of the completion of the Single
Market (HRT, 1996b), but has been modified in several ways to fit this analysis.
Similar analysis has been recently applied in two feasibility studies for Russia and
Ukraine prepared for the European Commission (Dabrowski, Emerson,
Maliszewska Eds. (2007) and Ecorys and CASE-Ukraine (2007)) and earlier in the
analysis of the Eastern EU Enlargement (Maliszewska, 2003a, 2003b) and Albanian
Integration with the EU (Maliszewska and Kolesnichenko, 2004).
A social accounting matrix (SAM) for Georgia for 2004 was based on Jasper
Jensen’s and David Tarr’s submission to the GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project)
data base55. The data for all other regions is based on GTAP7 pre-release 3 data base.
The GTAP database includes the national and regional input-output structures,
bilateral trade flows, final demands pattern and government intervention
benchmarked to 2004. The Georgian SAM has been imposed on the GTAP data using
a code developed by Thomas Rutherford (www.mpsge.com/gtap6)56. The benchmark
data includes Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, Ukraine, and remaining CIS
countries, EU27, Turkey and the Rest of the World (ROW). It includes 33 sectors out
of which 11 are subject to increasing returns to scale (IRTS) in the imperfect
competition scenarios57.
145
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND GEORGIA 
CASE Network Reports No. 79/2008
55 The submission by Jaspers Jensen and David Tarr was part of the ENEPO project coordinated by CASE and
financed by the European Commission (FP6 STREP).
56 The original SAM for Georgia was not introduced correctly into the pre-release GTAP data, which is still in the
testing stage. The Armenian and Azeri data submitted along with the Georgian data used in the present study
was introduced properly. Other adjustments have been made to the GTAP data to update tariff data to 2004
levels.
57 These are food, beverages and tobacco; textiles and wearing apparel; leather; paper products, publishing;
petroleum and coal products; chemical products, rubber, plastic; mineral products, metal and metal products;
transport equipment; machinery and equipment; other manufacturing products.
Source: HRT (1996a).
Figure 9.1. Demand structure in the IRTS scenario – firm level product differentiation within
an Armington aggregate
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We apply the CGE model to study the implications of the trade liberalisation in
respectively Georgia (unilateral significant tariff liberalisation of trade in goods
along with the recognition of foreign product standards) and the EU (granting
Georgia GSP+ under its new GSP scheme) that took place between 2004 and 2006
(baseline scenario), Simple and Deep FTAs scenarios. Before studying the
implications of various versions of an FTA we need to study the effects of trade
liberalisation that took place over 2004-2006 period. The changes due to tariff and
other trade related policies are already taking place and will require between 5-10
years to take their full impact on the Georgian economy. Without modelling of
these policy changes we would be wrongly attributing their impact to the
implications of FTAs. The Simple FTA scenario involves scrapping the tariffs in
the EU27-Georgia trade with the exception of agricultural products where tariffs
are only halved. Recent experience of the EU’s FTAs with Mediterranean countries
and the new Turkey-Georgia FTA indicate that agriculture may not be completely
liberalized. Looking at the Turkey-Georgia FTA we see that some products have
been completely liberalized, but some subject to 50% or 100% tariff cuts with
however the constraint of tariff quotas. Here we take a simplifying assumption of
a 50% average tariff cut on agricultural and food products. The level of
aggregation of the model (determined by the initial data set) does not allow for a
more detailed dissaggregation of agricultural and food sectors. However, we run
also separate simulations with full liberalization of all tariff lines (Simple FTA
BIS). Deep FTAs assume various degrees of changes in the domestic policy and
business environment affecting trade and investment in Georgia. An FTA+
combines a Simple FTA with a consolidation of the domestic reforms that took
place over the recent years in a binding agreement. The FTA+ could consolidate
measures such as unilateral recognition of EU and international product
standards and facilitation of customs procedures. Furthering the level of
integration via a Deep FTA would involve a more complete elimination of barriers
to trade and investment throughout various sectors of the economy. This would
also result in a more extensive commitment to the reform of domestic policies in
the direction of EU standards in Georgia. Finally, the comprehensive set of
reforms resulting from the Deep FTA along with more wide-ranging flanking
measures e.g. on competition and corruption could lead to a re-branding of
Georgia as a favourable investment location. This is our scenario Deep FTA+
where we assume that Georgia would achieve a notable reduction in the perceived
risk premium on investment, reflecting a sustained re-branding of Georgia as a
favorable and safe place to invest. 
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9.2. Tariffs 
Trade protection of Georgia has been described in more detail in chapter 4.
Here we only present the tariffs according to the model classification. Since
Georgia is a member of the CIS FTA tariffs between Georgia and the CIS countries
are assumed to be zero. Hence Table 9.1 below provides tariffs only in trade with
the EU27, Turkey and the ROW. The newly signed FTA between Georgia and
Turkey has not been taken into account here. The 2004 data originates from GTAP
and is consistent with the country submission to WITS. The 2006 tariff data has
been provided by the Georgian authorities. The tariffs applied in this study are trade
weighted based on the 6-digit HS imports/exports data from the UN Comtrade data
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Source: GTAP, WITS and own calculations.
Table 9.1. Georgian tariffs on imports from the EU27, Turkey and the Rest of the World (ROW)
according to the CGE model classification (in %)
EU27 Turkey ROW  
2004 2006 Simple
 FTA 
2004 2006 2004 2006 
Grains, fruits,  
vegetables, crops nec 
11.9 3.7 1.8 12.0 11.0 11.8 6.3 
Livestock 10.8 11.6 5.8 0.0 10.7 10.6 4.4 
Forestry 11.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.1 0.0 
Fishing 3.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.7 0.0 
Coal 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 
Gas 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 
Mining and quarrying 12.0 3.4 0.0 12.0 11.9 11.9 9.3 
Food products,  
beverages and tobacco 
12.0 5.4 2.7 12.0 6.0 11.8 6.2 
Textiles and  
textile goods 
12.0 0.0 0.0 11.9 0.0 11.7 0.0 
Leather products 11.9 0.0 0.0 12.0 0.0 11.8 0.0 
Wood products 12.0 0.0 0.0 12.0 0.0 11.3 0.0 
Paper products, 
publishing 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 
Petroleum, 
coal products 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 
Chemical, rubber,  
plastic products 
8.8 0.0 0.0 11.7 0.0 11.3 0.0 
Mineral products nec 11.9 3.1 0.0 11.9 3.3 10.9 4.1 
Metals and  
metal products 
11.5 0.0 0.0 11.6 0.0 11.7 0.0 
Transport equipment 5.6 0.0 0.0 9.1 0.0 9.5 0.0 
Machinery and  
electronic equipment 
5.5 0.0 0.0 5.6 0.0 5.3 0.0 
Manufactures nec 11.9 0.0 0.0 12.0 0.0 11.8 0.00 
base. Similarly to take into account the impact of the granting of the GSP+ status,
EU27 import tariffs on exports from Georgia are zero in 2006.
9.3. Non-tariff barriers
One of the studies ordered by the European Commission before completion of
the Single Market looked at the perception of European Community producers as
to the importance of barriers to be removed by the formation of the Single Market.
It showed that the elimination of physical frontiers, costs and delays, harmonisation
of national standards and regulations, and government procurement were the most
important barriers to trade before 1992. Similar conclusions were reached after a
survey of barriers to exports to the EU faced by the Ukrainian exporters (see
Jakubiak et. al. 2006). Elimination or lessening of these impediments to trade will
also likely bring major benefits to Georgia especially if it gains improved access to
the Single Market thanks to the creation of a Deep FTA. In modelling of a Deep FTA
we focus on reduction in border costs and delays, as well as reduction in costs of
compliance with varying national standards and technical regulations. In addition
we also study the impact of a reduction of barriers to foreign providers of services. 
9.3.1. Border costs
One of the most observable barriers to trade is due to the existence of borders
and customs formalities, which involve delays and various kinds of administrative
costs. At the moment all goods from Georgia exported to the EU and vice versa are
stopped at the EU border for customs clearance. In the CGE exercise border costs
are modelled as additional purchases of a domestic transportation good, which
includes shipping, handling and warehousing for customs purchases. 
As discussed in chapter 5.2 the corruption and delays at the border have been
dramatically reduced over the past few years. Also the administrative costs have
gone down significantly. The survey conducted in Georgia in the late 2007 (chapter
6) covered only a limited number of sectors, but its results also confirm that the
export-import procedures and their costs are not high. However, the survey results
do not allow us to compare these costs over time. Hence we refer to the “Cost of
Doing Business” World Bank report, which allows for the comparison of those
costs across time and across countries.  
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For the purpose of the CGE modelling, it is assumed that benchmark border
costs in Georgia are roughly 30% higher than those for Ukraine. This is based on
the comparison of border costs per shipment from Table 9.2. Ukrainian border
costs are approximated by the costs of customs clearance faced by the Ukrainian
exporters to the EU in 2006 (Jakubiak et al 2006). These costs amounted on average
to 7% of the value of exports, hence the 2004 benchmark border costs in Georgia
are assumed to be equal to 9.1% of the value of exports. In 2006 scenario these costs
go down by 20% again based on the comparison of the cost of shipment in Table
8.2. The Simple FTA is assumed to reduce those costs by a further 5%. The
argument behind this rather modest reduction is that already the majority of
industrial tariffs in trade with the EU have been eliminated; hence the additional
elimination of red tape or corruption as a result of complete elimination of tariffs
on industrial products is likely to be quite small. In a Deep FTA these costs are
assumed to be reduced by 50%, which is assumed to reflect a long-term
improvement in customs and transit procedures.
9.3.2. Standards costs
The European Community has been concerned with the elimination of the
technical barriers to trade since its creation. However, the major effort of
elimination of barriers to trade imposed by differing national regulations and
standards was undertaken with the creation of the Single Market. The Single
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Source: WB Costs of Doing Business report 2006 and 2008. 
Note: The reports for 2006 and 2008 cover data for Jan 2005 and Jan 2007 used to represent here the status quo
in 2004 and 2006. 
* Cost measures the fees levied on a 20-foot container in U.S. dollars. All the fees associated with completing the
procedures to export or import the goods are included, such as costs for documents, administrative fees for
customs clearance and technical control, terminal handling charges and inland transport. The cost measure
does not include tariffs or trade taxes.
Table 9.2. Border costs in Georgia and Ukraine in 2004 and 2006
Georgia Georgia/Ukraine Ukraine  
2004 2006 2004 2006 2004 2006 
Documents for export  
(number) 
9 8 1.50 1.33 6 6 
Time for export (days) 54 12 1.74 0.39 31 31 
Cost to export  
(US$ per container)* 
1370 1105 1.31 1.06 1045 1045 
Documents for import 
(number)  
15 7 1.50 0.70 10 10 
Time for import (days)  52 14 1.33 0.36 39 39 
Cost to import  
(US$ per container)*  
1370 1105 1.29 1.04 1065 1065 
Market measures consist of 2,556 different mandated standards. This number rises
to more than 20,000 when voluntary standards are considered. 
The differences in technical regulations and standards, which vary between
domestic and the EU markets, require producers to manufacture or package goods
in forms, which are different than for their domestic markets. Standardisation costs
therefore increase the cost of production for exports and they are modeled as
additional value added in each sector where trade takes place. This approach
ignores the fixed cost elements of implementation of new standards. However,
these are mostly one-off investments and their magnitude is not likely to be
significant.
In the survey mentioned above, CASE and CASE-UA investigated NTBs faced by
Ukrainian exporters to the EU (Jakubiak et al 2006). Among others, respondents
(over 500 companies) were asked to assess costs associated with meeting EU
technical regulations and the duplication of efforts related to compliance with both
national and the EU standards (existing for the majority of surveyed firms). 
As discussed in chapter 5.1, in early 2006 Georgia recognized mandatory
standards and technical regulations which are being applied worldwide and, in
particular, by main Georgian trade partners, such as EU, OECD and CIS countries.
Hence the domestic producers are entitled to produce according to EU and OECD
member states’ technical regulations and CIS GOSTs. This must have led to some
cost reduction for domestic firms willing to export to the EU, as now they do not
need to modify their production to satisfy differing domestic and EU technical
regulations, they might produce to EU regulations and sell these goods also on the
domestic market. Hence we assume that in 2006 the standards costs have gone
down by 10% as a result of this new legislation as compared to the status quo in
2004. However, there are two strong arguments that make us believe that the
standards costs are still significantly higher in Georgia than in Ukraine and were so
in 2004 as well. First of all, in the survey conducted as part of this study we were
able to obtain very little information regarding the costs of meeting the EU product
characteristics requirements, the costs of packaging, labelling and marketing
requirements, product testing and meeting any other technical requirements. The
reasons were twofold: the companies were either producing much unsophisticated
products not covered by technical regulations or in the majority of cases the
importing EU company made sure that all necessary tests have been concluded and
the technical requirements have been met. This suggests that the costs of
compliance with technical requirements are very high if the vast majority of
domestic firms do not even get involved in this process. This is supported by the
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information gathered during our visit to Georgia as discussed in chapter 5.1. There
are no conformity assessment centres established in Georgia that could issue
certificates of compliance recognized by the EU. This imposes significant costs on
firms willing to export to the EU, which must pay for the services of accreditation
centres based in the EU or in other countries. 
Given that we were not able to obtain data on standards costs for Georgia we
are relying on Ukrainian estimates. However, due to reasons discussed above we
assume that in 2004 these costs were 30% higher in Georgia than they were in
Ukraine. Costs of meeting EU standards for Georgian producers are given in Table
93. In many of those sectors Georgia does not have any exports to the EU. There
might be several reasons for this e.g. Georgia may not be producing particular
products, the quality of domestic production is insufficient or simply the barriers
to exports are too high. However, in all those cases the assumptions on NTBs need
to be established; hence the reliance on the Ukrainian data.
The reasons why we expect the costs of compliance with technical regulations
to decrease following a Deep FTA is greater availability of conformity assessment
centres in Georgia, which would result in lower costs of testing and compliance,
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Source: own calculations and assumptions based on survey described in Jakubiak et al (2006)
Note: * - simple average
Table 9.3. Costs of compliance with the EU technical barriers in 2004 as a share of exports to
the  EU (in %)
 2004 2006 Simple 
FTA 
Deep  
FTA 
Grains, fruits, vegetables, crops nec 18.2 16.4 16.4 9.1 
Livestock 18.2 16.4 16.4 9.1 
Forestry 9.1 8.2 8.2 4.6 
Fishing 9.1 8.2 8.2 4.6 
Coal 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Oil 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Gas 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Mining and quarrying 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Food products, beverages  
and tobacco 
13.5 12.2 12.2 6.8 
Textiles and textile goods 29.8 26.8 26.8 14.9 
Leather products 6.9 6.2 6.2 3.4 
Wood products 27.2 24.5 24.5 13.6 
Paper products, publishing 19.5 17.6 17.6 9.8 
Petroleum, coal products 13.0 11.7 11.7 6.5 
Chemical, rubber, plastic products  7.2 6.4 6.4 3.6 
Mineral products nec 38.1 34.3 34.3 19.0 
Metals and metal products 8.3 7.5 7.5 4.2 
Transport equipment 16.0 14.4 14.4 8.0 
Machinery and electronic equipment 13.0 11.7 11.7 6.5 
Manufactures nec 19.9 17.9 17.9 9.9 
better availability of information and greater cooperation between the EU and
Georgian firms that comes with increased integration. Hence we make a rough
assumption that the standards costs decrease by 50% in a Deep FTA. The
experience of the new EU members and EU firms following the formation of the
Single Market indicates that these costs have indeed gone down.
Our assumptions so far applied to Georgian exports to the EU. We do not know
of similar estimates for the other export destinations for the Georgian products and
in any case the impact of a Georgia-EU FTA on the costs of complying with
regulations of other importing partners is not clear. Hence in the simulations we
assume that these costs apply only to exports to the EU. Any harmonization of
legislation with the EU, wider availability of conformity assessment centres and
with that lower prices of certification that would follow a Deep FTA would lead to
a reduction of these costs for Georgian exporters to the EU. On the other hand, for
Georgian firms which have been producing only for domestic market, the
introduction of EU regulations to be compulsory on the domestic market as well
may impose additional investment. A certain part of this investment will be
undertaken in the normal course of replacing existing equipment over the coming
years. However, in some cases the costs of compliance may be significant.
Nevertheless even those firms are likely to benefit from the ability to export to the
enlarged EU and wider availability of the assessment centres. Overall, it seems
likely that all firms will experience some reduction in standards costs. 
9.3.3. Barriers to trade in services58
We have not conducted any survey on the barriers to trade in services for the
purpose of this study. To the best of our knowledge, such estimates exist only for
Russia and Ukraine within the CIS countries. Given that Ukraine is also a member
of the WTO and embarking on a process of negotiations of an enhanced FTA with
the EU, we decided to adjust the Ukrainian values to make assumptions for
Georgia. We base our estimates on the barriers to foreign direct investment in
services estimated by IERPC (2007). The authors estimate tariff equivalents of
barriers that discriminate against foreign providers of telecommunication,
transport and financial services and we use simple averages of the values for sub-
sectors as estimated by the IERPC (2007). The authors used the assessments of the
regulatory environment in Ukraine through the implementation of business surveys
and other information sources and converting these into an index of restrictiveness
in telecommunication, financial sector and transport sectors. Then these indexes
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58 This section is based on the information gathered by Svetlana Taran.
were converted into ad valorem equivalents of the existing restrictions. It should be
noted that distinctions were made between barriers faced by specifically foreign
investors vs. restrictions incurred by both foreign providers along with domestic
firms (through the separate calculations of foreign discriminatory restrictiveness
index (applicable only to foreign suppliers) and overall foreign restrictiveness index
(applicable to both foreign and domestic producers). In order to adjust Ukrainian
values for Georgia we look at the Heritage Foundation indices of investment and
financial freedom as presented in Table 9.4. The indices of investment and financial
freedom indicate a much more investor-friendly environment in Georgia than in
Ukraine. Still, it should be noted that these indices capture the wider definition of
investment and financial freedom including regulatory formal restrictions, as well
as corruption, contract enforcement, implementation of laws etc., than mere
restrictiveness of regulatory environment affecting investment in service sectors. 
Based on our own perception of barriers to FDI in service sectors in Georgia
and the fact that the foreign penetration in e.g. banking and finance is higher in
Georgia than in Ukraine, we assume that the barriers to foreign provision of
services are 35% lower in Georgia than in Ukraine. We model those barriers as
additional purchases of value added in the amount equal to tariff equivalents by
exporters or providers of those services from all regions. Hence we assume that in
order to provide financial services (banking, insurance) in Georgia foreign
companies face costs higher by 15.6% than local provides. The additional costs in
transport sector amount to 10.4% and in communications to 3.9%. In simulations
we assume that all foreign providers of services will face an improved access to the
Georgian market following a Deep FTA. Even though access to services sectors in
Georgia has been liberalized, relatively low penetration of the local market by
foreign providers indicates that significant barriers still remain. We assume that in
a Deep FTA those barriers would be halved. The above discussion of modelling
assumptions has been summarized in the Table 9.5.
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Source: The Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/countries.cfm
Note: Distribution of Global Economic Freedom: 80-100 – free; 70-79.9 – mostly free; 60-69.9 – moderately free;
50-59.9 – mostly unfree; 0-49.9 – repressed. 
Table 9.4. Index of economic freedom, 2008
 Rank Global economic  
freedom 
Investment 
freedom 
Financial  
freedom 
Ukraine 133 51.1% 30% 50% 
Armenia 28 70.3% 70% 70% 
Georgia  32 69.2% 70% 60% 
9.4. Implications of the 2006 scenario, Simple and Deep FTAs
In each simulation we can calculate the impact of a given trade policy change
assuming constant returns to scale in all sectors, increasing returns to scale in
selected sectors, as well as the short run impact (no change in capital stock) and the
long run impact (allowing for the adjustment of capital stock in response to a
change in return to capital). The calculation of steady state growth effects follows
HRT (1996a). In the short run scenarios the price of capital is allowed to vary
within each country, while capital stock is held constant. In the steady state
scenario capital stock in Georgia is allowed to adjust, while the price of capital is
held constant at its benchmark level. This approach assumes that there exists an
invariant capital stock equilibrium. It is defined as a set of prices, production and
investment levels for which the economy is able to grow at a steady rate with
constant relative prices. 
This approach provides an upper bound of the potential welfare gains as it
ignores the adjustment costs and foregone consumption necessary to increase
investment. For sufficiently high discount rates the costs of forgone consumption
could overturn the benefits of capital accumulation. Although we measure welfare
as equivalent variation as a share of GDP, it has to be born in mind that
incorporation of the cost of the investment required to build up the capital stock
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Source: The Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/countries.cfm
Note: Distribution of Global Economic Freedom: 80-100 – free; 70-79.9 – mostly free; 60-69.9 – moderately free;
50-59.9 – mostly unfree; 0-49.9 – repressed. 
Table 9.5. Summary of modelling assumptions
 Benchmark 
2004 
Initial 
liberalization 
2006 
Simple FTA Deep FTA 
Tariffs 2006 tariffs Zero tariffs in trade 
between Georgia and 
the EU on industrial 
products, 50% off 
tariffs on agricultural 
and food products  
Zero tariffs in trade 
between Georgia 
and the EU on 
industrial products, 
50% off tariffs on 
agricultural and 
food products 
Order 
costs 
20% off 2004 
level 
25% off 2004 level 50% off 2004 level 
Standards 
costs  
10% off 2004 
level 
10% off 2004 level 50% off 2004 level 
Barriers  
to trade 
in services 
Initial levels 
as described 
above 
2004 level 2004 level 50% off 2004 level 
may substantially reduce the estimates of welfare gains cited below. On the other
hand our approach does not incorporate the potential gains due to productivity
improvements or endogenous growth theory “learning by doing” effects. 
Table 9.6 displays major results of the CGE simulations. Apart from welfare
changes (equivalent variation as a share of GDP), we also present changes in wages
of skilled and unskilled workers and changes in capital stock in the long run
scenario. Since we believe that increasing returns to scale are prevalent in several
industrial sectors, we only report results of the IRTS scenarios. However, all other
estimations are available from the author on request. The results of simulations for
output, price changes, exports and imports are presented in the Appendix 8 CGE
Model Results59. When analysing the results of Simple or Deep FTAs it has to be
borne in mind that the benchmark for all simulations is 2004, hence the results for
Simple and Deep FTAs also include the impact of the initial trade liberalisation in
2006. The effects of the 2006 liberalization will take several years to fully
materialize. Therefore to look at the additional welfare gains from a Simple FTA
beyond the impact of the 2006 liberalisation, one needs to subtract welfare
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59  The appendix includes only detailed results for Georgia as the impact on other countries is zero or negligible.
However, full set of results along with the short run simulations is available from the author on request.
Source: own calculations.
Table 9.6. Welfare, and factor returns results of the CGE simulations
 2006 Simple 
FTA 
Simple 
FTA BIS 
FTA+ Deep 
FTA 
DEEP 
FTA+ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Welfare  (% change ) 
Russia -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
Ukraine -0.023 -0.024 -0.025 -0.024 -0.026 -0.024 
Armenia -0.019 -0.021 -0.023 -0.017 -0.006 0.002 
Azerbaijan -0.111 -0.112 -0.113 -0.107 -0.109 -0.097 
Georgia 0.973 1.085 1.007 3.352 2.736 7.509 
Turkey 0.027 0.028 0.027 0.029 0.032 0.036 
EU27 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.007 
CIS -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 
ROW  0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.006 
GDP (% change) 
Russia 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.057 
Ukraine 0.151 0.149 0.148 0.151 0.148 0.149 
Armenia 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.025 
Azerbaijan -0.082 -0.090 -0.090 -0.082 -0.082 -0.075 
Georgia 1.056 1.170 1.101 3.442 2.822 7.595 
Turkey 0.120 0.121 0.120 0.122 0.124 0.129 
EU27 0.037 0.037 0.038 0.038 0.036 0.037 
CIS -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 0.000 
ROW  0.018 0.018 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.018 
implications in column (1) from the result in column (2) and similarly for the
benefits of a Deep FTA one needs to subtract welfare impact in column (1) from
welfare implications in column (5) etc. These net effects are presented in Table 1 of
the Appendix 8 CGE Model Results – Georgia.
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Source: own calculations.
Table 9.6. cd
 2006 Simple 
FTA 
Simple 
FTA BIS 
FTA+ Deep 
FTA 
DEEP 
FTA+ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Wages of unskilled workers (% change)  
Russia -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
Ukraine -0.024 -0.026 -0.027 -0.025 -0.027 -0.026 
Armenia -0.039 -0.043 -0.047 -0.041 -0.011 -0.006 
Azerbaijan -0.109 -0.11 -0.112 -0.106 -0.094 -0.086 
Georgia 2.857 3.033 3.019 5.109 4.881 9.269 
Turkey 0.021 0.021 0.02 0.022 0.023 0.027 
EU27 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.006 
CIS -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 0.000 
ROW  0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
Wages of skilled workers (% change)  
Russia -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
Ukraine -0.014 -0.015 -0.016 -0.015 -0.016 -0.014 
Armenia -0.009 -0.01 -0.01 0.001 -0.013 0.010 
Azerbaijan -0.105 -0.105 -0.105 -0.101 -0.085 -0.078 
Georgia 2.369 2.542 2.529 4.445 3.945 7.917 
Turkey 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.019 0.02 0.023 
EU27 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.005 
CIS 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ROW  0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 
Total exports (% change) 
Russia 0.00 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.003 
Ukraine -0.038 0.039 -0.041 -0.037 -0.046 -0.041 
Armenia 0.002 -0.008 0.001 0.08 -0.175 -0.001 
Azerbaijan -0.538 -0.542 -0.544 -0.521 -0.5 -0.455 
Georgia 14.669 16.004 16.659 19.186 21.088 27.968 
Turkey 0.026 0.027 0.028 0.03 0.03 0.037 
EU27 0.011 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.014 
CIS 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.006 0.001 0.008 
ROW  0.009 0.009 0.009 0.01 0.007 0.009 
Total imports (% change) 
Russia -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.004 
Ukraine -0.049 0.043 -0.044 -0.041 -0.046 -0.041 
Armenia -0.099 -0.068 -0.062 -0.014 -0.179 -0.073 
Azerbaijan -0.597 -0.221 -0.222 -0.213 -0.225 -0.208 
Georgia 5.635 4.538 4.826 6.383 8.954 13.004 
Turkey 0.052 0.049 0.049 0.053 0.053 0.062 
EU27 0.011 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.014 
CIS -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 0 -0.006 0 
ROW  0.013 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.012 0.013 
Capital stock (% change) 
Georgia 0.871 0.982 0.835 6.704 3.706 15.967 
9.4.1. 2006 Liberalization
Our results indicate that in the long-run the liberalisation of 2006 will lead to
welfare gains of about 1% of the Georgian GDP. The impact on the EU27, ROW and
Turkey is positive, but negligible. The impact on the CIS countries is negative due
to the erosion of the margin of preference enjoyed by the CIS, but also negligible.
Following trade liberalisation Georgia experiences welfare gains, because its tariffs
are being reduced by a large margin in the majority of sectors and so there are
efficiency gains to be reaped. With cheaper import goods domestic prices fall in
several sectors, notably in wearing apparel, leather, wood, metal and metal
products (see Appendix 8 CGE Model Results). The changes are directly
proportional to changes in the Georgian tariffs. A significant fall in prices of
imports leads to an increase of imports and crowding out of domestic production
by imports in sectors with the highest reduction of import protection. Output in
those sectors falls or increases slightly, depending on the foreign demand.
Increased competition on a domestic market coupled with cheaper intermediate
inputs reduces the prices of most manufacturing goods in Georgia. Lower prices
raise demand for their products abroad and lead to production and exports
expansion. Output of several sectors such as metal and metal products, mining and
quarrying, transport expands. Sectors that expand are overall more unskilled-
labour intensive as wages of unskilled workers grow at a slightly faster pace than
those of skilled workers (2.9% vs. 2.4% relative to the benchmark 2004 level). 
When interpreting the output results one has to keep in mind that the overall
employment is held constant in simulations, hence decreases in production of some
sectors are compensated by increases in production in other sectors as skilled and
unskilled workers shift between sectors. The changes in output are only indicative
of the mechanisms at work and should not be treated as a forecast. Similarly, the
trade balance is held fixed in the simulations hence an increase in total exports is
accompanied by a compensating increase in total imports. The direction of changes
in exports and imports by sector is however a good indication of the likely
implications of trade policy changes.
9.4.2. Simple and Deep FTA scenarios
In the case of a Simple FTA the additional welfare gains from the removal of
remaining industrial tariffs and halving of remaining agricultural tariffs in the EU-
Georgia trade rises to 1.09%, i.e. only 0.11% more than that being achieved by the
2006 liberalisation (column (2) – column (1) in Table 9.6 or column 2 in Table 1 in
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Appendix 8 CGE Model Results – Georgia). This is not surprising given that in 2006
Georgian tariffs are almost all zero and Georgia enjoys free access to the EU
market. The welfare changes for other regions are negligible. The changes in wages
are slightly higher, and again unskilled workers gain relatively more. 
Column 3 in Table 9.6 presents results for a Simple FTA BIS with full
liberalisation of agricultural and food products. However, the results are very
similar to the Simple FTA. The Simple FTA scenario assumes already a 50%
reduction on tariffs on agro-food products; hence the additional benefits from the
removal of the remaining tariffs are not a significant policy change. The trade
weighted post-Simple FTA EU tariffs on Georgian major agricultural exports are
zero and hence a Simple FTA BIS does not lead to any improvement in the access
of Georgian exports to the EU market. On the Georgian side, the only sector where
the post- Simple FTA tariffs are quite high i.e. 5.8% (see Table 9.1) is livestock,
which constituted less than 1% of Georgian imports from the EU in the benchmark
2004. Another noticeable improvement in the access of EU products to the
Georgian market is for food, beverages and tobacco where barriers decrease from
post-Simple FTA level of 2.7% to zero. Despite low tariffs in this sector, the impact
of their reduction is significant for two reasons i.e. Georgia is a net-importer of food
products and imported food constituted 35% of domestic consumption in 2004.
Therefore this is the major change that impacts on the welfare implications of the
Simple FTA BIS scenario as compared to Simple FTA. As tables in the Appendix 8
CGE Model Results – Georgia indicate the domestic production is crowded out by
imports and domestic output falls further as compared to Simple FTA. Since we
have a single representative consumer in the model, the loss of tariff revenue and a
smaller increase in factor rewards outweigh the gains from lower consumer prices
and increased efficiency of production. This points out that again tariff barriers are
not the major obstacle to the expansion on Georgian exports to the EU, only quality
improvements and reductions of non-tariff barriers can lead to significant benefits
for the agro-food sector.
An FTA+ combines a Simple FTA with a consolidation of the domestic reforms
that took place in Georgia over the recent years in a binding agreement. The FTA+
could consolidate measures such as unilateral recognition of EU and international
product standards and facilitation of customs procedures. The FTA+ could impact
on the perception of Georgia as a safe place to invest. These effects are very difficult
to quantify, but one way to analyse this kind of implications is to look at a reduction
in the cost of capital. This is interpreted as a lowering of risk premium associated
with locating the capital in Georgia. A similar approach has been adopted in the
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study on the Eastern EU Enlargement (Baldwin, Francois, Portes, 1997) and in the
feasibility study for the EU-Ukraine FTA (CEPS, 2006), where a reduction of the
price of capital of 10% was assumed. Clearly a deep and comprehensive FTA could
result in a strong boost to the investors’ confidence in Georgia, but even an FTA+
might to some extent affect the investors’ expectations. It is not possible to estimate
with certainly the extent to which the investment risk will be affected by an FTA+,
but to illustrate its possible consequences we study the implications of a 2.5%
reduction in the cost of capital. We designate this scenario as FTA+, since it goes
significantly beyond a classic Simple FTA by including some obligations on
domestic policy and consolidation of the acceptance of EU standards for imports.
The results the FTA+ scenario are presented in column 4 in Table 9.6. Our
results indicate an increase of welfare by 3.35% of GDP or 2.38 percentage points
above the 2006 liberalization scenario. This is associated with an increase of wages
of skilled workers by 4.45% and 5,11% for unskilled workers. The capital stock
increases by 6.70% in response to the lowering of the risk to invest. 
There are several reasons why we should expect the elimination of NTBs to be
beneficial to Georgia and the EU. The reductions in barriers to trade and transport
costs decrease the prices of goods for consumers, as well as prices of intermediates
and capital goods for producers. The extent of these gains depends on the amount
of trade between the trading partners and the trade creation and trade diversion
effects. Apart from increased efficiency of resource allocation, as demand shifts to
regions with the lowest cost suppliers, additional gains stem from increased
competition. However all gains from trade also involve adjustment costs and may
be associated with potentially painful restructuring in Georgia and significant
redistribution effects. 
Furthering the level of integration via a Deep FTA would involve a more complete
elimination of barriers to trade and investment. This would result in a more extensive
commitment to the reform of domestic policies in the direction of EU standards in
Georgia. We operationalize this scenario by looking at the effects of the removal of
NTBs such as border and standard costs and barriers to foreign provision of services
as defined above. The estimates of the magnitude of those barriers in Georgia are not
perfect, yet they provide a useful tool to gain insight into the magnitude and direction
of changes in trade, prices and output by sectors. Our results indicate that the impact
of a Deep FTA here narrowly defined as only the removal of NTBs would bring
significant benefits to Georgia. In the long run the increase in welfare rises to 2.74%
of GDP or 1.76 percentage points over the impact of the 2006 reform. The impact of
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a Deep FTA on the EU27 is still lower than 0.1% of GDP, but this is to be expected
given that the share of Georgia in total EU imports and in total EU exports is less than
1%. The implications for other regions are also negligible. 
Finally, the comprehensive set of reforms resulting from the Deep FTA along
with more wide-ranging flanking measures e.g. on competition and corruption
could lead to a re-branding of Georgia as a favourable investment location. This is
our scenario Deep FTA+ (column 6) where we assume that Georgia would achieve
a notable reduction in the perceived risk premium on investment, reflecting a
sustained re-branding of Georgia as a favorable and safe place to invest. We
illustrate this by assuming a 5% decrease in the price of capital. In this scenario the
welfare implications increase to 7.51% of GDP i.e. the net effect of 6.54% over the
2006 liberalization scenario. 
Again in the Deep FTA+ scenario output of unskilled labour intensive sectors is
growing faster than output of sectors where skilled workers are used more
intensively and wages of unskilled workers grow relatively faster (increase by 9.27%
compared to 7.92% for wages of skilled workers). This is mainly explained by the
expansion of unskilled labour-intensive sectors such as textiles and wearing
apparel; metal and metal products; wood and wood products. Increase in real
wages stems from a more efficient allocation of resources as tariff and non-tariff
barriers are being eliminated. However it is also related to the nature of the
experiment. As we allow the capital stock to increase by 15% in response to changes
in return to capital following a Deep FTA+ holding total employment fixed, the
higher capital to labour ratio leads to an increase in wages. This is coupled with
falling prices across the majority of sectors due to lowering of tariffs and several
NTBs leading to an even sharper increase in real wages.
The sectoral impacts on prices, output and trade are displayed in the Appendix
8 CGE Model Results – Georgia. Prices fall across majority of sectors with the
impact on selected industries now being determined by changes in standards costs,
border costs, by changes in relative barriers to foreign providers of transport,
financial and communication services and their trade intensity and factor shares
intensity. The impact of the liberalisation of the access to services sector seems to
be very small. The majority of sectoral output changes seem to be determined by
changes in border and standards costs. Output of many sectors increases
dramatically e.g. textiles and wearing apparel or metal and metal products.
However, the increases of the order of 46-56% are not that impressive given that
the base production level was very small (less than 2% of the total value added was
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generated in each of those sectors in 2004). Other industries experiencing output
growth are wood products; mining and quarrying and chemical, rubber and plastic
products. The biggest fall in output is recorded in paper and paper products; leather
goods; machinery and equipment and manufactures NEC, food sector. The
production of those sectors is replaced by imports.
Trade changes are highly correlated with changes in output. A decrease in
domestic production is often associated with an expansion of imports to replace
domestic production. Exports increases are highest in sectors where prices fall the
most, hence the products become much more competitive on the world markets. 
9.5. Conclusions
These simulations have presented a series of scenarios for EU-Georgian free
trade. They begin with the effects of the 2006 unilateral free trade measures
adopted by Georgia combined with the EU’s granting it GSP+ under its new GSP
scheme. These effects will however take years still to fully mature. They could be
consolidated and completed in a formal FTA with the EU. The Simple FTA and
Simple FTA BIS scenarios might not add much, since only the remaining agro-food
tariffs would be halved or dismantled. However this simulation ignores possible
confidence and synergy effects that could come from the binding in of the multiple
liberalization and reform measures that Georgia has made in the recent past. These
confidence effects can be modeled as reductions in the perceived risk premium
attached to investment in Georgia, which noticeably enhances the result. We call
this scenario FTA+, given that it stands for measures going beyond Simple FTA (i.e.
only tariff reductions). The Deep FTA scenario also adds significant benefits as a
result of a more complete elimination of a comprehensive definition of barriers to
trade and investment. And finally we present a variant, which is the closest to the
definition of a deep and comprehensive FTA as understood throughout the report
which complements the elimination of NTBs with several additional flanking
measures related to competition policy, corruption etc. - Deep FTA+. This scenario
involves a larger reduction of the risk premium associated with a major
strengthening of investment climate and improved perceptions of Georgia’s
business climate, reputation and re-branding along with the significant reduction
of NTBs. The Deep FTA+ scenario sees the highest gains for the Georgian economy.
Which of these scenarios will materialize, or over what time horizon, of course
cannot be forecast. All depends on the actual content of the agreement signed and
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the ability of the Georgian government to take the policy measures that underlie the
scenario computations. At the same time it is evident that the ultimate benefits for
Georgia of an effectively implemented Deep FTA+ with the EU could be
substantial. 
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This chapter explores the prospects of selected important sectors in Georgia in
terms of trade expansion and foreign direct investment (FDI), highlights potential
issues and discusses the likely implications of free trade agreements with the EU.
Based on a descriptive statistical analysis including production and foreign trade
data, it focuses on domestic capacity constraints, domestic and regional policies,
and issues not covered under the regulatory convergence and investment climate
chapter. The selected sectors are the agro-food sector and energy sectors.
10.1. Agro-food sector
10.1.1. General Performance and Current Issues
Georgia possesses favourable conditions for the production of a wide range of
annual and perennial crops, making agriculture one of the key sectors of the
country’s economy. However, while the long-term development of the agro-food
sector in Georgia remains a potentially attractive undertaking, agriculture is
currently experiencing structural difficulties and sectoral growth has been a mixed
picture thus far.
Agriculture is a key sector in Georgia, though its relative importance is
declining. Real value added for the sector “Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing” from
1996 to 2006, based on figures from Statistics Georgia, as well as agricultural or
food production from 1992 to 2006, based on figures from FAOSTAT, remained
steady (Figure 10.1 and Figure 10.2). Meanwhile, the share of real value added in
GDP fell from 34.1% in 1996 to 18.8% in 2006 (Figure 10.1). 
163
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND GEORGIA 
CASE Network Reports No. 79/2008
10. Sectors of importance
At the same time, during the last fifteen years, the output structure of the agricultural
sector changed significantly. For example, grapes were ranked first in Georgia’s food
and agricultural production. By 2005, the production of grapes was nearly halved and
is now ranked third (Figure 10.3, displaying the commodities ranking from 1 to 6 in
1992). Conversely, the production of cow milk more than doubled. 
The main agriculture exports include shelled hazelnuts (21% of total
agricultural exports), mineral water (10%), refined sugar (9%), distilled alcoholic
beverages (9%), non-alcoholic beverages (6%), and citrus fruits (5%). Among the
main imported items are: wheat and wheat flour, sugar, poultry, fish, meat,
vegetable oil, milk, butter, and margarines. 
The biggest growth potential for exports is in the citrus, tobacco, and wheat
sectors. With substantial investment in technological and infrastructure capacity
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Source: Statistics Georgia
Figure 10.1. Real Value Added Agriculture and Share of GDP, Georgia
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Figure 10.2. Agro-Food Production Indices, Georgia (Base period: 1999-2001)
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building, Georgia’s agricultural sector also has significant potential to export soy,
cooking oil, corn, nuts, tea, and herbs.
Georgia’s agro-food sector is facing the following problems. 
1. Traditionally, Russia was Georgia’s primary export destination. In early 2006,
Russia imposed a ban on Georgian wine and mineral water because, according
to the Kremlin, the wine did not meet Russian quality standards60. Georgia,
however, insists that Russia is playing political power games. Additionally,
Georgian wines have been imitated in Russia with mislabelling of cheap Russian
wines, which has led to an increase in competitiveness in this sector. Mineral
water, citruses, and fruits were also consequently subject to political
interference in trade relations between the two countries.
Without Russia as an import market, much of Georgia’s wine production is in
jeopardy. Prior to the Russian embargo, the industry was producing 63 million
bottles of wine on average per year, 95% of which was exported. Current
production levels may be down to 20 million bottles per year.
2. Georgia has lost the wine and fruit market in Russia and, has not been able to make
major inroads into EU markets due to fierce competition in the EU and the
ineffective marketing strategy of Georgian wine producers. After the embargo,
Ukraine, Kazakhstan, the USA, and Poland became the main importers of
Georgian wine. With regards to the EU, the main exported goods remain hazelnuts.
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60 The recent statements by Russia indicate that these sanctions might be lifted soon.
Source: FAOSTAT
Figure 10.3. Production of food and agricultural commodities with rank 1 to 6 in 1992 (1000
US$  based on 1999-2001 international prices)
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To evaluate the impact of the Russian embargo imposed in 2006 on Georgia’s
exports of wine, we look at nominal monthly foreign trade data from January
1995 until September 2007, which is only available for the product group
“Beverages, spirits and vinegar”. The slump of exports of the goods from this
product group after March 2006 is nevertheless obvious. However,
improvement has also been recently observed.  
The challenges that the Georgian wine industry faces today and ways to
overcome the consequences of the Russian embargo lie in successful marketing
and branding, quality control, and protecting the market from counterfeits.
Since the imposition of the embargo, the wine industry has worked aggressively
to identify and develop alternative markets, particularly in Eastern Europe.
Georgia was equipped with a modern control laboratory for testing wine quality.
A certificate issued by the Ministry of Agriculture of Georgia (“Samtresti”)
guarantees the integrity of products exported to the EU.
3. Georgian agriculture is primarily subsistence agriculture with small market
surpluses and low productivity. According to World Bank surveys, approximately
83% of Georgia’s rural population is entirely dependent upon their farms for
subsistence and they consume approximately 73% of what they produce.61
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61 During the Soviet era, agricultural production was hindered through misallocation of land and excessive
specialization that did not allow for flexibility in exports. Large farms using plantation-style labor produced
most basic crops. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, land was redistributed to individuals, with the
stipulation that they farm it. By 1993, over half of cultivated land was in private hand. However, it partially
resulted in ownership by those who neither live nor farm the land. It also resulted in the return of subsistence-
oriented, small-scale production.
Source: FAOSTAT
Figure 10.4. Georgian beverage, spirits, and vinegar exports
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Family holdings account for the majority of the output of plant growing. Only
25.9% of farms have access to agro-technical machinery and the means to use
it. In eastern Georgia, the lack of equipment is accentuated by out-of-date
irrigation systems unsuitable for the drier climate and poor technical
conditions. Other issues stemming from the deterioration of the agriculture
system include a lack of access to high-quality fuel and pesticides.  
Lack of modern agricultural technology and equipment and infrastructure,
outdated drainage systems, underdeveloped livestock feed and seed production, as
well as lack of packaging and sorting technologies, are obstacles to production,
especially export-oriented. Georgia imports a great deal of agricultural products,
to the point where its self-sustainability rate has become dangerously low.62 At the
same time, the share of the agro-food sector in total imports has been declining.
In 1995, this share was 42%. By 2006, it decreased to 16%. 
4. Another large-scale problem is rural finance. The country’s existing financial
system is limited, focused on short term trade financing and does not serve the
agricultural sector. Thus, both, primary agriculture and the agro-processing
sector have serious liquidity constraints due to the tight supply of medium term
credit. However, a major coordinated effort is underway, supported by the
World Bank, IMF, International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), and
bilateral donors to strengthen the banking system’s infrastructure. Rural credit
unions and other non-bank financial institutions have been formed to address
the problem of credit to small-scale farmers (Csaki and Kray, 2005). 
5. Lack of strong industry associations inhibits the access of farmers to modern
technology, financial resources, the dissemination of best practices, and the
ability to influence government policy. This, in turn, hinders export
opportunities.
6. At present, the process of land privatisation and liberalisation of land markets is
not completed. Delays in land privatisation have stymied incentives for the
growth of efficiency of land tenure and the manufacturing of high quality
products.
7. The main exported agricultural products in Georgia are subtropical. Two
primary regions for such products are near Georgia’s Black Sea shore. After the
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62 According to the UN General Assembly adopted resolution in 1974, the minimum level of food security ranges
from 80-85%.  This means that a country's food security is at risk when more than 15-20% of food products
consumed domestically are imported.  
conflict in Abkhazia and the resulting separation of Abkhazia from Georgian
jurisdiction, the main transportation route to Russian markets through Abkhazia
broke down. Also, the eviction of the majority of the population greatly
hampered citrus manufacturing in this territory. 
8. Institutional reforms in 2004-2006 in Georgia aimed at reducing undue government
interference and strengthening market competition were the most important
components of a strategy to improve the business-enabling environment and hence
economic growth. The World Bank’s Doing Business survey named Georgia among
the leading reformers in the world in 2006 and 2007. The EBRD 2006 transition
indicators show Georgia now roughly in line with the EBRD average. 
This improvement in the business environment contributed to a dramatic
increase in private capital inflows. Trade openness became relatively high.
Nevertheless, foreign investors avoid the agro-food industry, because the
domestic market is small and the larger regional market is not fully accessible.
Foreign direct investment in Georgian agriculture is minimal. At present,
foreigners have invested in the nut industry (the Italian confectionery company
“Ferrero” started operating in Georgia in 2007), wine making (Italy and Russia),
and the water-bottling sector (Turkey). 
Foreign investment is critical not only from the point of view of advanced know-
how and access to foreign markets, but also as an alternative to medium term
bank credit from local banks, which is often unavailable.
According to the USAID funded AgVantage program, the following investment
opportunities are available in the agro-food sector of Georgia: milk processing;
individual quick freezing of fresh fruits and vegetables; mandarin orange
consolidation, packing and export; commercial production of pedigreed poultry
broiler hatching eggs; apple juice concentrate production; and, onion
consolidation, storage, and marketing. 
9. The Georgian government gives priority to reducing barriers to trade. This is
partly a matter of reducing tariffs and non-tariff barriers imposed by the central
government, stopping harassment and corruption by officials at the border and
those controlling transit routes. At the same time, the elimination of trade
restrictions creates problems for industries that were protected from
international competitive processes. The agro-food sector is one of them. 
10. Customs detection of the flows of pirated and counterfeit goods is weak. The
elimination of the phyto-sanitary service in Georgia in 2005 decreased food
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safety and gave Russia’s sanitary service ammunition to cast doubt over the
quality of Georgian vegetables, wine, and mineral water, which led to banning
these products. There is a critical need to modernize sanitary and phyto-sanitary
services, institute industrial standards, and create international certification
laboratories in order to ensure a compatibility with international norms and
standards. 
10.1.2. Relations with the EU
In 2006, 18.5% of the total imports of the EU-25 from Georgia (458 million euro)
were agricultural products (DG Trade, 200763). Additionally, 8.5% of the total EU-
25 exports to Georgia (688 million euro) were from this sector. Thus, Georgia has
a trade surplus in the area of agricultural products with the EU-25. Georgia’s
agricultural exports to the EU-25 were concentrated on a few products. The export
of fresh and dried hazelnuts (shelled and peeled) amounted to 37.7 million euro in
2006 (44% of total agricultural exports), followed by waters (mineral and aerated,
with added sugar, sweetener or flavour,) at 27.5 million euro (32%). Pure mineral
water, wine, apple juice and fruit preparations had a share between 3 and 4%.
Shares of hazelnuts and sweet beverages are rather stable since 2001. In contrast,
the agricultural exports of EU-25 to Georgia are much more diversified. In 2006,
no product group had a share greater than 9.5% in total agricultural export. Butter
had a share of 9.5%, followed by spirits obtained by distilling grape wine or grape
marc (7.7%), sausages and similar products (5.8%), cane or beet sugar, chemically
pure sucrose (5.8%) and cigarettes (5.4%).
There is also important foreign direct investment. For example, in the wine and
distilled alcohol industry, joint stock company “Georgian Wine and Spirits” was
formed in 1994 with the participation of the Dutch Royal Cooymans, an affiliated
company of the Pernod Ricard Group, an international liquor producer. Other
foreign-owned affiliates include the Italian-owned Badagoni wine company, Iberia
Refreshments, JSC (Pepsi Cola bottlers Georgia), and Nestle Georgia & Armenia.
The Italian company Ferrero bought land for hazelnuts orchards and intends to
build two factories for processing nuts. The high shares of hazelnuts and sweet
beverages in Georgia’s exports to the EU-25 countries can partially be explained by
the engagement of foreign-owned firms. This type of foreign investment is needed
in other parts of the agriculture sector to bring agro-food production out of its rut.
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63 Based on raw data from Eurostat, DG Trade processed these figures for its publications concerning EU-
Georgian trade relations only for the EU-25 countries.
10.1.3. Potential Impact of an FTA
Georgia is already a member of the WTO and it can be expected that a Simple FTA
with the EU will not have a large effect on the agro-food sector, because – due to the
resulting commitments – Georgia has already rather low tariff rates on agricultural
products (Figure 10.5). The binding coverage for agricultural products is 100% and
the final bound duties as well as the most favoured nation (MFN) applied duties are
between 10 and 15 % for nearly 70% of agricultural import values.64
Table 10.1 shows that there are some lower final bounds duties for some
agricultural products, but averages are – with the exception of beverages and
tobacco – in this corridor, or even lower like e.g. for oilseeds, fats & oils, cotton and
fish. MFN applied duties are on average similar to final bound duties. The only
exception is beverages & tobacco.
Vice versa, the very few remaining import tariffs on the EU side are not the main
hampering factor for e.g. the Georgian wine exports to the EU market, but the
recognition of Georgian wines, non-tariff requirements, lack of resources and skills
for marketing and different preferences of the EU consumers in comparison with
those of traditional markets (mainly the CIS).
Only in case of a Deep FTA, which would lead to the adoption of EU regulations
and quality standards, the export potential of Georgian agro-food products could
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64 According to the WTO the binding coverage is defined as the share of HS six-digit subheadings containing at
least one bound tariff line.
Source: WTO
Figure 10.5. Tariff lines and import values (in %) for agricultural products for Georgia
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improve and allow some products to capture larger market shares within the EU.
These are, however, highly competitive markets (as with wine) with several well-
established players in a lot of EU Member States. Here, Georgia clearly has to find
a market niche in the low to medium price segment. Furthermore, it has to be asked
whether there is actually the capacity on the side of the Georgian authorities and
businesses to implement a Deep FTA.  
Two things are especially important for Georgia to get a larger share of
European agriculture and food market – foreign firms have to come to Georgian
agriculture and food safety certification system has to satisfy EU regulations.
Successful Georgian exports demonstrate these conditions. A large part of Georgian
exports to the EU are carried out by foreign firms – wine and hazelnuts providing
examples. These exporters rely on special food safety certification arrangements
and not on dysfunctional general SPS certification system. A Deep FTA and Deep
FTA+ could only create more favourable conditions for this to happen but it will be
up to the private sector to take or pass these opportunities.
10.2. Energy
10.2.1. General Performance and Current Issues 
Georgia is not abundant in energy resources, other than hydropower, which is
the only potential export sector. Therefore, the country depends on foreign fuel
supply. In the first fifteen years following independence, 85% of all energy was
imported. The country experienced an energy shortage as power generation
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Source: WTO.
Table 10.1. Tariffs by product groups
Product groups Final bound duties MFN applied duties 
 Average Duty free 
in % 
Max. Binding 
in % 
Average Duty  
free in % 
Max. 
Animal products 11.8 1.2 12 100 11.8 1.2 12 
 Diary products 12.1 0 25 100 12.1 0 25 
Fruit, vegetables, plants 13.4 0 30 100 13.2 0 30 
Coffee, tea 12.3 0 20 100 12.3 0 20 
Cereals & preparations 14.5 1.2 50 100 14.1 1.2 25 
Oilseeds, fats & oils 3.6 67.1 12 100 3.1 69.7 12 
Sugars & confectionery 11.6 0 12 100 11.1 0 12 
Beverages & tobacco 46.9 0 496 100 23.4 0 30 
Cotton 9.0 0 12 100 9.0 0 12 
Other agricultural 
Products 
10.6 2.0 15 100 9.9 6.0 15 
Fish & fish products 0.3 97.2 12 100 0.3 97.2 12 
decreased in both the hydro and thermal sectors. The energy deficit was caused
mostly by poor technical conditions in power stations and corrosion of the gas
distribution network. Political corruption and diversion of supplies also played a
major part in the lack of energy during that time. Energy dependence became an
especially serious problem because of rising political tensions with Russia, which
led to a price hike by Gazprom in 2007. Georgia’s other suppliers, primarily of
gasoline and diesel fuel, include Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, Azerbaijan, and
Turkmenistan. Georgia has been seeking to further diversify its suppliers and
reduce its dependence on Russia. In early 2007, it began to receive gas from the
Shah Deniz field, the largest in Azerbaijan, in hopes of becoming independent of
politically unstable Gazprom gas flows. Georgia expected gas imports of 250
million cubic meters from the field in 2007. 
Aside from acting as a destination for energy, Georgia has also used pipelines as
a key element in it economic growth strategy and has begun to position itself as a
provider of energy security to Europe. One country that is a promising market for
Georgian pipeline logistics is Turkey, where energy demand increases by 7% on an
annual basis (Gorst, 2007). 
The most recently available data from the International Energy Agency (IEA)
shows that for 2005, the total primary energy supply of Georgia was 3.21 millions
of tons of oil equivalent (mtoe), where 1.27 mtoe stemmed from domestic energy
production and net imports amounted to 1.94 mtoe. Furthermore, electricity
consumption was 7.48 terawatt hours (TWh).
More recent data were published by Galt & Taggart, a Georgian-Ukrainian
investment bank, suggesting that the consumption of electricity increased in 2006
to 8.3 TWh and the forecast for 2007 was 8.6 TWh (Table 10.2). 94% of the
consumption in 2006 was provided by local production. The remainder was
imported from Russia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Turkey. However, Georgia
currently does export electricity to Turkey during the summer months. The report
further states that the Georgian government has undertaken effective restructuring
of the electricity sector, including upgrades to high-voltage lines. 
Currently, total installed generator capacity (thermal and hydropower) is
approximately 4,800 MW, but a significant portion of this capacity is not in
operable condition.65 The total hydroelectric capacity is 2,843 MW spread between
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65 The following four paragraphs are based primarily on Galt & Taggart (2007).
14 large scale and about 80 plants with less than 10 MW capacity each. In recent
years, electricity has been generated almost entirely by hydropower plants (81.4%
on average since 2000). The medium and large hydropower plants have a capacity
of 5.6 TWh, while the three large natural gas fired thermal power plants have a
operating capacity of 2.2 TWh. Due to aging equipment needing overhaul or
replacement and a shortage of fuel supplies, the thermal power plants only operate
at approximately 40% of their capacity. Furthermore, with the quadrupling of
Russian gas prices to Georgia since 2005 to 235 per 1000 m3, thermal generation
in Georgia is becoming more and more unprofitable and is being replaced by
cheaper hydro generation.
Serious rehabilitation of the sector began in 2004-2005, after the Rose
Revolution brought a new, anti-corruption political movement to power.
Substantial funds were invested to improve the reliability of the Georgian energy
system. The recent renovations have made it possible to increase the generating
capacity of hydro and thermal plants. The completion of a pipeline connecting
Georgia to Azerbaijan and Iran also allowed for an increase in energy
consumption by more than 30% from 2004-2005. Electricity production increased
by 387 million KWh from 2005-2006, and electricity imports decreased by 611
million KWh during the same period (Georgian National Energy Regulatory
Commission, 2006). 
According to the Georgian Deputy Minister of Energy, George Abdushelishvili
(project team interview on 16 October 2007), in 2007 the energy situation improved
to the point where Georgia could potentially become a net exporter of energy,
primarily electricity. Estimated capacity of electricity production on large and
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Source: Galt & Taggart (2007)
Table 10.2. Energy balance of Georgia, TWh
Product groups Final bound duties MFN applied duties 
 Average Duty free 
in % 
Max. Binding 
in % 
Average Duty  
free in % 
Max. 
Animal products 11.8 1.2 12 100 11.8 1.2 12 
 Diary products 12.1 0 25 100 12.1 0 25 
Fruit, vegetables, plants 13.4 0 30 100 13.2 0 30 
Coffee, tea 12.3 0 20 100 12.3 0 20 
Cereals & preparations 14.5 1.2 50 100 14.1 1.2 25 
Oilseeds, fats & oils 3.6 67.1 12 100 3.1 69.7 12 
Sugars & confectionery 11.6 0 12 100 11.1 0 12 
Beverages & tobacco 46.9 0 496 100 23.4 0 30 
Cotton 9.0 0 12 100 9.0 0 12 
Other agricultural 
Products 
10.6 2.0 15 100 9.9 6.0 15 
Fish & fish products 0.3 97.2 12 100 0.3 97.2 12 
medium-sized rivers was projected to be 136 million KWh in 2006 (Natural Gas
Strategy for Georgia, 2006).
Currently, Georgia is facing the following key challenges to growth in the energy
sector:
1. The energy system has suffered from unsustainable debts. The Georgian
authorities have made progress in improving payment collections, reduced
quasi-fiscal losses in the sector, and supported tariff policies at cost-recovery
levels; however progress has not been sufficient.
2. Lack of finance remains a problem. Capital investment is needed to
commercialize the sector. 
3. The Georgian government has already begun to privatize energy generation and
energy distribution, but the gas pipelines and high voltage network transmission
lines remain under state ownership. With electricity distribution companies in
Georgia under new management, technical and commercial losses in the system
have been reduced considerably. However, further privatisation steps are necessary.
4. Bank financing for many branches of the energy sector are insufficient, as banks
still view the sector as too risky.
5. Energy efficiency has to be improved further (2003 17.6% of the total energy
consumption) and the use of renewable energy sources has to be increased.
Though the share of hydropower is already very high, the use of other renewable
energy sources (e.g. wind power) should be encouraged.
6. Also it seems that some problems of the energy sector are linked with Georgian
national energy regulatory commission (GNERC), which does not operate in a
very transparent way.
7. The Georgian authorities prepared the Energy Sector Strategic Action Plan for
2005–08, which is being implemented and updated periodically, but there are no
long-term strategy and energy demand forecasts needed to formulate long-term
energy policy. 
8. The EBRD has invested almost $50 million to improve the Inguri hydropower
plant (ERBD, 2007), which is located on the Abkhaz-Georgian ceasefire line and
is operated jointly. This rehabilitation was co-financed with a grant by the EU.
The Inguri hydro power plant produces 71% of the total electricity production
supplied in Georgia. However the conflict with the separatist Abkhazia regime
creates risks for trade and revenue distribution. 
9. Georgia’s comparative advantage lies in its geographical location: a
transportation corridor connecting Europe and Asia goes through its territory.
It is vitally important that Georgia exploits this advantage. 
The following oil and gas pipelines traverse Georgia:
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• Russia-Georgia-Armenia gas pipeline - 5.8 bcm/year 
• Shah-Deniz gas pipeline (BTE) - 6.6 bcm/year
• The Iran-Azerbaijan-Georgia (IAG) gas pipeline – 3.5 bcm/year
• Baku-Supsa oil pipeline – 5.75 mt/year;
• Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline – 50 mt/year
There are discussions of other pipelines to carry Caspian basin energy resources
through Georgia. For example, Georgia and the Ukraine have proposed a gas
pipeline from the Caspian region to Ukraine and further to Poland (“White Stream”
or also known as Georgia-Ukraine-EU (GUEU) gas pipeline). This pipeline would
branch off from the South Caucasus Pipeline near Tbilisi and run for approximately
100 km via Georgia to Supsa at the Black Sea. From there a 650 km long offshore
section on the seabed of the Black Sea will run to Crimea near Feodosia in Ukraine.
This offshore section will be linked to Ukraine’s transit system by a 200 km long
onshore section. An alternative plan proposes to prolong the offshore pipeline to
Romania. This proposal has met with interest by the EU, which is looking at
alternative routes through the Black Sea. The EU will finance under TEN-E a
feasibility study on “White Stream”, which should start in February 2008 and end
in October 2008. There is also a proposed oil pipeline for this same route, but it
would essentially build from the existing Baku-Supsa route rather than entail new
construction. 
Some of the projected pipelines through Georgia may not materialize for many
reasons. One of them is that Russia has strong political ties to Kazakhstan, which
may prevent the further development of the Caucuses routes. Also, heavyweights
within the EU, such as France and Germany, may choose to deal with Russia on the
oil import issue, rather than Ukraine and several new EU members that prefer the
Caspian Sea-South Caucasus-Odessa-Brody-Gdansk route. 
Natural gas from Shah Deniz has been flowing to Georgia since early 2007,
allowing the country to cut its reliance on Russian gas imports from 100% to
around 50%. Georgia’s reliance on Russian gas may be reduced up to 20% this year.
Georgia may even be able to eliminate its need for Russian gas as a result of the
expansion by Azerigaz of a pipeline that connects Azerbaijan with Georgia.
In addition to receiving energy resources, Georgia benefits from pipeline transit
fees. For example, tariff revenues from the BTC amount to $50 million USD
annually. The transit revenues from BTE and BTC are estimated at 0.6% of GDP in
2007, and they may rise to about 1% of GDP by 2010. 
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10. Georgia has developed oil terminals at the Kulavi and Batumi seaports. The
Batumi and Poti ports processed 14.0 mln. tons of crude oil in 2005. Georgia
has opportunities to build new oil terminals and refineries on the Black Sea
that will enhance oil transit capacities from Central Asia and attract foreign
investments. High voltage lines connecting Georgia to Russia, Armenia,
Azerbaijan and Turkey provide opportunities for electric energy trade if
generating capacity is increased. 
10.2.2. Relations with the EU
Since Georgia still has large hydropower potential capacities, there remains
much room for European foreign direct investment in this area – far beyond
current investment, since the continued Georgian domestic demand growth for
electricity will be accompanied by strong foreign demand, particularly from Turkey
– the primary foreign consumer of Georgian electricity – where electricity
consumption has been growing by annually 7 % for the last 15 years and end tariffs
are among the highest in Europe.
There is no doubt that the EU places top priority on achieving its energy security
and is interested in the alternative gas and oil supplies. This strategy means adding
new pipelines to the existing ones and transit of energy to the EU through “multiple
pipelines”. There are number of projects of gas transit from Central Asia to Europe.
However, most of them are under the control of the Russian state-owned company
Gazprom. The Caspian Sea, via Georgia, is the only route that is free from Russian
control. Therefore is the already mentioned “White Stream” project also of high
interest for the EU, which is e.g. reflected in a feasibility study under TEN-E (cf.
section 10.2.1). Furthermore, there are two other Commission sponsored feasibility
studies looking at a Southern Corridor for gas imports to the EU which are of direct
relevance to Georgia. The first study entitled Study on the Trans-Caspian Gas
Pipeline from Kazakhstan to Azerbaijan, examines infrastructure issues
(assessment of rehabilitation needs for the existing pipeline infrastructure to feed a
TCP), environmental aspects (preliminary impact assessment), and various
financing options to build a Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline. The second study is
entitled “Feasibility Study of a Trans-Caspian - Black Sea Gas Corridor” and which
is investigating the feasibility of a gas transit corridor from Kazakhstan and
possibly, Turkmenistan across the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan and Georgia and then
through the Black Sea region to the EU. Investing in this route would support
multiple pipelines that would strengthen EU energy security. 
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The so called “Nabucco” pipeline project – as part of the EU energy foreign
policy – also falls in the area of the diversification of energy suppliers. Since 2002,
there are plans for a new gas pipeline connecting the Caspian region
(Azerbaijan/Iran if political conditions permit), Central Asia (Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan) and the Middle East (Egypt) via Turkey, Bulgaria,
Romania, Hungary with Austria and further with the Central and Western
European gas markets. The projected pipeline length is approximately 3,300 km,
starting at the Georgian/Turkish and/or Iranian/Turkish border and leading to
Baumgarten in Austria. The projected start of gas transportation is 2013. Initiator
of the project is the Austrian OMV AG. In addition to OMV Gas International
GMBH further owners are MOL from Hungary, Transgaz S.A. from Romania,
Bulgargaz Holding EAD from Bulgaria and BOTAÞ Petroleum Pipeline
Corporation from Turkey (each with 20% at the Nabucco Gas Pipeline
International GmbH). In February 2008, German RWE became the sixth partner.
Other partners could join the consortium. Interested firms are Gaz de France, Total
and Eon Ruhrgas.
In spring 2006, the Nabucco project entered the stage of EU energy policy. At
that time, the European Council asked the Commission for recommendations for a
future energy foreign policy. One year later, the Council agreed on the European
Energy Action Plan with the three goals of security of supply, efficiency and
environmental compatibility, in which the strategic importance of the Nabucco
project for the European energy supply is emphasized. Nabucco is characterized as
one of several “preferential projects of European interest” for a future common
energy foreign policy.
However, Russia and Gazprom have not sat on their hands and initiated an
alternative Russian-Italian gas pipeline project, the “South Stream”, which will run
on the seabed of the Black Sea and will link as a start the Russian seaport
Novorossijsk with the Bulgarian city Varna. On 22 November 2007 Gazprom and
the Italian ENI signed in the Kremlin an agreement for a feasibility study in the
presence of the Russian president Vladimir Putin and the Italian prime minister
Romano Prodi. At 18 January 2008 Bulgaria also agreed to that pipeline project
and a corresponding agreement was signed during a visit of Vladimir Putin in
Sofia. Furthermore, on 25 January 2008 Serbia joined the project. 
Nevertheless, Georgia’s importance is limited. It is merely a transit state, far less
‘strategic’ than Ukraine, for example, as the volumes of gas being supplied to
Europe via Georgia compared to gas supplied to Europe via Ukraine are far smaller
- the difference is that the EU is making a political issue out of it, since gas coming
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into the EU via Ukraine is Russian, whereas gas coming to EU via Georgia would
be non-Russian (Azeri, potentially Turkmen and Kazakh in the future). The push for
non-Russian gas supplies in the EU is making this a political issue and thus there is
more ‘strategic importance’ being placed on this. 
Currently, Georgia imports gas from Russia. This threatens its energy security
and creates tense political relations with Russia, mainly due to the fact that Russia
is not interested in losing control over the revenues from Caspian energy. In early
2006, the Georgian government announced that it was considering selling its main
local network of gas pipelines to Gazprom, which connects Russia to Armenia via
Georgia. It was meant to give Gazprom economic influence in the region. But the
deal was not completed because the Americans disrupted negotiations. Just after
the failure of the deal, Russia announced an embargo on wine and mineral water
and closed railway and airway connections with Georgia.  
Due to the Russia’s dominant position, the EU’s active role in helping Georgia
in its relations with Russia may be important. Toward this end, Georgia’s foreign
policy is decidedly pro-Western. It (as well as its neighbours) ratified in 20057 the
Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) and was accepted as an observer in the Energy
Community, as established by the Energy Community Treaty of 1 July 2006, at the
Ministerial meeting held in Belgrade on 17 December 2007. 
The general objective of the Energy Community is to create a stable regulatory
and market framework, the main instrument of which is to implement key parts of
the EU legislation (the electricity and gas directives and regulations, key
environmental directives, in particular the Environmental impact assessment
directive, key directives on renewable and biofuels and the main principles of EU
competition policy). It would therefore help Georgia to create the legal framework
for an integrated energy market with the EU in both the electricity and natural gas
sectors, strengthen national institutional capacities, adapt legislation and
regulation to EU norms, avoid discrimination on tariffs from energy suppliers, and
improve the utilization of supply and production capacities of electricity.
The ECT treaty has good rules on investment protection as well as transit and
dispute settlement. For trade and transports the principles of the GATT were
stipulated. However Russia has refused to ratify the Energy Charter Treaty (although
it has signed it), and also refused meaningful negotiations over a draft ‘Transit
Protocol’, which would give additional provisions on access to pipelines for transit.
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The energy sector is also prominently taken into account in the ENP Action Plan
for Georgia in the prioriy area 8 “Transport and Energy” as well as in the “General
Objectives and Actions”. Besides the objectives and actions concerning “Energy
policy convergence towards EU energy policy objectives”, “Gradual convergence
towards the principles of the EU internal electricity and gas markets” and “Progress
regarding energy networks” there are also clear objectives and actions with regard to
the “Progress on energy efficiency and the use of renewable energy sources”, namely:
• Take steps to develop an action plan including a financial plan for improving
energy efficiency and enhancing the use of renewable energy;
• Adopt legislation addressing energy efficiency and renewable energy.
Currently the Georgian government is developing with the assistance of
USAID and GEPLAC two new pieces of legislation on renewable energy and
energy efficiency. The aim is to finalise them by July 2008;
• Reinforce the institutions dealing with energy efficiency and renewable
energy sources;
• Implement a set of measures in this area.
• One concrete measure is e.g. the implementation of the Energy Efficiency
Centre (EEC) Georgia.
10.2.3. Potential Impact of an FTA
Since new developments in the Georgian energy sector are considered by the
Georgian government as a success story, it cannot be expected that a Simple FTA
will stimulate in the short run any further improvement in the functioning of this
sector. Some limited positive impact, especially with regard to the attraction of
European foreign investors, can perhaps be expected in the longer term perspective
with a Deep FTA+, assuming that improved trade relations and the branding of an
FTA with the EU generally enhances the confidence of foreign investors. A Deep
FTA+ could have, at least in the medium term, a potential for bringing a more
significant change to the sector, assuming it would entail changes in the legal and
regulatory framework and particularly in its implementation.
In general, the Georgian energy sector depends primarily on strategic pipeline
decisions, and not on an FTA. An exception may be the hydropower sector.
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10.3. Summary
Neither for the agro-food sector nor for the energy sector can it be expected that
a Simple FTA/Simple FTA BIS will have a large impact. With regard to the agro-
food sector, a Deep FTA only might matter if it increases the incentives to adopt EU
regulations and quality standards to a larger extent than the already existing
measures (GSP/GSP+, PCA and ENP Action Plan). With regard to the service
sector, the EU has a strategic interest to diversify its energy supply and particularly
with regard to gas to find alternatives to deliveries from Russia. In a comprehensive
EU energy foreign policy Georgia might play – at least as a transit country – an
important role. Thus the impact of a Deep FTA depends on its ability to facilitate
the integration in such a policy with measures which are beyond those already
implemented e.g. in the Energy Charter Treaty, the Energy Community Treaty and
the ENP Action Plan.
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1. The preceding chapters of this report have examined in some detail key aspects
of the Georgian economy and its regulatory environment and possibilities of its
integration with the EU. Below we summarize our major conclusions and policy
recommendations with regard to a range of scenarios, ranging from simple free
trade to very deep and comprehensive free trade between the EU and Georgia.
We start with two variants of a simple free trade agreement (FTA) assuming the
elimination of tariffs and quantitative restrictions in the bilateral trade between
Georgia and the EU. The first Simple FTA scenario assumes full liberalization
of trade in industrial products and halving of tariffs and elimination of all
quantitative restrictions on agricultural and food products on Georgian exports
to the EU and vice versa. The second Simple FTA BIS scenario assumes full
elimination of tariffs and quantitative restrictions on all products in the bilateral
trade between Georgia and the EU. Further, we look at three Deep FTAs. The
Deep FTAs assume various degrees of changes in the domestic policy and
business environment affecting trade and investment in Georgia. An FTA+
combines a Simple FTA with a consolidation of the domestic reforms that took
place over the recent years in a binding agreement. The FTA+ could consolidate
measures such as unilateral recognition of EU and international product
standards and facilitation of customs procedures. Furthering the level of
integration via a Deep FTA would involve a further more complete elimination
of barriers to trade and investment throughout various sectors of the economy.
This would also result in a more extensive commitment to the reform of
domestic policies in the direction of EU standards in Georgia. Finally, the
comprehensive set of reforms resulting from the Deep FTA along with more
wide-ranging flanking measures e.g. on competition and corruption could lead
to a re-branding of Georgia as a favourable investment location. This is our
scenario Deep FTA+ where we assume that Georgia would achieve a notable
reduction in the perceived risk premium on investment. 
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11. Conclusions
2. Georgia would appear to have a great potential for generating further growth in
GDP through the redeployment of labour into more productive activities, as
indicated by the extent of both unemployment and underemployment in
agriculture. Figures for growth in industrial output for recent years suggest that
there is substantial scope for industry to drive GDP growth in future years on
the basis of such a redeployment. The full exploitation of this potential would
require significant flanking measures relating primarily to reliability of the
general rule of law, and levels of corruption and efficiency in courts,
government departments, and in the governance of private-sector organizations
along the lines set out in the ENP EU/Georgia Action Plan.
3. Our ‘Sussex Framework’ based analysis suggests that the tariff liberalization
achieved so far by Georgia should be expected to increase Georgia’s trade with
its main partners, as well as to induce some welfare-increasing trade re-
orientation from CIS supply sources towards non-CIS partners. The risks of
welfare-decreasing trade diversion from the Simple EU-Georgia FTA as a result
of shallow integration are also low for both Georgia and the EU. From Georgia’s
perspective, the most substantial welfare gains could arise from deeper
integration, with a greater level of Georgia’s regulatory and institutional
approximation with the EU acquis, i.e through a deep and comprehensive FTA.
Therefore, the continuation of the profound economic reforms in accordance
with the ENP Action Plan and best practice is of primary importance for
Georgia. Although the diversity of Georgia’s exports to the EU is limited, it is
broader than some of its neighbours, suggesting a range of economic activities
where existing exporting firms could expand their activity and where new firms
can see the advantages of entering the export sector.
4. Survey results indicate that Georgian firms do not feel much burden resulting
from NTBs in European markets; however this perception might be misleading.
Firstly, Georgian exports to the EU include mostly mineral and raw materials
that satisfy EU regulations with little difficulty. There are just two agricultural
products exported to the EU – wine and hazelnuts, which have special (and
rather easy to comply with) arrangements for SPS conformity certification.
Secondly, manufacturing products are often produced under special
arrangements similar to the outward processing scheme. Under such
arrangements, the Georgian firms provide production services rather than the
finished product. European partners take care of most of the logistical issues
and required certifications. The major reason why the average Georgian
company does not export to the EU is because it cannot offer an attractive
product meeting quality and safety standards of the European market. A Deep
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FTA could provide stronger incentives for upgrading of product quality and
safety standards by respectively ensuring better access to the EU market and by
introducing binding changes to domestic legislation.
5. Analysing the institutional capacity to implement a Deep FTA with the EU we
note that the human resources of the Government bodies are uneven in terms of
education, qualifications, and international experience. The majority of staff has
limited understanding of European regulations, international practices, and
foreign languages. In a Deep FTA, flanking measures will probably go along the
path outlined in the PCA and ENP Action Plan, so the implementation of
Georgia’s commitments taken under the PCA and ENP Action Plan could serve
as a guide of the Government capability to implement a more challenging
agreement. As recent experience shows, Georgia has been progressing in legal
harmonization with the EU. However, implementation of statutory laws and
obligations remains a problem in many areas, as was stressed in this report.
Laws on the books and obligation under the PCA and ENP Action Plan did not
stop Georgia from effectively scrapping the enforcement of SPS measures and
product standards until the time when the markets demonstrate the need for
such institutions and export capacity develop. Therefore, implementation of the
flanking measures would be seriously influenced by the stance of the Georgian
Government on the practical economic policies of the day.
6. In terms of the likely impact of a Deep FTA+ on foreign direct investment flows,
we conclude that even though the years 2006-2007 brought significant increase
in FDI inflows to Georgia, FDI has been primarily resource and market driven.
The opportunities in the pipeline transportation sector may soon diminish.
Meanwhile, market-seeking motive will most likely be a dominant one for the
non-tradable sectors in Georgia. The most plausible new sectors for increased
FDI are in the service sectors, both for business services if Georgia becomes a
regional transport and commercial hub and for tourism. In addition it is possible
to envisage the emergence of labour-seeking motives for FDI, starting perhaps
with investments from neighbouring Turkey in view of their recently agreed FTA.
7. We also anticipate that potential inward FDI to Georgia resulting from
deepening of the trade relationship with the EU would be substantially higher
than the current flows. Some simulations suggest that the FDI stock in Georgia
could increase up to five-fold until 2020, but this has to be considered a rather
optimistic figure, since it assumes that Georgia succeeds in its transition reforms
to the extent of approaching the current level proxied by the case of Bulgaria,
which, it must be acknowledged, has been boosted by the incentives of EU
accession which are not available for Georgia.
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8. Looking at the possible impact of an FTA on the service sectors, we conclude
that Georgia has already gone beyond the content of a Simple FTA, given the
important structural reforms achieved in recent years. Deeper free trade could,
in contrast, have a much more substantial impact, and could help to transform
some sub-sectors. An effective Deep FTA would need far-reaching flanking
measures, some of which may be difficult to incorporate into a trade agreement.
Many of these important flanking measures – strengthening the rule of law,
improving the general business climate, combating corruption and reinforcing
the authority of competition policy, are listed under the priorities of the
EU/Georgia Action Plan. In this context a Deep FTA could therefore be seen as
complementary to continued implementation of the Action Plan.
9. For the agro-food sector, it is well known that the most important constraints on
trade are not tariffs but product standards and regulations. With regard to the
agro-food sector, a Deep FTA is more likely to be significant if it increases the
incentives to adopt EU regulations and quality standards to a larger extent than
the already existing measures (GSP/GSP+, PCA and ENP Action Plan). 
10. With regard to the energy sector, the EU has a strategic interest to diversify its
energy supply and particularly with regard to gas to find alternatives to
deliveries from Russia. In a comprehensive EU energy foreign policy Georgia
might play – at least as a transit country – an important role. The content of a
Deep FTA in this sector could for example see Georgia aiming to accede to the
Energy Community Treaty, completing its existing participation in the Energy
Charter Treaty.
11. Our analysis using a CGE model indicates that the welfare gains for Georgia
from its unilateral tariff liberalisation of trade in goods along with the
recognition of foreign product standards that took place in 2006 combined with
the EU’s granting it GSP+ under its new GSP scheme are likely to amount to
around 1% of GDP. Since following the above liberalization of 2006 Georgia has
unilaterally eliminated most of its tariffs and already enjoys largely tariff-free
access to the EU market, an EU-Georgia Simple FTA/Simple FTA BIS would
bring very small additional welfare effects to Georgia. Our assessment is that
further gains from an FTA+ which could lock-in Georgia’s reforms would lead
to a boost in investors’ confidence and a lowering of the risk to invest in Georgia.
Our results indicate that possible additional welfare gains of the FTA+ could
amount to 2.4% of GDP.
12. Furthering the level of integration via a Deep FTA would involve a more
complete elimination of barriers to trade and investment. This would result in a
more extensive commitment to the reform of domestic policies in the direction
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of EU standards. The additional welfare gains from elimination of selected NTBs
could amount to 1.7% of GDP. Additional flanking measures on competition and
corruption could lead to a reduction of the risk premium on investment, which
would work as an additional mechanism for boosting both investment and GDP
growth as a whole – this is the Deep FTA+ scenario. If this was to occur, from
our model simulations, we envisage the possibility of economic gains from a
Deep FTA+ reaching as much as 6.5% of GDP (on the top of the ones reached
out of the 2006 liberalisation). 
13.In conclusion: Overall we conclude that a free trade agreement between Georgia
and the EU is feasible, since Georgia has already taken liberalising measures
going considerably beyond a classic Simple FTA and on the other hand Georgia
benefits from the EU GSP+. We analyze the range of scenarios for deep
integration that show the benefits of the various degrees of integration. The final
degree of deep integration would be a result of negotiations between Georgia
and the EU and is not up to us to anticipate. The greatest benefits would accrue
with a Deep FTA+ involving a significant approximation of law along the
priorities of the ENP Action Plan for Georgia along with additional flanking
measures on e.g. competition and corruption and their effective
implementation, which would mean a re-branding of Georgia as a safe and
attractive investment location. At the same time, given the current progress with
the implementation of the ENP Action Plan, serious questions remain as to both
the willingness and institutional capacity of Georgia to undertake further
commitments in the regulatory area. We note that the human resources of the
Government bodies are uneven in terms of education, qualifications, and
international experience. However, this situation could be eased with technical
assistance.
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Appendix 1
Sussex Framework 
– Additional Tables
Source: WITS. Note: data for 2006 – HS 2002 6-digit, for 1996 –HS 1996 6-digit.  
Appendix 1 Table 1. Top 15 export sectors by export share in 2006, HS 6 digit
HS code Description 
% share 
in total 
exports 
RCA 
% share in 
total 
exports 
RCA 
  1996 2006 
720230 Ferro-silico-manganese 1.44% 76.16 8.46% 525.36 
260300 Copper ores and concentrates 6.73% 56.32 8.02% 31.16 
720449 
Ferrous waste and scrap, iron or 
steel, other 0.00% 0.00 5.53% 39.90 
080222 Hazelnuts without shells 0.51% 42.21 5.45% 520.25 
710813 
Gold in other semi-manufactured 
forms 0.00% 0.00 4.88% 32.95 
310230 Ammonium nitrate 5.86% 291.96 4.70% 342.01 
870323 
Automobiles Of a cylinder capacity 
exceeding 1 0.00% 0.00 4.23% 2.25 
220421 
Sparkling wine In containers holding 
2 l or less 1.43% 8.63 3.99% 26.70 
740400 Copper waste and scrap 0.00% 0.00 3.04% 21.20 
220820 
Spirits obtained by distilling grape 
wine 0.41% 7.05 2.57% 81.93 
270900 
Petroleum oils and oils obtained from 
bituminous minerals, crude 3.38% 0.95 2.57% 0.52 
220110 Mineral waters and aerated waters 2.46% 125.83 2.42% 123.95 
220210 Waters, including mineral waters 1.94% 53.43 2.32% 45.90 
880230 Aeroplanes and other aircraft 0.00% 0.00 1.90% 13.27 
170199 Cane or beet sugar, in solid form 0.00% 0.00 1.90% 20.91 
Total  12.08%  61.98%  
Average   44.2      121.88 
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Source: WITS. Note: Georgia’s data for 2006 – HS 2002 6-digit, for 1996 –HS 1996 6-digit.  
Appendix 1 Table 2. Top 15 export sectors by RCA in 2006, HS 6 digit  
HS code Description 
% share 
in total 
exports 
RCA % share in total exports  RCA 
  1996 2006 
720230 Ferro-silico-manganese 1.44% 76.16 8.46% 525.36 
080222 Hazelnuts without shells 0.51% 42.21 5.45% 520.25 
284590 Other isotopes 0.17% 133.27 0.47% 418.52 
080221 Hazelnuts in shell, fresh or dried 0.25% 411.30 0.23% 351.44 
310230 Ammonium nitrate 5.86% 291.96 4.70% 342.01 
252321 White Portland cement 0.00% 0.02 0.92% 263.93 
091040 Thyme; bay leaves 0.63% 808.29 0.13% 245.33 
252390 Other hydraulic cements 0.0001% 0.01 0.88% 214.65 
283711 
Cyanides and cyanide oxides of 
sodium 0.77% 245.17 0.38% 147.36 
440792 Beech (Fagus spp.) wood 0.004% 0.34 0.94% 140.59 
880400 Parachutes 0.00% 0.00 0.18% 129.39 
220110 Mineral waters and aerated waters 2.46% 125.83 2.42% 123.95 
880211 Helicopters Of an unladen weight  0.00% 0.00 1.71% 116.06 
731300 Barbed wire of iron or steel; twist 0.00% 0.00 0.14% 106.30 
870490 Trucks nes 0.002% 0.96 0.32% 104.33 
Total  12.08%  27.33%  
Average   142.37  249.96 
Source: WITS. Note: data for 2006 – HS 2002 6-digit, for 1996 –HS 1996 6-digit.
Appendix 1 Table 3. Top 15 export sectors by export share in 1996, HS 6 digit 
HS code Description 
% share 
in total 
exports 
RCA 
% share in 
total 
exports 
RCA 
  1996 2006 
271000 Petroleum oils, etc, (excl. crude) 8.74% 24.64 0.00% 0.00 
260300 Copper ores and concentrates 6.73% 56.32 8.02% 31.16 
271600 Electrical energy 6.60% 37.81 0.23% 0.82 
310230 Ammonium nitrate 5.86% 291.96 4.70% 342.01 
730410 Pipes, line, iron or steel, smls 5.29% 145.04 0.00% 0.08 
490700 New stamps; stamp-impressed paper;  5.06% 356.71 0.00% 0.19 
090240 Black tea (fermented) 4.10% 297.13 0.09% 20.06 
080520 Mandarins, clementines, wilkings 4.04% 111.79 0.25% 11.37 
270900 Petroleum oils and oils obtained from 
bituminous minerals, crude 3.38% 0.95 2.57% 0.52 
090220 Green tea, nes 2.67% 982.51 0.06% 29.00 
220110 Mineral waters and aerated waters 2.46% 125.83 2.42% 123.95 
720211 Ferro-manganese, containing by weig 2.41% 322.08 0.40% 56.73 
100190 Spelt, common wheat and meslin 2.03% 5.22 0.63% 3.90 
220210 Waters (incl. mineral and aerated) 1.94% 53.43 2.32% 45.90 
730420 Casings,tubing&drill pipe,i/st,smls 1.68% 31.11 0.00% 0.00 
Total  62.99%  21.70%  
Average   189.50  44.38 
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Source: WITS. Note: data for 2006 – HS 2002 6-digit, for 1996 –HS 1996 6-digit
Appendix 1 Table 4. Top 15 export sectors by RCA in 1996, HS 6 digit 
HS code Description 
% share 
in total 
exports 
RCA 
% share in 
total 
exports 
RCA 
  1996 2006 
090220 Green tea, nes 2.67% 982.51 0.06% 29.00 
091040 Thyme, bay leaves 0.63% 808.29 0.13% 245.33 
283429 Nitrates of barium; of beryllium 1.08% 734.21 0.00% 0.00 
220810 Compound alcoholic preparations  0.27% 616.42 0.00% 0.00 
550610 Synthetic staple fibres, of nylon 0.28% 498.46 0.00% 0.00 
080221 Hazelnuts in shell, fresh or dried 0.25% 411.30 0.23% 351.44 
490700 New stamps; stamp-impressed paper;  5.06% 356.71 0.00% 0.19 
720211 Ferro-manganese, containing by weig 2.41% 322.08 0.40% 56.73 
090240 Black tea (fermented) 4.10% 297.13 0.09% 20.06 
310230 Ammonium nitrate 5.86% 291.96 4.70% 342.01 
283711 Cyanides and cyanide oxides 0.77% 245.17 0.38% 147.36 
440392 Beech (Fagus spp.) wood in the roug 0.88% 176.85 0.01% 4.58 
320642 Lithopone and other pigments 0.19% 146.17 0.01% 12.15 
730410 Pipes, line, iron or steel, smls 5.29% 145.04 0.003% 0.08 
282010 Manganese dioxide 0.33% 143.62 0.01% 5.50 
Total  30.07%  6.03%  
Average   411.73  62.67 
Source: WITS. Note: data for 2006 – HS 2002 6-digit, for 1996 –HS 1996 6-digit
Appendix 1 Table 5. Top 15 export sectors by export share in 2006, non-agricultural exports, HS
6 digit
HS code Description 
% share 
in non-
agri 
exports 
RCA 
% share in 
non-agri 
exports 
RCA 
  1996 2006 
720230 Ferro-silico-manganese 2.06% 98.21 11.09% 643.07 
260300 Copper ores and concentrates 9.63% 72.63 10.51% 38.15 
720449 Ferrous waste and scrap, iron or st 0.00% 0.00 7.25% 48.84 
710813 Gold in other semi-manufactured forms 0.00% 0.00 6.39% 40.33 
310230 Ammonium nitrate 8.39% 376.51 6.16% 418.63 
870323 Automobiles with reciprocating pist 0.00% 0.00 5.55% 2.76 
740400 Waste and scrap, copper 0.00% 0.00 3.99% 25.95 
270900 Petroleum oils and oils obtained from 
bituminous minerals, crude 4.85% 1.23 3.36% 0.64 
880230 Aircraft nes of an unladen weight > 0.00% 0.00 2.49% 16.24 
880211 Helicopters of an unladen weight no 0.00% 0.00 2.23% 142.06 
760200 Waste and scrap, aluminium 0.00% 0.00 1.83% 18.76 
720429 Waste and scrap, of alloy steel, othr 0.00% 0.00 1.63% 71.45 
440792 Beech (Fagus spp.) wood 0.01% 0.43 1.23% 172.09 
252321 White portland cement 0.00% 0.02 1.21% 323.07 
252390 Other hydraulic cements 0.00% 0.01 1.15% 262.74 
Total  24.94%  66.08%  
Average   36.60  148.32 
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Source: WITS. Note: data for 2006 – HS 2002 6-digit, for 1996 –HS 1996 6-digit.  
Appendix 1 Table 6. Top 15 export sectors by RCA in 1996, non-agricultural exports, HS 6 digit
HS code Description 
% share in 
non-agri 
exports 
RCA 
% share in 
non-agri 
exports 
RCA 
  1996 2006 
720230 Ferro-silico-manganese 2.06% 98.21 11.09% 643.07 
284590 Other isotopes  0.25% 171.86 0.61% 512.30 
310230 Ammonium nitrate 8.39% 376.51 6.16% 418.63 
252321 White portland cement 0.00% 0.02 1.21% 323.07 
252390 Other hydraulic cements, etc 0.00% 0.01 1.15% 262.74 
283711 Cyanides and cyanide oxides 1.10% 316.17 0.50% 180.38 
440792 Beech (Fagus spp.) wood 0.01% 0.43 1.23% 172.09 
880400 Parachutes and parts 0.02% 7.88 0.24% 158.38 
880211 Helicopters of an unladen weight 0.00% 0.00 2.23% 142.06 
731300 Wire, barbed, twisted hoop 0.00% 0.00 0.18% 130.12 
870490 Trucks nes 0.00% 1.24 0.42% 127.70 
360490 Signalling flares 0.00% 0.00 0.11% 87.79 
720429 Waste and scrap, of alloy steel 0.00% 0.00 1.63% 71.45 
720211 Ferro-manganese 3.45% 415.35 0.52% 69.44 
841210 Reaction engines nes 0.04% 9.62 0.24% 66.54 
Total  15.31%  27.53%  
Average   93.15  224.39 
Source: WITS. Note: data for 2006 – HS 2002 6-digit, for 1996 –HS 1996 6-digit
Appendix 1 Table 7. Top 15 export sectors to the EU27 by export share in 2006, HS 6 digit 
HS code Description 
% share in 
GE-EU 
exports 
RCA 
% share in 
GE-EU 
exports 
RCA 
  1996 2006 
260300 Copper ores and concentrates 41.53% 3405.21 26.87% 1353.55 
080222 Hazelnuts without shells  0.72% 127.29 17.99% 6012.56 
220210 Waters, including mineral waters 0.00% 0.00 8.27% 85.72 
270900 Petroleum oils and oils obtained from 
bituminous minerals, crude 0.00% 0.00 5.86% 8.09 
310230 Ammonium nitrate, whether or not  8.52% 493.93 5.21% 462.46 
842911 Self-propelled bulldozers and 
angledozers, track laying 0.00% 0.00 2.29% 100.69 
720230 Ferro-silico-manganese 5.61% 887.52 2.19% 410.73 
880230 Aeroplanes and other aircraft 0.00% 0.00 1.80% 20.15 
284590 Other isotopes  0.07% 72.98 1.69% 2577.85 
870410 Dumpers designed for off highway 
use 0.00% 0.00 1.59% 49.05 
842952 Machinery with a 360° revolving  0.00% 0.00 1.46% 9.26 
720421 Of stainless steel 0.00% 0.00 1.42% 12.09 
220421 Sparkling wine In containers holding 
2 l or less 2.29% 7.17 1.35% 5.11 
843143 Parts for boring or sinking machine 0.00% 0.00 1.31% 19.19 
200819 Other nuts and seeds including 
mixtures 0.00% 0.00 1.28% 101.87 
Total  58.74%  80.59%  
Average   332.94  748.56 
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Source: WITS. Note: data for 2006 – HS 2002 6-digit, for 1996 –HS 1996 6-digit
Appendix 1 Table 8. Top 15 export sectors to the EU27 by RCA in 2006, HS 6 digit
HS code Description 
% share in 
GE-EU 
exports 
RCA 
% share in 
GE-EU 
exports 
RCA 
  1996 2006 
080222 Hazelnuts without shells 0.72% 127.29 17.99% 6012.56 
284590 Other isotopes  0.07% 72.98 1.69% 2577.85 
080221 Hazelnuts in shell, fresh or dried 0.92% 1927.54 0.61% 1654.36 
260300 Copper ores and concentrates 41.53% 3405.21 26.87% 1353.55 
310230 Ammonium nitrate 8.52% 493.93 5.21% 462.46 
720230 Ferro-silico-manganese 5.61% 887.52 2.19% 410.73 
260200 Manganese ores and concentrates 0.00% 0.00 0.30% 269.81 
620413 
Women's or girls' suits Of synthetic 
fibres 0.37% 35.24 0.47% 236.94 
842920 Graders and levellers 0.00% 0.00 0.42% 136.72 
120999 Other seeds, fruit and spores 2.31% 1043.51 0.32% 113.37 
200819 
Other nuts and seeds including 
mixtures 0.00% 0.00 1.28% 101.87 
842911 
Self-propelled bulldozers and 
angledozers, track laying 0.00% 0.00 2.29% 100.69 
220210 Waters, including mineral waters 0.00% 0.00 8.27% 85.72 
720219 Ferro-manganese, nes 0.00% 0.00 0.17% 85.67 
110630 
Flour, meal and powder of products of 
Chapter 8 0.00% 0.00 0.15% 74.98 
Total  60.04%  68.23%  
Average   532.88  911.82 
Source: WITS. Note: data for 2006 – HS 2002 6-digit, for 1996 –HS 1996 6-digit
Appendix 1 Table 9. Top 15 export sectors to the EU27 by export share in 1996, HS 6 digit
HS code Description % share in 
GE-EU 
exports  
RCA % share in 
GE-EU 
exports  
RCA 
  1996 2006 
260300 Copper ores and concentrates 41.53% 3405.21 26.87% 1353.55 
271000 Petroleum oils, etc, (excl. crude) 14.65% 52.20 0.00% 0.00 
310230 Ammonium nitrate 8.52% 493.93 5.21% 462.46 
720230 Ferro-silicon-manganese 5.61% 887.52 2.19% 410.73 
283429 Nitrates of barium; of beryllium;  4.49% 2991.65 0.00% 0.00 
391190 Polysulphides, polysulphones  3.71% 26.50 0.00% 0.00 
200970 Apple juice, unfermented 3.43% 93.60 0.00% 0.00 
120999 Other seeds, fruit and spores 2.31% 1043.51 0.32% 113.37 
220421 Wine (not sparkling); grape  2.29% 7.17 1.35% 5.11 
845730 Multi-station transfer machines 1.93% 68.03 0.00% 0.00 
711290 Waste scrap of precious metal  1.56% 224.50 0.00%  0.00 
730410 Pipes, line, iron or steel, smls 1.05% 35.02 0.00% 0.04 
080221 Hazelnuts in shell, fresh or dried 0.92% 1927.54 0.61% 1654.36 
080222 Hazelnuts without shells 0.72% 127.29 17.99% 6012.56 
730791 Flanges, iron or steel, nes. 0.52% 25.34 0.00% 0.00 
Total  93.23%  54.54%   
Average   760.60  511.13 
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Appendix 1 Table 10. Top 15 export sectors to the EU27 by RCA in 1996, HS 6 digit
HS code Description % share in 
GE-EU 
exports  
RCA % share in 
GE-EU 
exports  
RCA 
  1996 2006 
220810 Compound alcoholic preparations 0.04% 16899.50 0.00% 0.00 
260300 Copper ores and concentrates 41.53% 3405.21 26.87% 1353.55 
283429 Nitrates of barium; of beryllium; 4.49% 2991.65 0.00% 0.00 
080221 Hazelnuts in shell, fresh or dried 0.92% 1927.54 0.61% 1654.36 
120999 Other seeds, fruit and spores 2.31% 1043.51 0.32% 113.37 
720230 Ferro-silico-manganese 5.61% 887.52 2.19% 410.73 
310230 Ammonium nitrate 8.52% 493.93 5.21% 462.46 
711290 Waste&scrap of precious metal  1.56% 224.50 0.00% 0.00 
091040 Thyme, bay leaves 0.10% 179.77 0.03% 53.51 
080120 Brazil nuts, fresh or dried 0.06% 171.20 0.00% 0.00 
080222 Hazelnuts without shells, fresh or  0.72% 127.29 17.99% 6012.56 
200970 Apple juice, unfermented 3.43% 93.60 0.00% 0.00 
845970 Threading or tapping machines nes 0.20% 82.09 0.00% 0.00 
520811 Unbleached plain cotton weave 0.26% 73.97 0.00% 0.00 
500390 Silk waste, carded or combed 0.02% 73.70 0.00% 0.00 
Total  69.75%  53.22%  
Average   1911.67  670.70 
Source: WITS. Note: data for 2006 – HS 2002 6-digit, for 1996 –HS 1996 6-digit.  
Appendix1 Table 11 Top 15 export sectors to the EU27 by export share in 2006, non-agricultural
exports, HS 6 digit
 
HS code Description 
% share in 
non-agri 
GE-EU 
exports 
RCA 
% share in 
non-agri GE-
EU exports  
RCA 
  1996 2006 
260300 Copper ores and concentrates 47.40% 3472.15 39.80% 1844.48 
270900 Petroleum oils and oils obtained from 
bituminous minerals, crude 0.00% 0.00 8.68% 11.02 
310230 Ammonium nitrate 9.72% 503.64 7.71% 630.19 
842911 Bulldozers and angledozers, crawler 0.00% 0.00 3.39% 137.20 
720230 Ferro-silico-manganese  6.40% 904.97 3.25% 559.70 
880230 Aircraft nes of an unladen weight > 0.00% 0.00 2.67% 27.45 
284590 Other isotopes and their inorganic  0.09% 74.42 2.50% 3512.84 
870410 Dump trucks designed for off-highway 0.00% 0.00 2.36% 66.84 
842952 Shovels and excavators with a 360 0.00% 0.00 2.16% 12.62 
720421 Waste and scrap, stainless steel 0.00% 0.00 2.11% 16.48 
843143 Parts of boring or sinking machinery 0.00% 0.00 1.94% 26.15 
711590 Articles of precious metal or of me 0.00% 0.00 1.58% 60.40 
740400 Waste and scrap, copper or copper  0.00% 0.00 0.94% 5.07 
330590 Preparations for use on the hair 0.00% 0.00 0.85% 12.60 
841229 Hydraulic power engines & motors nes 0.00% 0.00 0.83% 25.61 
Total  63.61%  80.76%  
Average   330.35  463.24 
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Appendix 1 Table 12. Top 15 export sectors to the EU27 by RCA in 2006, non-agricultural
exports, HS 6 digit
HS code Description % share in 
non-agri 
GE-EU 
exports  
RCA % share in 
non-agri 
GE-EU 
exports  
RCA 
  1996 2006 
284590 Other isotopes and their inorganic  0.09% 74.42 2.50% 3512.84 
260300 Copper ores and concentrates 47.40% 3472.15 39.80% 1844.48 
310230 Ammonium nitrate 9.72% 503.64 7.71% 630.19 
720230 Ferro-silico-manganese 6.40% 904.97 3.25% 559.70 
260200 Manganese ores and concentrates 0.00% 0.00 0.44% 367.67 
620413 Women's or girls' suits of synthetic 0.42% 35.94 0.70% 322.87 
842920 Graders and levellers, self-propellers 0.00% 0.00 0.62% 186.30 
842911 Bulldozers and angledozers, crawler 0.00% 0.00 3.39% 137.20 
720219 Ferro-manganese, nes 0.00% 0.00 0.25% 116.74 
870410 Dump trucks designed for off-highway 0.00% 0.00 2.36% 66.84 
842790 Trucks fitted with lifting or handl 0.00% 0.00 0.69% 63.78 
711590 Articles of precious metal or of me 0.00% 0.00 1.58% 60.40 
282090 Manganese oxides (excl. manganese 0.00% 0.00 0.04% 56.35 
440799 Wood, nes sawn or chipped lengthwis 0.00% 0.00 0.71% 47.68 
410221 Pickled skins of sheep or lambs 0.00% 0.00 0.03% 36.62 
Total  64.03%  64.06%  
Average   332.74  533.98 
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Appendix 1 Table 13. Top 15 export sectors of the EU27, 2006, HS 6 digit
HS code Description 
% share 
in total 
exports 
RCA 
HS 
code 
Description 
% share 
in total 
exports 
RCA 
 by export share   by RCA 
271000 Petroleum oils, etc, (excl. 
crude) 
3.45% 0.92 070521 Witloof chicory, fresh or 
chilled 
0.00% 2.47 
300490 Other medicaments of mixed or 
unmixed 
3.25% 1.86 040640 Blue-veined cheese 0.01% 2.47 
870323 Motor cars principally designed 
for the transport of persons 
with spark-ignition internal 
combustion reciprocating 
piston engine of a cylinder 
capacity > 1.500 cm³ but <= 
3.000 cm³  
2.23% 1.19 310490 Mineral or chemical 
fertilizers 
0.03% 2.46 
852520 Transmission apparatus 2.11% 1.21 120911 Sugar beet seed 0.01% 2.45 
870332 Motor cars principally designed 
for the transport of persons 
with compression-ignition 
internal combustion piston 
engine "diesel or semi-diesel" 
of a cylinder capacity > 1.500 
cm³ but <= 2.500 cm³  
1.92% 2.11 020731 Fresh or chilled fatty 
livers  
0.00% 2.45 
847330 Parts and accessories of 
automatic data processing 
machines or for other ma-
chines of heading 8471, n.e.s. 
1.13% 0.59 290260 Ethyl benzene 0.00% 2.43 
870899 Motor vehicle parts nes 1.10% 1.24 253020 Kieserite and epsomite 
"natural magnesium 
sulphates" 
0.00% 2.42 
870324 Motor cars principally designed 
for the transport of persons 
with spark-ignition internal 
combustion reciprocating 
piston engine of a cylinder 
capacity >3000 cm³ 
1.01% 0.86 151000 Other oils and their 
fractions 
0.01% 2.41 
880240 Aircraft nes of an unladen 
weight 
0.91% 1.14 220510 Vermouth and other 
wine of fresh grape 
0.01% 2.40 
854211 Monolithic integrated circuits 0.79% 0.42 550490 Artificial staple fibres 0.02% 2.40 
270900 Petroleum oils and oils 
obtained from bituminous 
minerals, crude 
0.72% 0.15 220850 Gin and Geneva 0.01% 2.39 
870322 Motor cars principally designed 
for the transport of persons 
with spark-ignition internal 
combustion reciprocating 
piston engine of a cylinder 
capacity > 1.000 cm³ but <= 
1.500 cm³ 
0.68% 1.45 870331 Motor cars principally 
designed for the 
transport of persons with 
compression-ignition 
internal combustion 
piston engine "diesel or 
semi-diesel" of a 
cylinder capacity <= 
1.500 cm³ 
0.41% 2.38 
852810 Television receivers 0.63% 0.90 250870 Chamotte or dinas earths 0.00% 2.38 
271121 Natural gas in gaseous state 0.63% 0.56 530121 Flax, broken or scotched 0.01% 2.37 
847191 Digital process units 0.57% 1.31 292141 Aniline and its salts 0.02% 2.37 
 Total 21.13%    0.54%  
 Average  1.06    2.42 
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Appendix1 Table 14  RCA correlation coefficients, HS 6 digit, 2006
 Georgia Armenia Azerbaijan  Ukraine Russia Iran Turkey 
Armenia 0.052 1      
Azerbaijan 0.094 -0.004 1     
Ukraine 0.031 0.016 0.001 1    
Russia 0.044 -0.005 0.014 0.061 1   
Iran -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.007 -0.009 1  
Turkey 0.195 -0.007 0.069 -0.019 -0.043 0.018 1 
EU27 -0.021 -0.022 -0.024 -0.131 -0.091 0.009 -0.059 
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Appendix 2
Sussex Framework 
– Additional Tables
Appendix 2 Table 1. Top 10 Georgia’s import and export sectors by main trade partners
Georgia top imports Georgia top exports 
HS code % HS code % 
Armenia 
25 - Salt; sulphur; earths and stone; plastering 
materials; lime and cement 
40.1% 17 - Sugars and sugar confectionery 
21.7% 
27 - Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products 
of their distillation 
13.2% 10 - Cereals 
16.0% 
9 - Coffee, tea, mate and spices 9.5% 31 - Fertilizers 12.9% 
39 - Plastics and articles thereof 5.3% 87 - Vehicles other than railway or 
tramway rolling-stock 11.1% 
70 - Class and glassware 4.9% 23 - Residues and waste from the food 
industries; prepared animal fodder 5.0% 
84 - Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and 
mechanical appliances 
4.4% 44 - Wood and articles of wood 
4.9% 
10 - Cereals 2.1% 33 - Essential oils and resinoids; 
perfumery, cosmetic or toilet preparations 4.6% 
4 - Dairy produce; birds' eggs; natural honey 1.7% 22 - Beverages, spirits and vinegar 3.4% 
22 - Beverages, spirits and vinegar 1.7% 30 - Pharmaceutical products 2.9% 
30 - Pharmaceutical products 1.6% 28 - Inorganic chemicals 1.7% 
Turkey 
84 - Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and 
mechanical appliances; parts thereof 
10.6% 72 - Iron and steel i. Primary materials, 
products in granular or powder form 49.2% 
39 -  Plastics and artcles thereof 10.3% 44 - Wood and articles of wood 8.1% 
85 - Electrical machinery and equipment and 
parts thereof 
9.4% 87 - Vehicles other than railway or 
tramway rolling-stock 7.3% 
73 - Articles of iron or steel 5.7% 74 - Copper and articles thereof 7.2% 
48 - Paper and paperboard; articles of paper 
pulp, of paper or of paperboard 
5.4% 76 - Aluminium and articles thereof 
7.2% 
87 - Vehicles other than railway or tramway 
rolling-stock 
3.5% 62 - Articles of apparel and clothing 
accessories, not knitted or crocheted 6.1% 
61 - Articles of apparel and clothing 
accessories, knitted or crocheted 
3.2% 84 - Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery 
and mechanical appliances; parts thereof 3.0% 
34 - Soap, organic surface- active agents, 
washing preparations 
2.9% 26 - Ores, slag and ash 
2.6% 
94 - Furniture 2.8% 70 - Class and glassware 2.4% 
62 - Articles of apparel and clothing 
accessories, not knitted or crocheted 
2.7% 41 - Raw hides and skins with or without 
hair (other than furskins) and leather 1.5% 
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Appendix 2 Table 1 cd. Top 10 Georgia’s import and export sectors by main trade partners
Georgia top imports Georgia top exports 
HS code % HS code % 
Russian Federation 
27 - Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of 
their distillation 
40.8% 22 - Beverages, spirits and vinegar 
44.5% 
10 - Cereals 12.2% 72 - Iron and steel i. Primary materials, 
products in granular or powder form 30.9% 
84 - Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and 
mechanical appliances; parts thereof 
3.6% 8 - Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruits 
or melons and watermelons 7.1% 
11 - Products of the milling industry; malt; 
starches; inulin; wheat gluten 
3.2% 86 - Railway or tramway locomotives, 
rolling-stock and parts thereof 5.0% 
85 - Electrical machinery and equipment and 
parts thereof 
3.1% 88 - Aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof 
4.4% 
87 - Vehicles other than railway or tramway 
rolling-stock, and parts and accessories thereof  
2.9% 26 - Ores, slag and ash 
1.0% 
24 - Tobacco and manufactured tobacco 
substitutes 
2.4% 85 - Electrical machinery and equipment 
0.9% 
22 - Beverages, spirits and vinegar 2.3% 84 - Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and 
mechanical appliances; parts thereof 0.8% 
19 - Preparations of cereals, flour, starch or 
milk; pastrycooks' products 
2.1% 87 - Vehicles other than railway or tramway 
rolling-stock 0.7% 
18 - Cocoa and cocoa preparations 2.1% 18 - Cocoa and cocoa preparations 0.6% 
Azerbaijan 
27 - Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of 
their distillation 
76.6% 87 - Vehicles other than railway or tramway 
rolling-stock 38.4% 
17 - Sugars and sugar confectionery 3.8% 25 - Salt; sulphur; earths and stone; plastering 
materials; lime and cement 31.2% 
39 - Plastics and articles thereof 1.8% 30 - Pharmaceutical products 5.0% 
61 - Articles of apparel and clothing 
accessories, knitted or crocheted 
1.5% 22 - Beverages, spirits and vinegar 
3.9% 
23 - Residues and waste from the food 
industries; prepared animal fodder 
1.4% 84 - Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and 
mechanical appliances; parts thereof 3.5% 
84 - Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and 
mechanical appliances; parts thereof 
1.3% 90 - Optical, photographic, cinematographic, 
measuring, checking, precision, medical or 
surgical instruments and apparatus 3.2% 
94 - Furniture 1.2% 17 - Sugars and sugar confectionery 2.4% 
28 - Inorganic chemicals 1.0% 73 - Articles of iron or steel 1.7% 
85 - Electrical machinery and equipment 0.9% 27 - Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products 
of their distillation 1.6% 
62 - Articles of apparel and clothing 
accessories, not knitted or crocheted 
0.8% 8 - Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruits 
or melons and watermelons 1.6% 
Ukraine 
72 - Iron and steel 15.9% 22 - Beverages, spirits and vinegar 60.7% 
85 - Electrical machinery and equipment and 
parts thereof 
7.0% 72 - Iron and steel i. Primary materials, 
products in granular or powder form 22.2% 
87 - Vehicles other than railway or tramway 
rolling-stock 
6.8% 8 - Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruits 
or melons and watermelons 7.6% 
73 - Articles of iron or steel 6.3% 87 - Vehicles other than railway or tramway 
rolling-stock 3.3% 
84 - Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and 
mechanical appliances; parts thereof 
4.9% 9 - Coffee, tea, mate and spices 
1.7% 
15 - Animal or vegetable fats and oils and their 
cleavage products 
4.8% 7 - Edible vegetables and certain roots and 
tubers 1.2% 
24 - Tobacco and manufactured tobacco 
substitutes 
4.1% 27 - Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products 
of their distillation 0.4% 
4 - Dairy produce; birds' eggs; natural honey 3.7% 29 - Organic chemicals 0.4% 
18 - Cocoa and cocoa preparations 3.7% 3 - Fish and crustaceans, molluscs and other 
aquatic invertebrates 0.3% 
27 - Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of 
their distillation 
3.5% 30 - Pharmaceutical products 
0.3% 
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Appendix 2 Table 1 cd. Top 10 Georgia’s import and export sectors by main trade partners
Georgia top imports Georgia top exports 
HS code % HS code % 
The US 
87 - Vehicles other than railway or tramway 
rolling-stock 
40.5% 72 - Iron and steel i. Primary materials, 
products in granular or powder form 52.5% 
85 - Electrical machinery and equipment and 
parts thereof 
14.5% 31 - Fertilizers 
32.3% 
2 - Meat and edible meat offal 9.2% 22 - Beverages, spirits and vinegar 4.9% 
10 - Cereals 5.7% 90 - Optical, photographic, cinematographic, 
measuring, checking, precision, medical or 
surgical instruments and apparatus 3.2% 
90 - Optical, photographic, cinematographic, 
measuring, checking, precision, medical or 
surgical instruments and apparatus 
5.1% 27 - Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products 
of their distillation 
2.3% 
84 - Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and 
mechanical appliances; parts thereof 
4.7% 84 - Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and 
mechanical appliances; parts thereof 1.1% 
3 - Fish and crustaceans, molluscs and other 
aquatic invertebrates 
3.4% 20 - Preparations of vegetables, fruit, nuts or 
other parts of plants 0.8% 
56 - Wadding, felt and nonwovens; special yarns; 
twine, cordage, ropes and cables and articles 
thereof 
2.1% 88 - Aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof 
0.6% 
62 - Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, 
not knitted or crocheted 
1.9% 9 - Coffee, tea, mate and spices 
0.6% 
30 - Pharmaceutical products 1.8% 85 - Electrical machinery and equipment 0.4% 
Iran 
27 - Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of 
their distillation 
24.5% 44 - Wood and articles of wood 
40.4% 
70 - Glass and glassware 11.6% 84 - Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and 
mechanical appliances; parts thereof 33.4% 
34 - Soap, organic surface- active agents, 
washing preparations 
9.9% 73 - Articles of iron or steel 
11.1% 
39 - Plastics and articles thereof 8.3% 72 - Iron and steel 7.7% 
63 - Other made-up textile articles; sets; worn 
clothing and worn textile articles; rags 
6.8% 76 - Aluminium and articles thereof 
2.8% 
69 - Ceramic products  2.8% 4 - Dairy produce; birds' eggs; natural honey 2.1% 
8 - Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruits or 
melons and watermelons 
2.7% 28 - Inorganic chemicals 
1.2% 
94 - Furniture 2.5% 87 - Vehicles other than railway or tramway 
rolling-stock 0.5% 
61 - Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, 
knitted or crocheted 
2.3% 21 - Miscellaneous edible preparations 
0.3% 
73 - Articles of iron or steel 2.1% 85 - Electrical machinery and equipment  0.3% 
United Arab Emirates 
85 - Electrical machinery and equipment  40.4% 84 - Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and 
mechanical appliances; parts thereof 41.6% 
87 - Vehicles other than railway or tramway 
rolling-stock 
15.9% 87 - Vehicles other than railway or tramway 
rolling-stock 29.9% 
84 - Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and 
mechanical appliances; parts thereof 
14.5% 74 - Copper and articles thereof 
11.3% 
94 - Furniture 3.5% 76 - Aluminium and articles thereof 7.0% 
69 - Ceramic products 3.4% 44 - Wood and articles of wood 4.8% 
95 - Toys, games and sports requisites 2.9% 94 - Furniture 1.5% 
73 - Articles of iron or steel 1.9% 85 - Electrical machinery and equipment  1.1% 
39 - Plastics and articles thereof 1.7% 72 - Iron and steel 0.6% 
63 - Other made-up textile articles; sets; worn 
clothing and worn textile articles; rags 
1.2% 78 - Lead and articles thereof 
0.6% 
82 - Tools, implements, cutlery, spoons and 
forks, of base metals 
1.1% 73 - Articles of iron or steel 
0.5% 
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Appendix 2 Table 1 cd. Top 10 Georgia’s import and export sectors by main trade partners
Georgia top imports Georgia top exports 
HS code % HS code % 
Turkmenistan 
27 - Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of 
their distillation 
99.1% 88 - Aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof 
63.3% 
39 - Plastics and articles thereof 0.5% 84 - Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and 
mechanical appliances; parts thereof 10.5% 
28 - Inorganic chemicals 0.3% 89 - Ships, boats and floating structures 10.5% 
88 - Aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof 0.1% 85 - Electrical machinery and equipment 3.3% 
87 - Vehicles other than railway or tramway 
rolling-stock 
0.0% 73 - Articles of iron or steel 
2.0% 
89 - Ships, boats and floating structures 0.0% 87 - Vehicles other than railway or tramway 
rolling-stock 1.8% 
49 - Printed books, newspapers, pictures and 
other products of the printing industry 
0.0% 49 - Printed books, newspapers, pictures and 
other products of the printing industry 1.7% 
25 - Salt; sulphur; earths and stone; plastering 
materials; lime and cement 
0.0% 72 - Iron and steel 
1.6% 
42 - Articles of leather 0.0% 40 - Rubber and articles thereof 1.4% 
36 - Explosives; pyrotechnic products; matches; 
pyrophoric alloys 
0.0% 36 - Explosives; pyrotechnic products; 
matches; pyrophoric alloys 1.2% 
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Appendix 3
Top 15 export sectors of Georgia’s
main partners: by export share and
RCA, 2006
Source: WITS
Appendix 3 Table 1. Top 15 export sectors of Armenia, 2006, HS 6 digit
HS code Description 
% share 
in total 
exports 
RCA HS code Description 
% share 
in total 
exports 
RCA 
 by export share   by RCA 
710239 
Diamonds, worked, but 
not mounted or set (excl. 
industrial diamonds) 24.07% 65.80 911180 
Cases for watches of 
materials other than 
precious metal 0.67% 1338.65 
720270 Ferromolybdenum 16.02% 502.08 911110 
Cases for watches of 
precious metal 0.56% 508.30 
260300 
Copper ores and 
concentrates 7.39% 28.71 720270 Ferromolybdenum 16.02% 502.08 
220820 
Spirits obtained by 
distilling grape wine 7.30% 232.69 400249 
Chloroprene 
"chlorobutadiene rubber, 
CR"                                    2.45% 468.46 
740200 
Unrefined copper; 
copper anodes 7.24% 127.03 284450 
Spent (irradiated) fuel 
elements 0.002% 245.03 
710813 
Gold, other semi 
manufactured forms 3.72% 25.16 220820 
Spirits obtained by 
distilling grape wine  7.30% 232.69 
711319 
Articles of jewellery of 
precious metal other 
than silver 3.44% 12.77 911430 
Dials for clocks or 
watches 0.31% 229.32 
400249 
Chloroprene 
"chlorobutadiene rubber, 
CR"                                  2.45% 468.46 030629 
Crustaceans, fit for 
human consumption 0.39% 197.33 
271600 Electrical energy 1.77% 6.30 810299 
Molybdenum and articles 
thereof nes 0.58% 144.27 
621210 Brassieres  1.75% 26.60 740200 
Unrefined copper; copper 
anodes 7.24% 127.03 
252329 Portland cement 1.71% 37.43 730590 
Tubes and pipes having 
circular cross-sections 0.11% 105.07 
261390 
Molybdenum ores and 
concentrates (excl. 
roasted) 1.63% 62.07 710239 
Diamonds, worked, but 
not mounted or set (excl. 
industrial diamonds) 24.07% 65.80 
710231 
Non-industrial diamonds 
unworked or simply 
sawn 1.23% 3.51 570190 
Carpets and other textile 
floor coverings, of textile 
materials 0.09% 63.17 
911180 
Cases for watches of 
materials other than 
precious metal 0.67% 1338.65 261390 
Molybdenum ores and 
concentrates (excl. 
roasted) 1.63% 62.07 
810299 
Molybdenum and 
articles thereof nes 0.58% 144.27 720291 
Ferro-titanium and ferro-
silico-titanium 0.32% 57.33 
 Total 80.97%    61.7%  
 Average  205.44    289.77 
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Appendix 3 Table 2. Top 15 export sectors of Azerbaijan, 2006, HS 6 digit
HS code Description 
% share in 
total 
exports 
RCA HS code Description 
% share in 
total 
exports 
RCA 
 by export share   by RCA 
270900 Petroleum oils and oils 
obtained from bituminous 
minerals, crude 
60.51% 12.2 151221 Crude cotton-seed oil 0.02% 238.5 
271000 Petroleum oils, etc, (excl. 
crude); 
23.67% 6.3 860620 Railway cars, insulated 
or refrigerators 
0.02% 99.5 
281820 Aluminium oxide, other 
than artific 
2.44% 26.7 121110 Liquorice roots, of a 
kind used  
0.02% 82.5 
760120 Aluminium unwrought, 
alloyed 
1.11% 5.5 382320 Naphthenic acids, their 
water-insol 
0.02% 76.1 
390110 Polyethylene having a 
specific grav 
0.93% 5.6 080222 Hazlenuts without 
shells, fresh 
0.69% 65.8 
080222 Hazelnuts without shells 0.69% 65.8 121291 Sugar beet, fresh or 
dried 
0.02% 57.7 
520100 Cotton, not carded or 
combed 
0.61% 8.8 230610 Oil-cake and other 
solid residues o 
0.02% 48.4 
890590 Floating docks and 
vessels 
0.58% 27.7 090230 Black tea (fermented) 0.28% 47.9 
890190 Cargo vessels nes and 
other vessels 
0.53% 1.7 151529 Maize (corn) oil (excl. 
crude)  
0.13% 37.0 
170199 Cane or beet sugar, in 
solid form,  
0.49% 5.4 230230 Brans, sharps and other 
residues 
0.10% 34.6 
081090 Other fruit, fresh, nes 0.46% 22.4 290512 Propan-1-ol (propyl 
alcohol) 
0.26% 29.6 
151620 Vegetable fats and oils 0.41% 16.1 890590 Floating docks and 
vessels 
0.58% 27.7 
391190 Polysulphides, 
polysulphones 
0.35% 6.3 841382 Liquid elevators 0.04% 27.4 
080810 Apples, fresh 0.30% 7.7 281820 Aluminium oxide, 
other than artific 
2.44% 26.7 
271600 Electrical energy 0.30% 1.1 081090 Other fruit, fresh, nes 0.46% 22.4 
 Total 93.40%    5.08%  
 Average  14.6    61.5 
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Appendix 3 Table 3. Top 15 export sectors of Russia, 2006, HS 6 digit
HS 
code 
Description 
% share 
in total 
exports 
RCA HS code Description 
% share 
in total 
exports 
RCA 
 by export share   by RCA 
270900 Petroleum oils and 
oils obtained from 
bituminous 
minerals, crude 
35.06% 7.1 251020 "Ground natural calcium 
phosphates, " 
0.06% 25.7 
271000 "Petroleum oils, etc, 
(excl. crude) 
16.04% 4.3 400231 Isobutene-isoprene (butyl) 
rubber 
0.11% 23.1 
271121 Natural gas in 
gaseous state 
15.53% 13.6 400260 Isoprene rubber 0.10% 21.6 
750210 "Nickel unwrought, 
not alloyed" 
1.98% 13.8 310540 Ammonium 
dihydrogenorthophosphate  
0.15% 19.9 
760110 "Aluminium 
unwrought, not 
alloyed" 
1.61% 7.7 252400 Asbestos 0.05% 16.9 
270112 "Bituminous coal, 
not agglomerated" 
1.42% 3.5 440320 Untreated coniferous wood 0.91% 16.6 
720712 "Semi-fin prod, iron 
or n-al steel" 
1.16% 10.4 750220 "Nickel unwrought, alloyed" 0.16% 16.1 
440320 Untreated 
coniferous wood 
0.91% 16.6 283030 Cadmium sulphide 0.00% 15.9 
740811 Wire of refined 
copper 
0.83% 5.6 310551 Mineral or chemical 
fertilizers con 
0.02% 15.8 
440710 Coniferous wood 
sawn or chipped  
0.81% 3.7 720249 "Ferro-chromium, nes" 0.08% 15.1 
760120 Aluminium 
unwrought, alloyed 
0.72% 3.6 470411 Unbleached coniferous 
chemical wood 
0.00% 14.9 
710231 Diamonds non-
industrial unworked 
0.62% 2.5 284130 Sodium dichromate 0.02% 14.5 
740311 Copper cathodes and 
sections of cat 
0.59% 1.5 722820 Bars and rods of silico-
manganese 
0.04% 14.0 
720449 "Ferrous waste and 
scrap, iron or steel" 
0.57% 4.1 750210 "Nickel unwrought, not 
alloyed" 
1.98% 13.8 
720824 "Flat rlld prod, i/nas, 
in coil, hr," 
0.53% 4.0 271121 Natural gas in gaseous state 15.53% 13.6 
 Total 78.39%    19.22%  
 Average  6.8    17.2 
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Appendix3 Table 4 Top 15 export sectors of Turkey, 2006, HS 6 digit
HS code Description 
% share 
in total 
exports 
RCA HS code Description 
% share in 
total 
exports 
RCA 
 by export share   by RCA 
721420 
Bars&rods,i/nas,hr,hd 
or he,cntg in 
7.11% 68.9 080222 Hazelnuts without 
shells 
2.05% 195.43 
610910 
T-shirts, singlets and 
other vests 
5.45% 31.9 081310 Dried apricots 0.42% 192.11 
852810 
Television receivers 
including vide 
3.70% 5.3 080420 Figs, fresh or dried 0.29% 141.80 
620462 
Women's or girls' 
trousers, breeches 
2.67% 18.3 520291 Garnetted stock of 
cotton 
0.04% 139.08 
711319 
Art. of jewellery and pts 
thereof o 
2.52% 9.3 091040 Thyme, bay leaves 0.06% 102.59 
080222 
Hazelnuts without 
shells 
2.05% 195.4 252910 Felspar 0.19% 101.66 
620342 
Men's or boys' trousers, 
breeches  
1.81% 13.2 121230 Apricot, peach or plum 
stones 
0.02% 90.13 
611020 
Jerseys, pullovers, etc, 
of cotton, 
1.81% 14.4 080620 Dried grapes 0.66% 89.08 
680291 
Worked 
monumental/building 
stone nes 
1.40% 79.4 551110 Yarn, with >=85% 
synthetic staple 
0.10% 80.68 
611592 
Hosiery and footwear, 
of cotton 
1.34% 43.6 620891 Women's or girls' 
dressing gowns 
0.33% 80.06 
630260 
Toilet linen and kitchen 
linen, of  
1.29% 35.1 680291 Worked 
monumental/building 
stone nes 
1.40% 79.40 
610990 
T-shirts, singlets, etc, of 
other t 
1.17% 18.1 251511 Marble and travertine 
crude or rough 
0.37% 74.03 
240110 
Tobacco, not 
stemmed/stripped 
1.12% 64.1 120791 Poppy seeds 0.09% 71.67 
570330 
Tufted floor coverings 
of man-made  
1.04% 44.6 630539 Sacks and bags, used 
for packing 
0.54% 69.78 
710812 
Gold in unwrought 
forms non-monetary 
1.01% 3.4 721420 Bars&rods,i/nas,hr,hd 
or he,cntg in 
7.11% 68.89 
 Total 35.49%    13.68%  
 Average  43.0    105.1 
207
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND GEORGIA 
CASE Network Reports No. 79/2008
Source: WITS, Note: * excluding exports less than 0.01%.
Appendix 3 Table 5. Top 15 export sectors of Ukraine, 2006, HS 6 digit
HS 
code 
Description 
% share 
in total 
exports 
RCA HS code Description 
% share 
in total 
exports* 
RCA 
 by export share   by RCA 
271000 "Petroleum oils, 
etc, (excl. crude);" 
4.39% 1.2 
392041 
Plates of polymers of 
vinyl chl 0.01% 281.0 
720712 "Semi-fin prod,iron 
or n-al steel,re" 
4.19% 37.3 
480522 
Multi-ply paper with 
only one ou 0.01% 277.8 
720711 "Semi-fin 
prod,i/nas,rect/sq 
cross-s" 
4.05% 65.8 
151211 
Crude sunflower-seed 
and safflower 
2.08% 139.7 
721420 "Bars&rods,i/nas,hr
,hd or he,cntg in" 
3.16% 30.6 
720450 
"Remelting scrap 
ingots, of iron or " 
0.11% 129.1 
720720 "Semi-fin prod, 
iron or non-alloy 
st" 
2.89% 71.3 
721020 
"Flat rlld prod, plated 
or coated wit" 
0.04% 128.6 
720842 "Flat rolled prod, 
i/nas, not in coi" 
2.80% 23.4 
250830 
Fire-clay 0.29% 117.4 
151211 Crude sunflower-
seed and safflower 
2.08% 139.
7 230630 
Oil-cake and other 
solid residues 
0.32% 117.3 
720824 "Flat rlld prod, 
i/nas, in coil, hr," 
2.04% 15.5 
860610 
"Railway tank cars, 
not self-propell" 
0.73% 108.9 
310210 Urea 1.97% 46.3 
410410 
"Whole bovine skin 
leather" 
0.15% 92.1 
721331 "Bars/rods,i/nas,hr,i
n irreg wnd coi" 
1.92% 26.4 
860699 
Railway cars nes 0.35% 79.8 
100190 "Spelt, common 
wheat and meslin" 
1.57% 9.7 
720230 
Ferro-silico-
manganese 
1.25% 77.8 
730511 "Pipe,line,i or 
s,longitudinally 
sub" 
1.56% 32.4 
860630 
"Railway cars, self-
discharging, oth" 
0.32% 75.6 
100300 Barley 1.49% 47.1 
720720 
"Semi-fin prod, iron 
or non-alloy st" 
2.89% 71.3 
720843 "Flat rlld prod, 
i/nas, not in coil," 
1.29% 34.2 
860692 
"Railway cars, open, 
with non-removal" 
0.25% 66.5 
720230 Ferro-silico-
manganese 
1.25% 77.8 
720711 
Semi-fin 
prod,i/nas,rect/sq 
cross-s 
4.05% 65.8 
  Total 36.64%    12.86%  
 Average  43.9    121.9 
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Appendix 3 Table 6. Top 15 export sectors of Iran, 2005, HS 6 digit
HS 
code 
Description 
% share 
in total 
exports 
RCA 
HS 
code 
Description 
% share 
in total 
exports 
RCA 
 by export share  by RCA 
270900 Petroleum oils and 
oils obtained from 
bituminous 
minerals, crude 
83.48% 16.9 091020 Saffron 0.16% 497.8 
080250 "Pistachio, fresh or 
dried" 
1.25% 207.4 720610 Ingots, iron or non-
alloy steel 
0.58% 441.7 
570110 Carpets and other 
textile floor cov 
0.80% 142.8 570292 Non-pile floor 
coverings of man-
made 
0.17% 223.7 
720610 "Ingots, iron or 
non-alloy steel, of" 
0.58% 441.7 080250 "Pistachio, fresh or 
dried" 
1.25% 207.4 
271000 "Petroleum oils, 
etc, (excl. crude);" 
0.54% 0.1 293212 2-Furaldehyde 
(furfuraldehyde) 
0.06% 170.2 
720822 "Flat rlld prod, 
i/nas, in coil, hr" 
0.50% 11.2 251120 Natural barium 
carbonate (whitherit 
0.00% 152.0 
271112 "Propane, 
liquefied" 
0.45% 6.8 570110 Carpets and other 
textile floor cov 
0.80% 142.8 
270750 Aromatic 
hydrocarbon 
mixtures which 
0.45% 10.2 280200 "Sulphur, sublimed 
or precipitated; " 
0.07% 83.8 
271111 "Natural gas, 
liquefied" 
0.44% 1.4 610799 "Men's or boys' 
dressing gowns, 
0.01% 68.6 
760110 "Aluminium 
unwrought, not 
alloyed" 
0.40% 1.9 080410 "Dates, fresh or 
dried" 
0.12% 60.7 
081090 Other fruit, fresh, 
nes 
0.38% 18.4 010420 Live goats 0.04% 55.7 
290511 Methanol (methyl 
alcohol) 
0.33% 8.6 410512 "Sheep, lamb skin 
leather, non-veg. " 
0.11% 50.4 
271113 "Butanes, 
liquefied" 
0.33% 7.0 570299 Non-pile floor 
coverings of textile 
0.05% 46.6 
290220 Benzene 0.32% 6.9 570210 "Kelem, Schumacks, 
Karamanie and other" 
0.02% 28.9 
290243 p-Xylene 0.26% 3.8 080620 Dried grapes 0.20% 26.6 
 Total 90.52%    3.63%  
 Average  59.0    150.4 
The sample consists of 102 exporting firms. Thereof, 81 firms exported to the EU
and the 21 -- at least to CIS countries. Appendix4 Figure 1 shows that the majority of
firms in the sample are rather small -- 82 firms have less than 26 employees.
Furthermore, all firms are private and fully Georgian-owned.
Most of the surveyed firms have rather high export shares in production. Seventy-
eight of them reported an export share of 100 %. The shares seem to vary a little bit
with the size of the firms. On average, small firms tend to have a little bit larger export
shares (Appendix 4 Figure 2). However, the smaller export shares for firms with more
than 101 employees should not be overrated, since here are only two observations
available.
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Appendix 4
Description of the sample and
questionnaire
Source: Survey Results
Appendix 4 Figure 1 Distribution of firms by size
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With regard to export destinations of the surveyed firms within the EU, old EU
members are clearly dominating. Firms reported 162 export relationships with the
EU15 countries, but only 35 export relationships with six out of the twelve new EU
members. Germany (54 % of the respondents sell there) is the far most important
export destination, followed by Italy (25 %) and Austria as well as the Netherlands
(each 22 %). Within the group of new EU members Latvia is reported as export
destination by 12 % of the firms. However, taking all three Baltic countries together
yields a quota of 24 %. 
The sample looks quite representative in terms of the geographical distribution of
exports. The left panel of Appendix4 Figure 3 shows the export destinations of all
surveyed firms, while the right panel contains the geographical distribution of
Georgian exports in 2006 according to Statistics Georgia. The visual inspection already
reveals that the rankings of EU export partners in both graphs broadly correspond to
each other. The rank correlation coefficient (between the rank of a certain EU export
destination in the sample and according to Statistics Georgia) is 0.74, which allows us
to assume that the sample is at least for the EU countries with regard to the
geographical distribution of exports to a large extent representative. With regard to the
other export destinations reported by the surveyed firms, the correspondence to the
official statistics is not so large: the rank correlation coefficient is only 0.35. However,
since only trade to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, Ukraine and other CIS countries is
analysed in-depth, the bias might be tenable.
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Source: Survey Results
Appendix 4 Figure 2. Distribution of firms by size and share of exports
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Source: Survey Results, Statistics 
Appendix 4 Figure 3. Export destinations of surveyed firms vs. geographical distribution of
Georgian exports in 2006
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Appendix 4 Figure 4. Duration of trade relations
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Trade relations of the reporting firms with EU countries are in most cases rather
young. Asked how long they had been exporting to the EU, 48 % answered one to three
years, 38 % between three and five years and only 14 % more than five years.
Appendix4 Figure 4 shows that the trade relations of small firms have a particularly
short duration. However, for firms with more than 25 employees, the sample size is too
small for a reliable comparison of distributions.
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QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
My name is _______________________ I represent research company _________.  Currently, we 
are conducting an exporter survey. The goal of the study is to evaluate the implications of a possible 
Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and your country.  Our research company 
conducts the interview at the request of European Union in collaboration with Center for Social and 
Economic Research (CASE, Poland) and Global Insight, Inc. (USA). The interview is anonymous; 
the results of the interview will be aggregated and presented to the public. The length of the 
interview is about 45 minutes.  Would you agree to answer the questions? 
 
WHAT IS YOUR POSITION? 
 
Chief Manager/owner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Deputy Chief Manager . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Head of export department . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Head of sales department . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Export manager . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Sale manager . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Other PLEASE SPECIFY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
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INFORMATION ON THE COMPANY 
 
1. What is the ownership of your company? Please, mark one:  
 
1.1 state-owned    
1.2 private  
1.3 mixed  
 
2. Is there foreign origin capital in the capital founding your company? 
 
2.1 Yes    
2.2 No (Go to Question 6)  
2.3 Do not know (Go to Question 6)  
 
3. What share of the capital founding your company is the foreign origin capital?  
 
3.1   Please write down _______________ %   
 
4.  Is there EU-origin capital in the capital founding your company?  
 
4.1 Yes    
4.2 No (Go to Question 6)  
4.3 Do not know (Go to Question 6)  
 
5.  What share of the capital founding your company comes from the EU? 
 
5.1   Please write down _______________ %   
 
6. Does your company possess any of the following certificates: 
 
 Yes  No 
 1  2 
6.1 ISO: 9000      
6.2 ISO: 14000                
 
7. How many employees are working full-time in your company? Please, mark one: 
 
7.1   1 – 9  
7.2   10 - 25   
7.3   26 - 50   
7.4  51 - 100    
7.5  101 and more   
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8.For how long has your company been operating?  
 
8.1   <1 year    
8.2   1-2 years  
8.3   3-5 years   
8.4  6-10 years    
8.5  11-15 years  
8.6  >15 years  
8.7  Do not know   
 
9. What was the turnover of your company in 2006?  
 
9.1   Please, enter in local currency _____  
 
INFORMATION ON EXPORT ACTIVITIES 
 
10. Choose those sectors of economy that your company is in. Please, mark maximum three 
sectors: 
10.1 A   Agriculture, hunting and forestry   
10.2. 01   Agriculture, hunting and related service activities  
10.3. 02   Forestry, logging and related service activities   
10.4. B   Fishing   
10.5. 05   Fishing, aquaculture and service activities incidental to fishing   
10.6. C   Mining and quarrying   
10.7. 10   Mining of coal and lignite; extraction of peat   
10.8. 11   Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas; service activities incidental 
to oil and gas extraction, excluding surveying 
 
10.9. 12   Mining of uranium and thorium ores  
10.10. 13   Mining of metal ores  
10.11. 14   Other mining and quarrying  
10.12. D   Manufacturing   
10.13. 15   Manufacture of food products and beverages  
10.14. 16   Manufacture of tobacco products  
10.15. 17   Manufacture of textiles  
10.16. 18   Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur   
10.17. 19   Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags, 
saddlery, harness and footwear 
 
10.18. 20   Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; 
manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials  
 
10.19. 21   Manufacture of paper and paper products  
10.20. 22   Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media   
10.21. 23   Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel  
10.22. 24   Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products  
10.23. 25   Manufacture of rubber and plastics products  
10.24. 26  metallic mineral products  
10.25. 27   Manufacture of basic metals  
10.26. 28   Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and 
equipment 
 
10.27. 29   Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.   
10.28. 30   Manufacture of office, accounting and computing machinery  
10.29. 31   Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.   
10.30. 32   Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and 
apparatus 
 
10.31. 33   Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and 
clocks 
 
10.32. 34   Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi trailers   
10.33. 35   Manufacture of other transport equipment  
10.34. 36   Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.   
10.35. 37   Recycling  
10.36. E   Electricity, gas and water supply   
10.37. 40   Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply  
10.38. 41   Collection, purification and distribution of water   
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INFORMATION ON EXPORT CAPACITY AND CONDITIONS OF THE COMPANY 
 
11. Please, specify your status: 
 
11.1 current exporter to the EU   
11.2 exported to the EU last year but do not export now  
 
12. For how many years have you been exporting your goods to the EU?  
 
12.1 1-3 years  
12.2 3-5 years  
12.3 more than 5 years  
 
13. Please, specify what percentage of your total sales you exported during last year  
 
13.1 Please write down _______________ %  
 
14. What percentage of your total export volume do you send to EU 
 
14.1 Please write down _______________ %  
 
15. What percentage of your total export volume do you send to each CIS country:  
15.1 Please write down country code (provided in Question 17) _______________  
15.2 Please write down _______________ %  
15.3 Please write down country code (provided in Question 17) _______________  
15.4 Please write down _______________ %  
15.5 Please write down country code (provided in Question 17) _______________  
15.6 Please write down _______________ %  
15.7 Please write down country code (provided in Question 17) _______________  
15.8 Please write down _______________ %  
15.9 Pease write down country code (provided in Question 17) _______________  
15.10 Please write down _______________ %  
 
 
16. Please check the specific countries where you export (exported): 
       
 EU countries and Turkey  
16.1.  Austria  
16.2.  Belgium  
16.3.  Bulgaria  
16.4.  Cyprus  
16.5.  Czech Republic  
16.6.  Denmark   
16.7.  Estonia  
16.8.  Finland  
16.9.  France  
16.10.  Germany  
16.11.  Greece  
16.12.  Hungary  
16.13.  Ireland  
16.14.  Italy  
16.15.  Latvia  
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16.16 Lithuania  
16.17. Luxembourg  
16.18.  Malta  
16.19.  Netherlands  
16.20.  Poland  
16.21.  Portugal  
16.22.  Romania  
16.23.  Slovakia  
16.24.  Slovenia  
16.25.  Spain  
16.26.  Sweden   
16.27.         Turkey  
16.28.  United Kingdom  
   
16.29.  Non-EU countries  
16.30.  Georgia (for the survey in Armenia)  
16.31.  Armenia (for the survey in Georgia)  
16.32.  Azerbaijan (for the survey in Georgia)  
16.33.  Ukraine  
16.34.  Russia  
16.35.  Other CIS  
16.36.  Iran  
16.37.  UAE  
16.38.  USA and Canada  
16.39.  Other (specify) ____________   
 
17. Which group of products do you export (exported, plan to export) to the EU market:  
 
17.1 A   Agriculture, hunting and forestry   
17.2. 01   Agriculture, hunting and related service activities  
17.3. 02   Forestry, logging and related service activities  
17.4. B   Fishing   
17.5. 05   Fishing, aquaculture and service activities incidental to f ishing  
17.6. C   Mining and quarrying   
17.7. 10   Mining of coal and lignite; extraction of peat   
17.8. 11   Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas; service activities incidental 
to oil and gas extraction, excluding surveying 
 
17.9. 12   Mining of uranium and thorium ores  
17.10. 13   Mining of metal ores  
17.11. 14   Other mining and quarrying  
17.12. D   Manufacturing   
17.13. 15   Manufacture of food products and beverages  
17.14. 16   Manufacture of tobacco products  
17.15. 17   Manufacture of textiles  
17.16. 18   Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur   
17.17. 19   Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags, 
saddlery, harness and footwear 
 
17.18. 20   Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; 
manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials  
 
17.19. 21   Manufacture of paper and paper products  
17.20. 22   Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media   
17.21. 23   Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel   
17.22. 24   Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products  
17.23. 25   Manufacture of rubber and plastics products  
17.24. 26  metallic mineral products  
17.25. 27   Manufacture of basic metals  
17.26. 28   Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and 
equipment 
 
17.27. 29   Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.  
17.28. 30   Manufacture of office, accounting and computing machinery  
17.29. 31   Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.   
17.30. 32   Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and 
apparatus 
 
17.31. 33   Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and 
clocks 
 
17.32. 34   Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi trailers  
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17.33 35   Manufacture of other transport equipment  
17.34 36   Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.  
17.35 37   Recycling  
17.46 E   Electricity, gas and water supply   
17.37 40   Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply  
17.38 41   Collection, purification and distribution of water  
 
 
RULES OF ORIGINS 
 
18. Did you obtain a certificate of origin valid on EU market issued by the Chamber of Commerce 
in the last year? 
 
18.1 Yes  
18.2 No (Go to Question 24)   
18.3 Do not know/Do not know about this certificate (Go to Question 24)  
 
19.   How often do you have to obtain a certificate of origin?  
 
19.1 Indicate the number of times per year here:  _______  
  
20. Indicate how much on average does a certificate of origin for one delivery cost to your company  
 
20.1 Indicate the amount in local currency:  _______  
 
21. How important are the costs of obtaining the rules of origin certificate valid in the EU for your 
company? 
 
21.1 not at all important  
21.2 somewhat important  
21.3 important  
21.4 very important                
 
22. Did you have any difficulties in obtaining a certificate of origin or/and technical and quality 
standards certification, such as: 
 
22.1 time-consuming procedure  
22.2 costly procedure  
22.3 unclear or uncertain regulations  
22.4 other, please specify  ____________,  
22.5 other, please specify  ____________,  
22.6 other, please specify  ____________,  
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CUSTOMS PROCEDURES 
 
23. Indicate the amount (in the local currency) spent in 2006 to pass export customs of your home 
country? (If answer this question, then skip Q25) 
 
23.1 Indicate the amount in local currency:  _______  
 
24. Indicate the percent of export value you spent to pass export customs of your home country 
 
24.1 Indicate the percentage  _______ %  
 
25. How many hours/days does your carrier spend at your country’s border while exporting 
products? 
 
25.1 less than one day (indicate number of hours__________)  
25.2 one day  
25.3 more than one day (indicate the number of days_______________)  
 
26. Indicate the amount (in the local currency) spent in 2006 to pass import customs procedures in 
the EU destination country? (If answer to this question, then skip Q28) 
 
26.1 Indicate the amount in local currency:  _______  
 
27. Indicate the percent of export value you spent to pass export customs of EU destination 
country? 
 
27.1 Indicate the percentage  _______ %  
 
28. How many hours/days does your carrier spend at EU border while exporting products? 
 
28.1 less than one day (indicate number of hours__________)  
28.2 one day  
28.3 more than one day (indicate the number of days_______________)  
 
29. What are the main obstacles related to passing import customs procedures in the EU market: 
 
29.1 time-consuming procedure  
29.2 costly procedure  
29.3 unclear or uncertain regulations  
29.4 other, please specify  ____________, ____________, ______________  
29.5 no problems encountered  
29.6 cannot say  
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30. Indicate the amount (in the local currency) spent in 2006 to pass import customs procedures in 
CIS countries? (If export to CIS countries)  
30.1 Please write down country code (provided in Question 17) _______________  
30.2 Indicate the amount in local currency:  _______  
30.3 Please write down country code (provided in Question 17) _______________  
30.4 Indicate the amount in local currency:  _______  
30.5 Please write down country code (provided in Question 17) _______________  
30.6 Indicate the amount in local currency:  _______  
30.7 Please write down country code (provided in Question 17) _______________  
30.8 Indicate the amount in local currency:  _______  
30.9 Please write down country code (provided in Question 17) _______________  
30.10 Indicate the amount in local currency:  _______  
 
31. Indicate the percentage of export value you spent to pass import customs procedures in CIS 
countries? 
 
31.1 Please write down country code (provided in Question 17) _______________  
31.2 Indicate the percentage  _______ %  
31.3 Please write down country code (provided in Question 17) _______________  
31.4 Indicate the percentage  _______ %  
31.5 Please write down country code (provided in Question 17) _______________  
31.6 Indicate the percentage  _______ %  
31.7 Please write down country code (provided in Question 17) _______________  
31.8 Indicate the percentage  _______ %  
31.9 Please write down country code (provided in Question 17) _______________  
31.10 Indicate the percentage  _______ %  
 
32. How many hours/days does your carrier spend at CIS country border while exporting products?  
 
32.1 Please write down country code (provided in Question 17) _______________  
32.2 less than one day (indicate number of hours__________)  
32.3 one day  
32.4 more than one day (indicate the number of days_______________)  
32.5 Please write down country code (provided in Question 17) _______________  
32.6 less than one day (indicate number of hours__________)  
32.7 one day  
32.8 more than one day (indicate the number of days_______________)  
32.9 Please write down country code (provided in Question 17) _______________  
32.10 less than one day (indicate number of hours__________)  
32.11 one day  
32.12 more than one day (indicate the number of days_______________)  
32.13 Please write down country code (provided in Question 17) 
_______________ 
 
32.14 less than one day (indicate number of hours__________)  
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32.15 one day  
32.16 more than one day (indicate the number of days_______________)   
32.17 Please write down country code (provided in Question 17) 
_______________ 
 
32.18 less than one day (indicate number of hours__________)  
32.19 one day  
32.20 more than one day (indicate the number of days_______________)   
 
TECHNICAL REGULATIONS 
 
33. Must your company meet domestic technical regulations in order to sell in domestic market:  
33.1 Yes  
33.2 No  
33.3 Do not sell in domestic market  
33.4 Do not know  
 
34. Must your company meet domestic technical regulations in order to sell in the EU market:  
34.1 Yes  
34.2 No (Go to Question 57)   
34.3 Do not know (Go to Question 57)  
 
35. How expensive is the compliance with the domestic technical r egulations compared to foreign 
technical regulations for your exports? Would you say that they are….?  
Technical regulations Much less 
expensive 
Less 
expensive 
About the 
same 
More 
expensive 
Much 
more 
expensive 
Not 
applicable 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
35.1 performance       
35.2 product quality       
35.3 testing and 
certification 
      
35.4 consumer safety       
35.5 labeling       
35.6 health/environment       
 
36. What types of EU technical standards are the most burdensome and expensive for your 
company? Standards which relate to: 
Technical regulations Not at all 
important 
Somewhat 
important 
Important Very 
important 
Not 
applicable 
 1 2 3 4 5 
36.1 performance      
36.2 product quality      
36.3 testing and 
certification 
     
36.4 consumer safety      
36.5 labeling      
36.6 health/environment      
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37. What was the approximate cost of meeting the EU requirements in local currency last year? (If 
answer this question, skip next question) 
  1 2 
37.1 Product characteristics requirement   
37.2 Marking, labeling, and packaging requirements   
37.3 Other technical requirements   
 
 
38. What was the approximate cost of meeting the EU requirements as a percentage of your total 
sales over the last year? 
  1 2 
38.1 Product characteristics requirement   
38.2 Marking, labeling, and packaging requirements   
38.3 Other technical requirements   
 
39. How would you evaluate the ease of access to the necessary information?  
39.1 easy  
39.2 not very easy  
39.3 difficult  
39.4 information is not available  
 
 
TESTING FOR CONFORMITY WITH TECHNICAL REGULATIONS 
 
40. Are your products tested for conformity with the foreign technical regulations before they are 
shipped to the EU? 
40.1 Yes  
40.2 No (Go to Question 57)   
40.2 Do not know (Go to Question 57)  
 
41. How important the costs of testing the products for your company? 
41.1 not at all important   
41.2 somewhat important  
41.3 important  
41.4 very important  
 
42. Are test results and conformity certificates issued domestically accepted by customs authorities 
of the EU countries? 
42.1 yes  
42.2 no  
 
43. Were your products tested for conformity with the EU technical regulations in the destination 
country over the last year? 
43.1 Yes  
43.2 No (Go to Question 57)   
43.3 Do not know (Go to Question 57)  
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44. In your opinion, how important are the costs of testing for conformity with the EU technical 
regulations in the destination country for your company? 
 44.1 Not at all important  
44.2 Somewhat important  
44.3 Important  
44.4 Very important  
44.5 Cannot say  
 
45. If you export to more than one country in the EU do you need to have several product testing?  
45.1 Yes  
45.2 No   
 
46. What is the cost of product testing (if answer, skip next question) 
46.1 Indicate the amount in local currency:  _______  
 
47. What is the cost of product testing as percentage of the last year sales 
47.1 Indicate the percentage  _______ %  
 
48. If your product meets both domestic and foreign technical requirements, what is the extent of 
duplication of effort involved in testing for both requirements?  
48.1 no duplication  
48.2 minor duplication  
48.3 significant duplication  
48.4 complete duplication (two tests are required)  
 
49. How many days on average does technical regulations conformity inspection usually last upon 
arrival at EU country? 
49.1  1 day of less  
49.2  2 to 4 days  
49.3  5 to 6 days  
49.4  6 to 14 days  
49.5  more than 14 days  
 
SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY MEASURES  
 
For those who are not working in food sector skip this section 
 
50. Did your company implement the HACCP system? 
50.1 Yes  
50.2 No   
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51. If exporting to the EU, do you encounter sanitary and phytosanitary regulations which are 
burdensome for the company?  
51.1 Yes  
51.2 No (If choose this option, skip next question)  
 
52. Indicate which types of regulations you perceive as impediments to your exports 
52.1 certification  
52.2 quarantine  
52.3 other, please specify  ____________,  
52.4 other, please specify  ____________,  
52.5 other, please specify  ____________,  
 
53. What amount in the local currency was spent in 2006 to ensu re compliance with the respective 
sanitary and phytosanitary EU regulations? (If answer, skip the next question)  
53.1 Indicate the amount in local currency:  _______  
 
54. How much was spent in 2006 to ensure compliance with the respective sanitary and 
phytosanitary as percent of Export value to EU?  
54.1 Indicate the percentage  _______ %  
 
55. How important the costs of meeting the sanitary and phyto-sanitary regulations in the EU for 
your company? 
55.1 not at all important  
55.2 somewhat important  
55.3 important  
55.4 very important  
 
 
OTHER TYPES OF NTBS 
 
56. Are your company’s exports to the EU market subject to one of the measures from the list 
below? 
 Yes  No 
 1  2 
56.1 Antidumping duties    
56.2 Countervailing duties    
56.3 Other measures affecting price (i.e. minimum import 
prices, voluntary export price restraints)  
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57. If yes, how would you evaluate the degree of restrictiveness of the above measures for your 
export activities?   
 
Technical regulations not at all 
restrictive 
somewhat 
restrictive 
restrictive very 
restrictive 
prohibitive 
 1 2 3 4 5 
57.1 Antidumping duties      
57.2 Countervailing 
duties 
     
57.3 Other measures 
affecting price 
     
 
 
 
End of Interview 
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Appendix 5
Background information on inward
FDI in Georgia
Source: UNCTAD
Appendix 5 Table 1. FDI inflows to Georgia and other countries, in USD million, 1997-2005
Countries 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
   Economies in transition:  
Asia 3 107 3 013 2 497 1 895 3 550 4 501 6 103 8 818 4 296 
     Armenia 52 232 135 125 88 144 157 217 220 
     Azerbaijan 1 115 1 023 510 130 227 1 393 3 285 3 556 1 680 
     Georgia 243 265 83 135 133 167 340 499 450 
     Kazakhstan 1 321 1 151 1 472 1 283 2 835 2 590 2 092 4 113 1 738 
     Kyrgyzstan 83 109 44 -2 5 5 46 175 47 
     Tajikistan 18 30 7 24 9 36 14 272 54 
     Turkmenistan 108 62 125 126 170 100 100 -15 62 
     Uzbekistan 167 140 121 75 83 65 70 1 45 
   Economies in transition:  
Europe 8 994 7 639 7 974 7 167 7 978 8 410 18 089 30 760 35 383 
     Albania 48 45 41 143 207 135 178 332 260 
     Belarus 352 203 444 119 96 247 172 164 305 
     Bosnia and Herzegovina 1 67 177 146 119 265 381 606 298 
     Bulgaria 505 537 819 1 002 813 905 2 097 3 443 2 223 
     Croatia 538 935 1 464 1 085 1 338 1 213 2 133 1 262 1 695 
     Macedonia, TFYR 30 128 33 175 442 78 95 157 100 
     Moldova, Republic of 79 76 38 127 102 133 78 154 225 
     Romania 1 215 2 031 1 041 1 037 1 157 1 144 2 213 6 517 6 388 
     Russian Federation 4 865 2 761 3 309 2 714 2 748 3 461 7 958 15 444 14 600 
     Serbia and Montenegro 740 113 112 25 165 137 1 360 966 1 481 
     Ukraine 623 743 496 595 792 693 1 424 1 715 7 808 
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Source: UNCTAD
Appendix 5 Table 2. FDI stock per capita in Georgia and other countries, in USD, 1997-2005
Countries 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
   Economies in transition:  
Asia 131 173 207 244 292 352 433 554 619 
     Armenia 43 119 164 205 235 285 337 332 406 
     Azerbaijan 262 385 446 459 484 651 1 045 1 468 1 661 
     Georgia 50 106 125 155 185 223 300 414 519 
     Kazakhstan 346 426 529 674 866 1 036 1 172 1 478 1 654 
     Kyrgyzstan 58 80 88 90 88 95 96 131 100 
     Tajikistan 13 18 18 22 23 29 31 72 80 
     Turkmenistan 146 158 184 210 244 262 280 272 281 
     Uzbekistan 15 21 26 28 31 33 36 35 36 
   Economies in transition:  
Europe 41 53 69 200 296 389 547 701 813 
     Albania 109 124 138 184 251 294 349 453 533 
     Belarus 50 70 114 130 140 165 192 209 243 
     Bosnia and Herzegovina 2 21 68 105 134 201 298 453 528 
     Bulgaria 129 196 298 282 347 469 796 1 183 1 184 
     Croatia 462 422 566 782 959 1 523 2 274 2 776 2 750 
     Macedonia, TFYR 101 165 181 268 454 600 801 877 924 
     Moldova, Republic of 43 57 74 106 131 167 190 232 291 
     Romania 105 198 246 293 347 356 558 945 1 101 
     Russian Federation 7 3 5 218 360 485 665 815 920 
     Serbia and Montenegro 101 112 123 125 141 154 283 376 517 
     Ukraine 41 56 66 79 99 123 159 203 367 
Source: UNCTAD
Appendix 5 Table 3. FDI inflows in percent of domestic investment in Georgia and other
countries, 1997-2005
Countries 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
   Economies in transition:  
Asia 24.4 24.2 21.5 17.8 29.1 34.1 37.0 39.0 14.9 
     Armenia 19.5 75.7 44.6 35.4 23.4 28.8 24.4 26.9 16.2 
     Azerbaijan 76.1 64.8 39.0 10.7 17.4 65.5 85.4 71.0 29.3 
     Georgia 37.4 28.7 11.3 17.4 15.2 20.1 32.3 33.6 24.0 
     Kazakhstan 36.7 33.1 53.9 40.5 53.9 43.8 29.4 38.0 11.8 
     Kyrgyzstan 37.9 51.7 22.6 -1.0 1.9 1.8 17.4 54.4 12.4 
     Tajikistan 11.1 16.9 3.7 28.9 9.7 27.5 7.9 151.4 23.7 
     Turkmenistan 9.8 4.8 8.2 8.6 11.8 8.0 7.7 -1.2 3.6 
     Uzbekistan 3.2 3.1 2.6 2.3 3.2 3.0 3.3 0.0 1.6 
   Economies in transition:  
Europe 8.4 10.1 14.5 10.2 9.0 8.6 14.2 18.0 16.4 
     Albania 7.9 6.5 3.9 9.8 10.9 6.3 5.9 9.2 6.6 
     Belarus 9.9 5.1 13.9 4.5 3.4 7.7 3.8 2.6 4.0 
     Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.1 5.1 18.9 15.2 13.4 24.1 27.0 34.1 16.3 
     Bulgaria 44.4 32.4 41.8 50.6 32.8 31.8 54.3 68.2 36.2 
     Croatia 11.0 18.5 31.5 27.0 30.2 21.6 26.9 13.3 16.1 
     Macedonia, TFYR 4.7 20.5 5.4 30.0 86.5 12.4 12.2 16.4 9.7 
     Moldova, Republic of 20.5 20.2 17.5 63.7 41.1 48.9 21.3 28.0 31.7 
     Romania 16.3 26.5 16.5 14.8 13.9 11.7 17.4 39.9 28.0 
     Russian Federation 6.6 6.3 11.7 6.2 4.7 5.6 10.0 14.3 10.5 
     Serbia and Montenegro 28.8 4.7 6.3 1.5 9.5 5.2 37.7 23.9 33.7 
     Ukraine 6.3 9.1 8.2 9.7 10.6 8.5 13.8 11.7 45.2 
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Source: World Bank (2007)
Appendix 5 Table 4. Selected indicators of trading across borders in Georgia and other
countries, 2007
Trading Across Borders  Country 
Documents 
for export 
(number) 
Costs of 
export 
procedures 
in USD 
Time for 
export 
(days) 
Documents 
for import 
(number) 
Costs of 
import 
procedures in 
USD 
Time 
for 
import 
(days) 
OECD AVERAGE 
(2007) 
4.5 905 9.8 5.0 986 10.4 
Georgia 8 1,105 12 7 1,105 14 
Armenia 7 1,165 30 8 1,335 24 
Moldova 6 1,425 32 7 1,545 35 
Russian Federation 8 2,050 36 13 2,050 36 
Ukraine 6 1,045 31 10 1,046 39 
Turkey 7 865 14 8 1,013 15 
Bulgaria 5 1,329 23 7 1,377 21 
Romania 5 1,075 12 6 1,075 13 
Regional economic integration is likely to affect the firm’s FDI decision. A
regionally integrated area may attract more inward FDI for various reasons such as
access to  a larger market, defensive investments by firms from non-member countries
to obtain similar treatment as firms within the area, and gains in economic efficiency. 
Dunning’s (1993) OLI (Ownership-Location-Internalisation) framework of
international production shows the role of location in the overall FDI decision of a
firm. According to Dunning, three factors need to be present for firms to engage in FDI:
ownership-specific advantages of property rights and intangible assets in multinational
enterprise (MNE); internalization incentive advantages, and the presence of locational
advantages in a host country. The interaction of the particular FDI motivations and the
location-specific advantages provided by a potential host country will thus prove
determinant as to where a firm will seek making the investment.
While the first and second are firm-specific determinants of FDI, the third is
location-specific and has a crucial influence on a host country’s inflows of FDI. If only
the first condition is met, firms will rely on exports, licensing or the sale of patents to
service a foreign market. In the presence of internalization incentives, e.g. protection
from supply disruptions and price hikes, lack of suitable licensee, and economies of
common governance FDI becomes the preferred mode of servicing foreign markets,
but only if location-specific advantages are present. Within the trinity of conditions for
FDI to occur, locational determinants are the only ones that host governments can
influence directly (UNCTAD, 1998). 
The locational determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) are an extensively
researched area of international business. While scholars have yet to reach a consensus
on the significant FDI determinants, a few key variables have been identified. Large
market size, strong market growth, abundant natural resources along with cultural and
distance proximity are attractive for FDI inflows (Aharoni 1966, Bass, McGregor and
Walters 1977, Grosse, Trevino 1996, Basu, Srinivasan 2002, Benassy-Quere, Fontagne,
Lahreche-Revil 2003, Blumentritt and Nigh 2002). Another widely cited FDI
determinant - labour cost – have not universally been found to be significant. While
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Appendix 6
The Model of FDI
Markusen, Zhang (1997), using general equilibrium simulation, showed that wage level
is important for small, scarce-labour country, Loree and Guisinger (1995), who studied
US investment in 48 countries, found wage rates to be insignificant.
Obviously, market size and labour costs are not the only important FDI
determinants; country political and economic risk and/or friendliness of overall
business environment are of great concern to foreign investors as well (Basu,
Srinivasan, 2002). A number of surveys, conducted among investors (Aharoni (1966),
Foster, Alkan (2003), Bass, McGregor and Walters, (1977)), have indicated that sound
and stable macroeconomic policy, a positive attitude to foreign investors and
supportive institutional environment are important for investment location decisions.
In particular, Blumentritt and Nigh (2002), revealed that favourable regulatory
practices would facilitate an integration of a subsidiary company into the host country
environment. 
Another important factor for FDI flows is the level of regional economic
cooperation in a particular location. In general it is found to have a positive impact on
FDI for several reasons. First, it expands the size of the local market, and therefore
makes the region more attractive to FDI. Second, regionalism can promote political
stability and permit countries to coordinate their policies Asiedu (2006). Giovanni
(2004) also finds the significance of RTAs for cross-border M&A flows. Jaumotte (2004)
concluded that market size of regional trade agreement (RTA) has positive impact on
the FDI inflow, but countries within the same RTA do not benefit to the same extent as
those ones from different RTAs. Countries with relatively higher education and
financial stability tend to attract a larger share of the FDI at the expense of other RTA
members. This conclusion supports the above mentioned findings on the importance of
the institutional environment and macroeconomic stability for foreign direct
investment. 
A related issue is the impact of a country’s engagement in international trade on
FDI. The OLI framework suggests that, as trade becomes concentrated in goods
produced by firms using knowledge-intensive assets, FDI will gradually substitute
trade. On the other hand, if a country is a recipient of largely efficiency-seeking FDI,
then it would stimulate flows of imports of intermediate products and exports of final
(or more completed products). Therefore, a country’s engagement in international
trade may have either substitutary or complementary impact on FDI. As a result,
exports/imports variables are rarely employed in FDI models. In those cases when they
were included, they have been reported to not have a significant impact on FDI (Bevan
and Estrin, 2000). Consequently, we decided not to include trade variables in our
analysis. 
Yet, instead we do employ an indicator of the openness of the economy in our
model. It has traditionally been measured as a ratio of exports plus imports to GDP.
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Kravis and Lipsey (1982) and Culem (1988) report it to have a significant positive effect
on FDI. The degree of a country’s openness can affect FDI in multiple ways (some of
them are similar to the trade effects). Lower import barriers discourage tariff-jumping
FDI but may stimulate vertical FDI by facilitating the imports of inputs and machinery.
Lower export barriers tend to stimulate vertical FDI by facilitating the re-export of
processed goods, and other (non-tariff-jumping) horizontal FDI by expanding the
effective market size and leading to an improved business climate and expectations of
better long-term economic growth. So, although it is based on trade data, it is less
influenced by imports vs. exports (substitution vs. complementarity) logic and on top to
the trade activity in a country, it also reflects the country’s general business climate.
Although the endogeneity problem – whether openness of the economy causes more
FDI or more FDI result in higher engagement in international trade – is in place in this
case; we cannot think of a good instrument which could have helped us to resolve this
issue, hence we assume that causality runs the former way. 
The scholars employed various methods - ranging from straightforward surveying
of foreign investors to robust econometric modelling - to explore FDI determinants.
Following recent developments in the field, we are employing a gravity model in this
analysis (Brainard 1997, Brenton 1998, Benassy-Quere, Fontagne, Lahreche-Revil,
2003 Benassy-Quere, Coupet, Mayer 2005). 
The gravity model, which was developed by Linnemann (1966), is widely used in the
analysis of bilateral trade. It was applied to the field of FDI analysis by Brainard (1997).
He succeeded in matching the company based logic of OLI with general equilibrium
trade models. According to OLI, multinational enterprises’ choices in serving foreign
markets are determined by the trade-off between incremental fixed costs of investing
and the costs of exporting. While many of these costs are determined by the traditional
factors which were discussed above - economies of scale, relative input costs, intangible
assets - the success of the gravity model in explaining bilateral trade flows points
strongly to the inclusion of distance variables in FDI equations. 
Distance acts as a proxy for transportation costs, or economic barriers to trade.
Another aspect of the distance is cultural proximity, which implies cultural and
language community. The closer the countries, the more common cultural aspects are
available, the easier to conduct business. The proximity is usually measured as a
distance between the capital city of the host country and investing country, or a
distance between a host country capital and Brussels. Most studies found positive
negative correlation between distance and FDI (Bevan and Estrin (2000), Smarzhynska
and Wei (2000, 2002), Resmini (2000), Johnson (2006)). However, Campos and
Kinoshita found positive relation for distance from Brussels for CIS countries, which
may indicate that the geographical proximity to the Western markets also play an
important role in attracting FDI. Interestingly, Tondel (2001) revealed a positive
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correlation between geographical position and progress in transition. He noted that the
most advanced countries in terms of transition are most often geographically closer to
Western Europe. 
In our study we estimate the following model (it is specified in logarithms):
lnFDIij = β0 + β1 borderij + β2 ln_dist ij + β3 ln_gdpi + β4 ln_gdpj + β5 ln_popi + β6
ln_popj + β7 ln_debtj + β8 TOj + β9 ln TIj + β10 ln gdp_capita j + β11 WTOj + β12 EUj
where:
lnFDIij - a natural logarithm of nominal (USD) FDI flows from country i to country
j, 
borderij - dummy variable, equals 1 if i and j have common border,
ln_dist ij - a natural logarithm of the distance between the capitals of country i and
country j,
ln_gdpi - a natural logarithm of the nominal (USD) GDP of countries i and j
respectively,
ln_popi - log population of countries i and j respectively,
ln_debtj - a natural logarithm of the external debt of country j as a percentage of GNI
of country j,
TOj - the ratio of sum of exports and imports of country j to GNI of country j,
ln TPIj - a natural logarithm of the EBRD Transition Progress Index of country j,
ln gdp_capitaj - a natural logarithm of nominal (USD) GDP per capita in country j,
WTOj - dummy, equals 1 if a country j (a recipient country) is a member of WTO,
and
EUj - dummy, equals 1 if a country j (a recipient country) have signed the
Europe Agreements
As a measure of market size, and consequently economic attractiveness of the
location, we use GDP of home and recipient countries. We also employ GDP per capita
as another measure of market attractiveness, i.e. purchasing power in the host country. 
We have faced a challenge of finding a suitable index of business environment
which will cover the countries in the sample plus Georgia and Armenia. After
comparing various indicators, it was found that the only suitable index is the EBRD
transition indicators which is available at the EBRD website. The EBRD assesses
progress in transition through a set of transition indicators. These have been used to
track reform developments in all countries of its operations since the beginning of
transition. Progress is measured against the standards of industrialised market
economies, while recognising that there is neither a “pure” market economy nor a
unique end-point for transition.
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The measurement scale for the indicators ranges from 1 to 4+ (i.e. 4.33), where 1
represents little or no change from a rigid centrally planned economy and 4+
represents the standards of an industrialised market economy. The reform scores
reflect the assessments of EBRD country economists using the criteria described in the
methodological notes.
Assessments are made in nine areas: Large scale privatisation, small scale
privatisation, governance and enterprise restructuring, price liberalisation, trade and
foreign exchange system, competition policy, banking reform and interest rate
liberalisation, securities markets and non-bank financial institutions, and
infrastructure. For purposes of our research we use an average index of all of the above
indicators apart from the infrastructure, we call it Transition Progress Index.
We also control for the level of indebtedness of the host economy, measured as a
ratio of the country’s external debt to GNI, which is another explanatory/control
variable employed in this study. Furthermore, we are analysing an impact of WTO
accession on FDI inflows through the inclusion of a dummy variable. Finally, we
directly control for the impact an EU membership has had on the FDI inflows in the
region by including a corresponding dummy variable. We were not able to gather data
on unit labour costs for a number of countries in the sample, so unfortunately, we did
not include a labour cost measure in our model.
The sample under consideration includes 31 OECD countries as source countries
and 10 transition countries as FDI destinations (Armenia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic,
Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Ukraine). The sample
covers years 1995-2003 that yields 819 observations in a panel under examination. 
We use random effects model to estimate our model. The Haussman specification
test does not reject random effects speciation at the 5% significance level. Table A1
reports the model’s estimates. In line with the previous research we report significant
effects of distance, GDP, population, progress in transition and indebtedness of the host
economy. The distance has a significantly negative effect on FDI flows and, hence,
supports the basic logic of the gravity model. Other traditional gravity model factors –
GDP of both home and host countries – have significant positive effects on FDI inflows
that confirms a hypothesis of the importance of host country’s market size for FDI.
In the earlier versions of the model, we have also considered the common language,
surfaces of the donor and recipient, and other variables, which appeared to be highly
insignificant. Hence, we decided to exclude them as this model is also to be used for
forecasting purposes (in this case it is better to have a model which consists of
statistically significant variables mostly).
The impact of the level of indebtedness is significantly negative, which is in line with a
conventional economic logic. The more indebted an economy is, the poorer perception of the
level of economic stability investors have, and, hence, the investment is less likely to happen. 
233
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND GEORGIA 
CASE Network Reports No. 79/2008
The EBRD transition indicator index has also been found to have a significantly
positive effect in our sample. It indicates that countries with more stable business
environment are significantly more attractive for foreign investors than less stable
countries. The WTO dummy came out insignificant in our analysis – probably WTO
membership itself does not affect FDI flows strongly.
Interestingly, the EU dummy did not turn out to be significant in our specification
(we have also tried a specification which included only the EU dummy without the
WTO one and received similar results). One of possible explanations for this lack of
significance is that our sample covers only the years after signing of the Europe
agreements, so there is no variation across time (only among countries: members and
non-members). Yet, in this case other variables (for example, GDP of countries-
recipients) may have stronger power in explaining differences in FDI inflows than the
EU association, hence, making the dummy insignificant.
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*** - significant at 1% level
**  - significant at 5% level
* - significant at 10% level
Appendix 6 Table 1. Estimates of the Gravity Model for FDI inflows into CEE
Independent Variables Dependent Variable 
Log (FDI) 
Border 
0.763 
(0.173) 
Log(Distance) 
-0.298 
(0.135) 
Log(GDP Source) 
1.449*** 
(0.000) 
Log(GDP Recipient) 
0.521** 
(0.023) 
Log (Population Source) 
-0.984*** 
(0.000) 
Log (Population Recipient)  
0.199 
(0.785) 
Log (Debt) 
-0.008** 
(0.045) 
Log(TPI) 
3.894*** 
(0.001) 
Trade Openness 
0.001 
(0.973) 
Log(GDP capita) 
0.196 
(0.873) 
WTO (Dummy) 
-0.402 
(0.836) 
EU (Dummy) 
0.436 
(0.815) 
Constant Term 
-40.238*** 
(0.000) 
R-Squared 0.301 
Number of observations 819 
Model structure
This model is based on the MRT - Multiregional Trade Model - by Harrison,
Rutherford and Tarr (HRT) used in their evaluation of the Single Market (HRT, 1994)67. 
Markets and prices
The following notational conventions are adopted:
i, j – indexes of goods
r, s – indexes of regions
f – primary factors
p – market price index, 1 in the benchmark
– benchmark value of quantity variable X. 
The following market prices are included in the model:
PCr – price index for final consumption in region r
PGr - price index for government provision in region r
PAir – price index for the Armington aggregate of good i in region r, inclusive of all
applicable tariffs, border costs and monopolistic markups
PYir - supply price (marginal cost) of good i from region r, excluding fixed costs
associated with the production of goods in industries subject to IRTS
PFir - price index for factor inputs in sector i, region r
PT - price index for transport services.
Summary of the equilibrium relationships
Final demand in each region arises from a representative agent, maximising a
Cobb-Douglas utility function subject to a budget constraint. Income is composed of
returns to primary factors and tax revenue directed to the consumer as a lump sum.
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67 Their code was obtained from Anders Hoffmann with the permission of Thomas Rutherford and our modelling
exercise uses large parts of this code. This model in turn is based on the code employed in their evaluation of
the Uruguay Round in HRT (1995, 1996a), which is available for public access on Harrison’s Web site.
Appendix 7
CGE Model Equations
x
Within each region, final and intermediate demands are composed of the same
Armington aggregate of domestic and imported varieties. The composite supply is a
nested CES function, where consumers first allocate their expenditures among
domestic and imported varieties and in the second level the consumers choose among
imported varieties. In the imperfect competition case firm varieties enter at the bottom
of the CES function. 
There is no distinction between goods produced for domestic market and for
exports. Goods are produced with the use of intermediate inputs and primary factors.
Primary factors are mobile across sectors, but not across regions. We assume a CES
function over primary factors and a Leontief production function for intermediate
inputs and factors of production composite. Exports are not differentiated by the
country of destination.
All distortions are represented as ad valorem price-wedges. They consists of factor
and intermediate input taxes in production, output tax, import tariffs, export subsidies,
taxes on government and private consumption. 
Equations
Markets
• Regional output
(1)
where Yir is output of good i in region r, Xirs is export of good i from region r to s and
if r=s,  Xirs represents domestic sales.
• Regional demand
(2)
where Air is total supply (production plus imports), Cir is total final consumption, aijr is
intermediate demand coefficient and Tir is demand for good i in transport costs.
• Value added
(3)
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where Vir is total sector i value added, a
V
ir is value added demand coefficient, fir is the
fixed cost per firm and Nir is the number of firms in IRTS sectors. 
• Primary factor markets
(4)
where     is the endowment of factor f in region r and aFfir is the price-responsive
demand coefficient for factor f in sector i. 
• Armington supply
(5)
where      is the benchmark supply,    is the value share of domestic supply,      is
benchmark exports of good i from region r to s,     is the benchmark value share of
region r exports in region s imports and ρDM and ρM are determined by Armington
elasticities of substitution σDM and σM:             .
• Value added supply
(6)
where      is benchmark value-added, αFfir is the benchmark value share of factor f,       is
the benchmark input coefficient and ρFir is determined by the elasticity of substitution. 
• Border/transport costs
(7)
where τ is the index of single commodity used for transport services and βjrs is the
transportation cost coefficient. 
• Welfare index
(8)
where      is benchmark final demand for good i in region r.
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Profit conditions
• Value added
(9)
where fFir is the ad valorem factor tax rate,         is the benchmark (tax-inclusive) price.
• Marginal cost
(10)
• Armington composite supply price
(11)
where 
(12)
and
(13)
and 
(14)
where       is the mark-up on marginal cost on sales of good i from a firm in region r in
region s, 
is the ad valorem tax rate which incorporates import tariffs and export subsidies,  
is the benchmark supply price for goods from domestic producers,           is the
benchmark supply price for imports. 
• Regional income 
Regional income is a sum of factor income, indirect taxes, taxes on intermediate
demand, factor tax revenue, public tax revenue, consumption tax revenue, export tax
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revenue and tariff revenue net of investment demand, public sector demand and net
capital outflows:
(15)
• Final demand
Public sector output consists of Cobb-Douglas aggregation of market commodities:
(16)
A representative agent determines demand in each region. He is endowed with
primary factors, tax revenue and exogenous capital flows from other regions. He
allocates his income to investment (exogenous), public demand (held constant in real
terms) and private demand. Private demand is determined by the maximisation of
Cobb-Douglas utility function:
(17)
Aggregate final demand is then determined by regional expenditures and the unit
price of aggregate commodities gross of tax:
(18)
where Er is regional expenditure, which equals income (Mr) net of investment and
public expenditures.
• Bilateral trade flows
There are two tax margins (import and export tax) and transport costs in the model.
Transport costs are proportional to trade. Transport costs are defined by a Cobb-
Douglas aggregate of international transport inputs supplied by different countries:
(19)
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Bilateral trade flows are determined by cost-minimising choice given the fob export
price of commodity from region r (PYir), the export tax rate (tir
X), and the import tariff
rate (tir
M), where the export tax applies on the fob price net of transport margins, while
the import tariff applies on a cif price.
• Free entry zero-profit condition for monopolistic firms
(20)
Monopolistic competition
• Goods are distinguished by firm, by region and area of origin (domestic or imported). 
• Demands arise from a nested CES function with a supply from firms in a single
region at the lowest level of the CES aggregate. At the next level, the firms compete
with supplies from other regions from the same area and at the top level consumers
choose between goods from different areas. Demand for final composite arises from
a Cobb-Douglas utility function.
• Producers compete in quantities based on a Cournot model with fixed conjectural
variations. Markups over marginal costs are based on the profit maximisation. There
is free entry, so profits in equilibrium are zero. Markup covers the fixed costs, which
are fixed at the firm level and as the markup revenue in a region changes, so does
the number of firms.
• The model does not incorporate gains from variety, only the rationalisation gains. A
reduction in tariffs leads to loss of the market share by domestic firms. Domestic
producers reduce the markup on marginal costs, some domestic firms exit, the
remaining firms slide down their average cost curves and output per firm increases. 
Algebraic relations
The equilibrium conditions for each market where there are IRTS are estimated
separately. The following notation is adopted:
X – Aggregate demand
Yk – Supply from are k
Sr – Supply from region r
qfr – Supply from firm f in region r
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P – Price index for aggregate demand
Pk- Price index for supply from area k
wr – Price index for supply from region r
πfr – Sales price for supply from firm f in region r.
CES aggregators are used to create the composite goods:
(21)
(22)
(23)
The associated price indices:
(24)
(25)
(26)
and associated demand functions:
(27)
(28) for k = kr
(29)
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Behaviour of firms
The profit of firm f in region r selling into a given market is as follows:
(30)
where C is total cost. First order conditions for profit maximisation may be written as
follows:
(31)
in which cfr is the marginal cost of supply and mfr is a markup over marginal cost (on
gross basis):
(32)
where efr is the perceived elasticity of demand. The expression for the elasticity of
demand arises from the nested CES structure of demand and depends on the assumed
reaction of other producers.
The perceived elasticity of demand
Derivation of the perceived elasticity of demand begins with the inverse demand
function:
(33)
Then compute the derivative:
(34)
Here, HRT develop further derivations with the simplifying assumption of unitary
conjectural variations (Cournot conjectures). The non-unitary conjectures are
introduced to reconcile the estimates of the economies of scale in production with the
estimates of elasticities of substitution in demand.  Under Cournot conjectures:
(35)
and the term         is computed using the chain rule the second time:
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Substituting (34) and (35) into (33) we get:
(37)
Then using (32):
(38)
make the substitution to obtain:
(39) 
Applying the same steps at the next level we get an analogous expression:
(40)
Applying the same operations again at the highest level of the CES, given that the
demand elasticity for the aggregate X is unity, we get:
(41)
When equations (39)-(41) are assembled, we obtain an expression for the optimal
Cournot markup as follows:
(42)
where the share of supply from region r in the supply from area k is denoted as:
(43) for k = kr
and the supply from area k in total supply of a given good is denoted as:
(44)
In our model we assumed that products of different firms are imperfect substitutes
in demand. The elasticity of demand depends on the country of origin. There are three
243
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND GEORGIA 
CASE Network Reports No. 79/2008
 
fr
r
r
r
fr
r
q
S
S
w
q
w
∂
∂
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
 
r
r
fr
r
r
fr
fr
r
r
fr
frfr
frfr
S
w
1
q
S
w
q
1
q
S
S
q11
q
q
∂
∂ε
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
+ε⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
ε
+
ε
−=
π∂
π∂
r
fr
fr
r
wq
S πε
=⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
1
rr
frfr
r
r
r
r
rr
frfr
fr Sw
q
w
S
S
w
Sw
q
e
ππ
εε ∂
∂
++−=
111
kk
rr
k
k
k
k
kk
rr
rr
rr
Yp
Sw
p
Y
Y
p
Yp
Sw
wS
Sw
∂
∂
++−=
∂
∂
ηη
11
PX
Yp
PX
Yp
pY
Yp kkkk
kk
kk ++−=
∂
∂
σσ
11
fr
Y
rk
X
k
fr
Y
fk
fr
fr NNN
m
θθ
σ
θ
ησεηε
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛ −+⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
−+⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
−+=
1
1
111111
kk
rrY
rk Yp
Sw
=θ
PX
Yp kkX
k =θ
elasticities of substitution associated with the nested CES structure of demand
discussed earlier:
σDD – elasticity of substitution between varieties supplied by domestic firms 
σMM – elasticity of substitution between products of any two foreign suppliers 
σDM – elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported varieties.
We assume that domestically produced goods are more easily substitutable among
themselves than products from different countries and that σDD is 15. In addition
imported goods are assumed to be better substitutes to each other than domestic and
foreign goods. The elasticity of substitution between imported goods is assumed to be
equal 10, while domestic and foreign goods enter the demand function with the
elasticity of substitution of 5. These are priors used by HRT (1994).
Further let θrs denote the market share of region r firms in region s. Then we can
apply equation (42) to represent the optimal markup applied in the domestic market
and in the foreign markets:
(45)
These are the optimal markups expressed as a function of elasticities of substitution,
market shares, θMr the market share of imports in region r and Nr the number of firms
producing in the region r. 
Estimation of the equilibrium conditions in ITRS sectors
This paper adopts a simplification by estimating the equilibrium conditions in IRTS
industries for each commodity in separate models. Demands and supplies for all
regions are included into these calculations, but factor markets, intersectoral linkages
and income effects are ignored. In each iteration of the IRTS models, regional demand
functions are calibrated to the most recently estimated equilibrium conditions of the
general model including all GE interactions. Given constant marginal cost, sales prices
are determined by the markup equations.  
The single commodity models are estimated as follows. The markup pricing
equation (45) is specified given the benchmark elasticities of substitution, the number
of firms and an adjustment parameter, the conjectural variation. First, the values of
elasticities of substitution at all nests of the CES function, as well as the number of
firms and therefore their market shares are specified. Further, the value of production
at consumer prices at the benchmark combined with the estimates of the cost
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disadvantage ratio taken from the literature (see next section), determine the value of
fixed costs, i.e. FCir = CDRirYCir. Given the assumption of zero profits, the markup over
marginal cost generates the revenue equal exactly to the fixed costs. This condition
appears as a constraint in a non-linear least squares calculation. 
The objective in the estimation is to calibrate the conjectural variations, which are
as close as possible to one. This value is consistent with pure Cournot-Nash behaviour
of players. Therefore a sequence of least-squares problems is solved for each
commodity subject to IRTS. These problems look for implicit numbers of firms (Nr)
which results in calibrated conjectural variations (CVrs) which are as close as possible
to 1. This looks as follows:
(46) 
subject to:
(47)
where MG is a markup equation, i.e. equation (45), and Xirs represents sales of i from
region r in region s. 
Therefore, the conjectural variations act as parameters, which allow reconciliation
of the benchmark data with the estimates of the elasticities of substitution and CDR
taken from the literature. In the majority of sectors calibrated conjectural variations
are less than 1 indicating a more competitive behaviour than predicted by the Cournot
model. 
For sectors, where the assumption of free entry and zero profits in the benchmark,
given values of the elasticity of substitution, is consistent with pure Cournot-Nash type
behaviour, a second calculation is performed. It looks for the number of firms as small
as possible subject to the consistency of conjectures with the Cournot behaviour. 
(48)
subject to:
(49)
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Calibrating the Cost Disadvantage Ratio
The calibration of the cost disadvantage ratio (CDR) in IRTS sectors is based on the
assumption of constant marginal cost. The total cost function is specified as follows:
(50)
where f is fixed cost, m is constant marginal cost and q denotes the output level.
Average cost function looks as follows:
(51)
Assuming zero profits, the benchmark data provides the information on the industry
total costs (C) and output (Q). If there are n representative firms in the initial
equilibrium (1), then nc1=N and nq1=Q. Since
(52)
given the initial data we know already one point on the firm’s average cost curve i.e.:
(53)
Given the assumption about a specific form of the average cost curve, we only need
a second point in order to calibrate it. This is done with the use of information from the
engineering estimates on changes in average cost accompanying changes in output. 
If output declines to αq1 then average costs increase to               where 0<α<1, β>1 is 
required for the marginal cost to be nonnegative. Given the values of α and β we know
the second point on the industry average cost curve:
(54)
By multiplying the nominators and denominators of the last two equations we
obtain equations on the total output and costs of industry, on which the data is
available. The equations look as follows:
(55) and 
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(56)
where F is the fixed cost. Further, we solve the above equations for the fixed and
marginal costs:
(57) and
(58) .
Since the cost disadvantage ratio is defined as f/c, which by symmetry equals F/C,
we know that at the initial equilibrium:
(59) .
We obtain the values of α and β from Pratten (1988). Since there are no estimates
of the economies of scale for all 3-digit sectors according to NACE classification or the
available estimates are not representative, we used a rage of estimated parameters for
each GTAP sector. Based on those parameters we constructed three values of the CDRs
i.e. low and high using the lowest and highest values of the estimated parameters and
middle one. The only exception was the food sector, where the economies of scale differ
a lot by products, so we used the average production values to aggregate the CDRs for
more finely defined sectors. The allocation of Pratten’s NACE sectors to GTAP sectors,
as well as the final CDRs are presented in Appendix 7 Table 1 below.
Following others such as Gasiorek, Smith and Venables (1992) or HRT (1994), we
are assuming that in the benchmark equilibrium firms operate at the minimum
efficient scale (MES). Firms should have difficulties competing, if they were operating
at less than MES. Given the function form used in this study, at the MES further
expansion of output reduces average cost of production. If initially output is lower than
the MES, then the CDRs will be underestimated since the slope of the average cost
curve increases in absolute value for decreases in output. In all scenarios we assume
low values for the economies of scale. 
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Notes:
Column 1: Parameter β in the CDR calibration equation.
Column 2: Data corresponds to (β-1)*100 where β is from the CDR calibration equation.
Column 3-5: CDR estimated according to equation 58.
Column 6: Numbers indicated in this column correspond to NACE sectors from Table 5.1 in Pratten (1988).
The assumptions on CDRs in services follow assumptions of HRT (1994). 
Appendix 7 Table 1. Data on CDR values
Implied CDR  Share of MES 
(á) 
Percentage 
Cost Increase at 
Output Level 
(â) 
Low Medium High 
Source of Data  
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Agriculture 0 0 0 0 0  
Raw materials 0 0 0 0 0  
Food, Beverages, 
Tobacco 
  7.7 11.1 14.5  
   Meat 0.67 5    412 
   Dairy 0.67 2    413 
   Other food 0.67 4 to 9    414, 416, 420, 422 
   Tobacco 0.33 2.2 to 5    429 
Textiles 0.5 2 to 10 2 6 10 43 
Clothing 0 0 0 0 0  
Leather 0.33 1.5 0.7 0.7 0.7 451 
Wood 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0  
Paper 0.5 8 to 13 8.0 10.5 13.0 471, 472 
Petroleum 0.33 4 2.0 2.0 2.0 14 
Chemicals 0.33 4 to 19 2.0 5.7 9.4 25 
Non-metallic 
Minerals 
0.33 10 to 26 4.9 8.9 12.8 241-247 
Iron, steel 0.33 10 to 11 4.9 5.2 5.4 22 
Other metals 0.33 11 to 11 4.9 5.2 5.4 224 
Metal prod. 0.33 10 4.9 4.9 4.9 221 
Motor vehicles 0.5 11 11.0 11.0 11.0 35 
Other transport 0.5 8 to 20 8.0 14.0 20.0 361 
Electronics 0.33 5 to 15 2.5 4.9 7.4 23, 344, 345 
Machinery n.e.c. 0.5 3 to 10 3.0 6.5 10.0 321, 322, 326 
Manufacturing 
n.e.c. 
0.5 3 to 5 3 4 5 HRT 
Utilities  0 0 0 0 0  
Trade 0 0 0 0 0  
Transport 0.5 2 2 2 2 HRT 
Financial services 0.5 5 5 5 5 HRT 
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Appendix 8 Table 1. Welfare, GDP and factor returns results of the CGE simulations – net effects
compared to the 2006 scenario
  2006 SIMPLE 
FTA 
SIMPLE 
FTA BIS 
FTA+ DEEP FTA DEEP 
FTA+ 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Welfare  (% change ) 
Russia  -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Ukraine  -0.023 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 
Armenia  -0.019 -0.002 -0.004 0.002 0.013 0.021 
Azerbaijan  -0.111 -0.001 -0.002 0.004 0.002 0.014 
Georgia  0.973 0.112 0.034 2.379 1.763 6.536 
Turkey  0.027 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.005 0.009 
EU27 0.007 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.000 
CIS -0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 
ROW  0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
GDP (% change) 
Russia  0.057 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Ukraine  0.151 -0.002 -0.003 0.000 -0.003 -0.002 
Armenia  0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.025 
Azerbaijan  -0.082 -0.008 -0.008 0.000 0.000 0.007 
Georgia  1.056 0.114 0.045 2.386 1.766 6.539 
Turkey  0.12 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.009 
EU27 0.037 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.000 
CIS -0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.003 
ROW  0.018 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Wages of unskilled workers (% change) 
Russia  -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Ukraine  -0.024 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 
Armenia  -0.039 -0.004 -0.008 -0.002 0.028 0.033 
Azerbaijan  -0.109 -0.001 -0.003 0.003 0.015 0.023 
Georgia  2.857 0.176 0.162 2.252 2.024 6.412 
Turkey  0.021 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.002 0.006 
EU27 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
CIS -0.004 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.004 
ROW  0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Wages of skilled workers (% change) 
Russia  -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Ukraine  -0.014 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 
Armenia  -0.009 -0.001 -0.001 0.010 -0.004 0.019 
Azerbaijan  -0.105 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.020 0.027 
Georgia  2.369 0.173 0.160 2.076 1.576 5.548 
Turkey  0.018 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.005 
EU27 0.005 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
CIS 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ROW  0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
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Appendix 8 Table 1. Welfare, GDP and factor returns results of the CGE simulations – net effects
compared to the 2006 scenario
  2006 SIMPLE 
FTA 
SIMPLE 
FTA BIS 
FTA+ DEEP FTA DEEP 
FTA+ 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Total exports (% change) 
Russia  0 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.003 
Ukraine  -0.038 0.077 -0.003 0.001 -0.008 -0.003 
Armenia  0.002 -0.010 -0.001 0.078 -0.177 -0.003 
Azerbaijan  -0.538 -0.004 -0.006 0.017 0.038 0.083 
Georgia  14.669 1.335 1.990 4.517 6.419 13.299 
Turkey  0.026 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.011 
EU27 0.011 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.003 
CIS 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.004 -0.001 0.006 
ROW  0.009 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.002 0.000 
Total imports (% change) 
Russia  -0.006 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002 
Ukraine  -0.049 0.092 0.005 0.008 0.003 0.008 
Armenia  -0.099 0.031 0.037 0.085 -0.080 0.026 
Azerbaijan  -0.597 0.376 0.375 0.384 0.372 0.389 
Georgia  5.635 -1.097 -0.809 0.748 3.319 7.369 
Turkey  0.052 -0.003 -0.003 0.001 0.001 0.010 
EU27 0.011 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.003 
CIS -0.004 0.001 0.002 0.004 -0.002 0.004 
ROW  0.013 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.000 
Capital stock (% change) 
Georgia  0.871 0.111 -0.036 5.833 2.835 15.096 
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Appendix 8 Table 2. Output changes - Georgia (%)
 2006 Simple 
FTA 
Simple 
FTA BIS 
FTA+ DEEP 
FTA 
DEEP 
FTA+ 
Grains, fruits, vegetables, crops 
nec 
0.4 0.3 0.3 6.8 4.3  
Livestock -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 3.9 1.5 6.3 
Forestry -2.9 -2.8 -2.6 -0.8 -3.6 2.1 
Fishing 0 -0.1 -0.1 4.8 1 8.9 
Coal 3.5 3.6 3.8 3.8 0.3 7.5 
Oil 9.5 9.7 9.8 18 5.4 32.2 
Gas 2.7 2.8 5.6 8 2.8 13.6 
Mining and quarrying 12.2 14 14.4 25 17.3 33.4 
Food products, beverages and 
tobacco 
-4.9 -6 -7.1 -4.4 -6.8 -2 
Textiles and textile goods 1.4 2.7 3.3 56.6 56.3 56.7 
Leather products -21.4 -21.4 -21.1 -19.5 -21.2 -17.8 
Wood products 1.8 4.1 4.4 18.1 13.6 22.8 
Paper products, publishing -20.2 -20.8 -20.7 -19.9 -23.3 -16.3 
Petroleum, coal products -2 -2.1 -1.8 3.6 -4.9 0 
Chemical, rubber, plastic 
products 
0.9 2.7 2.8 15.9 12.2 19.8 
Mineral products nec -6.2 -8.1 -7.9 -4.8 -7.6 -1.8 
Metals and metal products 16.6 21.1 21.7 42.9 39.6 46.1 
Transport equipment -5.2 -4.8 -4.6 -3.4 -6.5 0 
Machinery and electronic 
equipment 
-16.4 -16.4 -16.2 -16.1 -18.4 -13.6 
Manufactures nec -20.4 -20.3 -20.1 -5.3 -10.5 0.4 
Electricity -0.2 -0.1 -0.3 3.4 0.7 6.4 
Gas manufacture, distribution 3.9 4 4 6.7 -1.2 15.7 
Water 0.3 0.3 0.2 4.7 1.9 7.8 
Construction 2.2 2.2 2.1 6.4 4 8.9 
Trade -0.5 -0.4 -0.5 4.4 1.3 7.8 
Transportation and Storage 
Services 
9.2 9.6 9.7 9.1 7.5 10.9 
Communications -0.7 -0.7 -0.8 2.2 -1.8 6.7 
Banking lending and insurance -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 2.4 -0.2 5.2 
Business services nec -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 5.6 1.4 10.3 
Other Communal, Social and 
Personal Services 
0.6 0.7 0.7 5 2 8.3 
Public administration, 
education, health care 
-0.3 -0.3 -0.3 1.9 0.5 3.5 
Investments 2.1 2.2 2.1 6.4 4 8.9 
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Appendix 8 Table 3. Price changes – Georgia (%)
 2006 Simple 
FTA 
Simple 
FTA BIS 
FTA+ DEEP 
FTA 
DEEP 
FTA+ 
Grains, fruits, vegetables, crops 
nec 
-1 -1 -1.1 -0.7 -0.5 -0.9 
Livestock -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 0.3 0.5 0 
Forestry -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 0.3 0.6 -0.1 
Fishing -0.8 -0.8 -0.9 -1.1 -0.2 -1.9 
Coal -0.9 -0.9 -0.9 -0.9 -0.8 -0.9 
Oil -0.9 -0.9 -0.9 -1.7 -0.5 -2.8 
Gas -0.7 -0.7 -0.1 -1.2 -0.5 -1.9 
Mining and quarrying -1.4 -1.8 -1.8 -2.6 -2 -3.1 
Food products, beverages and 
tobacco 
-2.6 -3.1 -3.5 -3.5 -3.4 -3.6 
Textiles and textile goods -10.9 -11 -11 -11.4 -11.4 -11.4 
Leather products -8.4 -8.4 -8.5 -8.3 -8.2 -8.3 
Wood products -10.4 -10.7 -10.7 -12.2 -12.2 -12.2 
Paper products, publishing -7.6 -7.8 -7.8 -9 -8.9 -9.2 
Petroleum, coal products -2.8 -2.9 -2.9 -3.3 -3.2 -3.3 
Chemical, rubber, plastic 
products 
-7.8 -7.9 -7.9 -8.4 -8.4 -8.5 
Mineral products nec -3.6 -4.3 -4.4 -4.8 -4.6 -4.9 
Metals and metal products -8.3 -8.4 -8.4 -8.8 -8.8 -8.9 
Transport equipment -4.2 -4.2 -4.2 -4 -3.9 -4.2 
Machinery and electronic 
equipment 
-4.1 -4 -4.1 -3.9 -3.9 -3.9 
Manufactures nec -7.9 -7.9 -7.9 -7.9 -7.8 -8.1 
Electricity -0.4 -0.3 -0.4 -0.1 0.4 -0.7 
Gas manufacture, distribution -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.6 0.1 -1.3 
Water -0.6 -0.6 -0.7 -0.9 -1.4 -1.7 
Construction -1.7 -1.8 -1.8 -2.3 0 -3.1 
Trade -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.6 0.4 -1.6 
Transportation and Storage 
Services 
-1 -1 -0.9 0 0 0 
Communications 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 1 -0.7 
Banking lending and insurance 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.8 1.3 0.4 
Business services nec -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -2.4 -0.2 -4.6 
Other Communal, Social and 
Personal Services 
-0.7 -0.7 -0.7 -1.5 -0.2 -2.7 
Public administration, education, 
health care 
-0.5 -0.5 -0.6 1.4 0.7 2 
Investments -3 -3 -3 -3.1 -2.7 -3.4 
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Appendix 8 Table 4. Change in exports to all regions - Georgia (%).
 2006 Simple 
FTA 
Simple 
FTA BIS 
FTA+ DEEP 
FTA 
DEEP 
FTA+ 
Grains, fruits, vegetables, crops 
nec 
11 12 12 32 29 34 
Livestock 4 4 5 3 1 5 
Forestry 1 1 2 -1 -3 2 
Fishing 11 12 12 20 11 30 
Coal 3 3 3 3 1 5 
Oil 9 10 10 17 6 30 
Gas 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mining and quarrying 15 17 18 28 20 37 
Food products, beverages and 
tobacco 
41 46 47 70 68 72 
Textiles and textile goods 90 95 97 250 252 248 
Leather products 51 51 52 65 64 67 
Wood products 33 37 37 62 57 67 
Paper products, publishing 20 20 21 36 30 42 
Petroleum, coal products 3 3 3 9 0 19 
Chemical, rubber, plastic 
products 
40 44 44 73 69 78 
Mineral products nec 25 29 30 51 48 53 
Metals and metal products 31 36 37 62 59 65 
Transport equipment 14 15 16 13 10 16 
Machinery and electronic 
equipment 
17 19 20 39 38 40 
Manufactures nec 64 65 66 185 167 204 
Electricity 3 3 4 1 -4 7 
Gas manufacture, distribution 4 4 4 6 -1 14 
Water 6 6 7 8 0 17 
Construction 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Trade 2 2 3 5 -4 15 
Transportation and Storage 
Services 
9 9 10 0 0 6 
Communications -2 -2 -1 -2 -9 -3 
Banking lending and insurance -2 -2 -1 -7 -11 53 
Business services nec 3 3 3 25 2 28 
Other Communal, Social and 
Personal Services 
6 7 7 14 2 -16 
Public administration, 
education, health care 
5 5 6 -11 -6 0 
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Appendix 8 Table 5. Change in imports from all regions- Georgia (%)
 2006 Simple 
FTA 
Simple 
FTA BIS 
FTA+ DEEP 
FTA 
DEEP 
FTA+ 
Grains, fruits, vegetables, crops 
nec 
10 10 10 11 25 28 
Livestock 5 5 6 5 13 15 
Forestry 10 10 10 11 26 29 
Fishing 11 11 10 9 18 14 
Coal -2 -2 -1 5 -3 11 
Oil 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Gas 0 0 0 2 1 6 
Mining and quarrying 16 16 16 17 33 36 
Food products, beverages and 
tobacco 
13 13 15 15 21 25 
Textiles and textile goods -1 -1 -1 1 2 6 
Leather products 8 8 7 10 11 15 
Wood products -8 -8 -8 -6 -6 -1 
Paper products, publishing 9 9 9 11 13 16 
Petroleum, coal products -3 -3 -3 -1 -3  
Chemical, rubber, plastic 
products 
-1 -1 -1 1 1 5 
Mineral products nec 20 20 19 22 30 34 
Metals and metal products 1 1 1 3 2 7 
Transport equipment 7 7 7 9 10 13 
Machinery and electronic 
equipment 
2 2 2 4 4 9 
Manufactures nec 5 5 5 6 7 10 
Electricity -2 -2 -2 -2 3 2 
Gas manufacture, distribution 1 1 1 4 1 7 
Water -3 -3 -3 -4 1 -2 
Construction 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Trade -2 -2 -2 -4 3 -1 
Transportation and Storage 
Services 
3 3 3 6 23 29 
Communications 0 0 0 0 8 7 
Banking lending and insurance 1 1 -2 1 27 27 
Business services nec -2 -2 -3 -9 0 -14 
Other Communal, Social and 
Personal Services 
-3 -3 -3 -6 0 -6 
Public administration, education, 
health care 
-3 -3 -3 1 4 13 
 
